A tax-sharing agreement between the County of San Benito and the City of Hollister requires the city to pay the county a fixed fee (Additional Amount) per residential unit constructed on land annexed into the city from the county during the period covered by that agreement. Plaintiff’s predecessor entered into an annexation agreement with the city, agreeing to comply with “all applicable provisions” of that tax sharing agreement. When the plaintiff purchased the annexed land and sought to develop it into subdivisions, the city informed the plaintiff that it was liable for the Additional Amount fees. Plaintiff paid the fees under protest, then sued, seeking a declaration of its rights and duties under various written instruments.The court of appeal affirmed a defense judgment. Plaintiff is contractually liable for the Additional Amount by the terms of the annexation agreement. Any challenge to the calculation of the Additional Amount is beyond the scope of a declaratory relief action and time-barred. The court rejected the plaintiff’s arguments that neither the annexation agreement nor the tax sharing agreement requires the plaintiff to pay the Additional Amount and that the fees violate the Mitigation Fee Act and federal constitutional constraints on development fees as monetary exactions. View "BMC Promise Way, LLC v. County of San Benito" on Justia Law

Hodroj, a passenger, was injured in a single-car collision. The driver was insured by CSAA. Hodroj’s attorney wrote to CSAA offering that Hodroj would settle his claim for bodily injuries in exchange for payment of the driver’s insurance policy limits if CSAA provided a sworn declaration confirming the policy limits and delivered a check within 21 days of acceptance. CSAA could condition its acceptance on Hodroj signing a written release of all bodily injury claims. CSAA responded: “We accept ... [and] are tendering ... $100,000[.]” Enclosed were a sworn declaration attesting to the policy limits, and a written release to be signed by Hodroj. A $100,000 check was sent separately, providing that it should not be presented until the release was signed. Hodroj reneged on the settlement because the release included a release of claims for property damage. Hodroj sued the driver. CSAA sued Hodroj for breach of contract.The court of appeal affirmed judgment in favor of CSAA. An objective observer would conclude that the parties intended to settle Hodroj’s bodily injury claim for the policy limits. That the proposed document contained terms materially different from what had been agreed did not change the binding effect of the agreement. Hodroj was not obliged to sign a release that was inconsistent with what he agreed to but a proposal that does not accurately reflect the agreement does not unwind the entire deal. Hodroj breached the contract by filing suit. View "CSAA Insurance Exchange v. Hodroj" on Justia Law

The South Carolina Supreme Court accepted three certified questions from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. In this case, Curt Hall sued UBS Financial Services Inc. (UBS) (his former employer) and Mary Reid, a former co-worker, seeking to hold them liable for damages he allegedly incurred when he was fired by UBS. Hall's claims against UBS included one for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and Hall's claims against Reid included one for tortious interference with contractual relations. The certified questions concerned the nature of Hall's at-will employment and the viability of Hall's causes of action in the employment at-will context. Hall did not concede he was an at-will employee. The Supreme Court held: (1) terminable at-will employment relationships are contractual in nature as a matter of law; (2a) the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing may arise in the context of terminable-at-will employment relationships; (2b) an employer's termination of an at-will employee does not constitute a breach of the relationship such that it may give rise to a claim by the former employee against the employer for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (3) potential liability extends to third parties who are not fellow employees of the terminated employee. The Court issued a caveat to its responses to the district court's questions: it answered all questions under the assumption that no exception to the doctrine of at-will employment applies "our answers to these questions do not alter the established rule that, as long as an exception does not apply, an employer may terminate an at-will employee for any reason without incurring liability." View "Hall v. UBS Financial Services Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Roy Kumar appealed a trial court’s order imposing terminating and monetary sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7. The trial court found that Kumar’s first amended complaint was factually and legally frivolous because no reasonable attorney could conclude that Kumar’s claims against defendants Kelly Ramsey and Elizabeth Pintar were timely under the applicable four-year limitations period. On appeal, Kumar argued the trial court abused its discretion by granting the motion. Finding ample legal and factual support to conclude that Kumar made a plausible, nonfrivolous argument that the applicable statute of limitations did not bar his suit, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order. View "Kumar v. Ramsey" on Justia Law

Tioga Properties, LLC, appealed a district court judgment awarding Wades Welding, LLC $27,669.90 relating to Wades Welding’s lawsuit for enforcement of construction liens and unjust enrichment. Janice Ellsworth owned Tioga Properties. Tioga Properties owned a restaurant and home (referred to by the parties as a “mobile home”) adjacent to each other in Tioga, North Dakota. Susan Gordon leased the restaurant from Tioga Properties. Gordon delivered rent payments to John Ellsworth Jr., Janice Ellsworth’s son. Gordon resided in the home but had no written lease for that property. In late 2016 and early 2017, Gordon hired Wades Welding to repair the home and restaurant. Wades Welding performed $19,840 of work on the home and $2,500 of work on the restaurant. Wades Welding delivered the invoices for its work to Ellsworth Jr. A day after Wades Welding completed its work at the home, Ellsworth evicted Gordon from the restaurant and home. Ellsworth Jr. supervised the eviction and Gordon left both properties within 48 hours. In December 2017, Wades Welding recorded construction liens against the properties after Tioga Properties failed to pay for the repairs. Tioga Properties sold the restaurant in July 2019. In September 2019, Tioga Properties served on Wades Welding a demand to enforce the home lien. In October 2019, Wades Welding sued Tioga Properties for breach of contract, foreclosure of the construction liens and unjust enrichment. Tioga Properties denied the allegations, claiming it did not authorize Wades Welding's work on the properties. The district court found Wades Welding's construction liens on both properties were valid, and ordered foreclosure of the home lien. The court found the lien on the restaurant was unenforceable due to a service error, but nonetheless awarded Wades Welding the amount of the repaired under the doctrine of unjust enrichment. Finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed judgment in favor of Wades Welding. View "Wades Welding v. Tioga Properties" on Justia Law

When a city delegates the administration of ambulance services to the surrounding county, which then assumes control, the city may not later attempt to resume administration of those services. In this case, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court properly applied this holding when it denied a motion for a preliminary injunction sought by the City to prohibit the County and Ventura County Emergency Medical Services Agency (VCEMSA) from contracting for ambulance services within City limits.The court concluded that there was no error in the trial court's determination that the City lacks the authority to contract for its own ambulance services under the EMS Act. In this case, the City contends it meets the criteria for Health and Safety Code section 1797.201 grandfathering because it contracted for ambulance services on June 1, 1980, as one of the signatories to the joint powers agreement (JPA). However, on that date the JPA empowered the County, not the City, to contract for and administer ambulance services. Therefore, this fact is fatal to the City's contention. Furthermore, even if the court assumed that the provision of ambulance services is a police power, the exercise of that power is subject to constitutional constraints. The court explained that the City ceased contracting for, providing, and administering ambulance services when it signed the JPA in 1971. Regardless of whether it withdraws from the JPA, it may not now resume providing those services absent the County's consent. View "City of Oxnard v. County of Ventura" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the judgment of the judgment of the district court granting a motion to compel arbitration filed by the personal representative of the estate of a famous American artist (Estate), dismissing an art publisher's (Publisher) motion for a preliminary injunction as moot, and eventually dismissing the case, holding that the district court erred.At issue was an agreement between the Estate and Publisher. Publisher asserted that the parties' original contract, which included an agreement to arbitration, was terminated and supplanted by a superseding contract that did not contain an arbitration provision. In question was whether the arbitrability of the parties' dispute about the newer contract's enforceability and impact on the earlier agreement to arbitrate should be decided by the court or by arbitrators. The district court concluded that the gateway question of arbitrability was for the arbitrators. The First Circuit reversed, holding that it is the court, and not the arbitrators, that must resolve the disagreement in this case. View "McKenzie v. Brannan" on Justia Law

Elation sued Fenn and Shi for breach of a nondisclosure agreement (NDA) (against Shi only) entered during the course of Shi’s prior employment with Elation and breach of a confidential settlement agreement and mutual release (Settlement Agreement) (against both defendants) entered to resolve a prior action between the parties. The defendants filed a cross-complaint, alleging Elation’s breach of the Settlement Agreement. Elation admitted to liability and stipulated to $10,000 in liquidated damages on the cross-claim for breach of the Settlement Agreement. A jury found that Shi had breached the NDA and harmed Elation, and awarded Elation $10,000 in damages. The court entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), denied Elation’s motion for injunctive relief, and awarded defendants $700,000 in attorney fees.The court of appeal reversed in part. The trial court should have awarded Elation nominal damages on its NDA claim, as defendants’ JNOV motion did not challenge the jury’s finding that Shi breached the NDA. Substantial evidence did not support the jury’s finding in Elation’s favor on its Settlement Agreement claim. The court affirmed the order granting JNOV as to Elation’s Settlement Agreement claim and vacated the award of attorney fees. View "Elation Systems, Inc. v. Fenn Bridge LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that Allstate breached the terms of their insurance policies by not using either the "Cost Approach" or "Comparable Sales Approach" to determine the "Actual Cash Value" (ACV) of their automobiles. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of Allstate's motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), concluding that neither the contract nor Texas state law requires either the Cost or the Comparable Sales Approach. View "Cody v. Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Co." on Justia Law

After a woman died and left a will disposing of several parcels of real property and two trailers, her ex-husband — with whom she had maintained a romantic relationship following divorce — filed claims against the woman’s estate for those properties. He contended the decedent had transferred title to three of those parcels to him. He also claimed that they made an agreement about two parcels and the trailer that sat on them: he and the decedent would live there until their deaths, after which the properties would be sold and the proceeds given solely to their great-grandchild. The estate rejected these claims, invoking the statute of frauds. The superior court ruled in favor of the estate, finding that the ex-husband failed to prove the existence of contracts satisfying the statute of frauds and rejecting his alternative claims for restitution. On appeal, the ex-husband argued the proceedings were marred by procedural flaws, and challenged the superior court’s decision on the merits. After review, the Alaska Supreme Court largely affirmed the superior court’s decision, but remanded for further proceedings on the restitution claim involving one parcel. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Alexina Rodman" on Justia Law