The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court concluding that an arbitration provision was void under Nev. Rev. Stat. 597.995 for failure to include a specific authorization, holding that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq., preempted section 597.955, and therefore, the district court's decision was erroneous.Nev. Rev. Stat. 597.995 requires any agreement that includes an arbitration provision to include a specific authorization for that provision. The district court concluded that the arbitration provision at issue in this case was void for failure to include a specific authorization, as required by section 597.995. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because section 597.995 singles out and disfavors arbitration provisions by imposing stricter requirements on them than on other contract provisions, the FAA preempts the statute in cases involving interstate commerce; and (2) the district court erred by concluding that section 597.995 voided the parties' arbitration agreement. View "Maide, LLC v. Dileo" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's order reflecting a jury verdict awarding almost $6 million in compensatory damages, jointly and severally, against KBX, Inc. and three KBX individuals (collectively, Appellants) and other defendants and reversed the court's award of attorney's fees, holding that the court erred in part.In this case involving certain farmers' dispute with KBX, a grain exporter and merchandiser, and the KBX individuals over a series of written contracts for the purchase of rice, the circuit court entered a judgment reflecting the jury's award of compensatory damages against Appellants and other defendants. The court assessed attorney's fees and costs against Appellants as a sanction for alleged spoliation of evidence. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) without any evidence of deceit in the form of a false representation by KBX or the KBX individuals to the farmers, substantial evidence did not support the jury's verdict on deceit; (2) substantial evidence did not support the jury's verdict on constructive fraud or the farmers' conspiracy claim; (3) the circuit court erred as a matter of law in denying Appellants' motion for directed verdict on the farmers' unjust enrichment claim; and (4) remand was required on the issue of attorney's fees for recalculation of an award consistent with this opinion. View "KBX, Inc. v. Zero Grade Farms" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing order of the circuit court denying the motion of Legacy Health Services, Inc. Cambridge Place Group, LLC, and Cambridge Place Properties, LLC (collectively, Defendants) to dismiss or stay this lawsuit and compel arbitration of the medical malpractice claims brought by Christopher Jackson, as guardian for Christine Jackson, his mother, holding the court of appeals erred.At issue was whether Christopher possessed the authority, as his mother's guardian, to enter a voluntary arbitration agreement that was not a prerequisite to the provision of care or services to his ward. The circuit court concluded that Christopher did not have that authority. The court of appeals reversed, holding that a guardian's authority to enter into contracts generally is within the ambit of what is reasonably inferable from the relevant statutes. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) guardians have the authority to bind their wards to contracts that limit or deprive the civil rights of their wards only to the extent necessary to provide needed care and services to the ward; and (2) because the arbitration agreement was not necessary to provide care or services to Christine, Christopher lacked the authority to enter into the arbitration agreement. View "Jackson v. Legacy Health Services, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2012, the Moores sued, claiming that Equitrans breached the parties’ right-of-way agreement and trespassed on the Moores’ land by laying two pipeline segments outside of the area specified in their agreement. A jury found that Equitrans either trespassed on the Moores’ West Virginia property or violated the right-of-way agreement but made no findings as to the proper remedy. While the Moores initially sought equitable relief (ejectment), a subsequent condemnation judgment in favor of Equitrans ultimately precluded such relief. Following several appeals, the district court allowed the Moores to pursue damages for breach-of-contract and trespass but denied leave to add a claim for intentional trespass. Later, the district court barred any claim for breach-of-contract damages. After excluding much of the Moores’ evidence of trespass damages, the court sua sponte entered judgment in favor of Equitrans.The Fourth Circuit vacated in part. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend, in making its motion in limine rulings, or in entering judgment in favor of Equitrans on contract damages. The court rejected a contention that the proper measure of trespass damages includes a portion of Equitrans’s profits. Because the Moores lacked sufficient notice that they needed to come forward with all evidence of trespass damages, the court vacated the portion of the judgment concerning trespass damages for procedural error and remanded. View "Moore v. Equitrans, L.P." on Justia Law

Labor unions and the West Virginia Pipe Trades Health and Welfare Fund, sued Nitro Construction under the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. 185, after Nitro made several tardy payments to the Fund. Nitro had paid its required contribution before the suit was filed; the suit sought $77,373.95 in liquidated damages, plus interest and attorneys’ fees, as provided for by the collection procedures.The district court granted Nitro summary judgment, holding that the liquidated damages constituted penalties and were therefore unrecoverable. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Although ERISA allows punitive liquidated damages, federal common law prohibits punitive damages for breach of contract. The federal common law to be applied in LMRA Section 301 cases is ordinarily the general law of contracts. The court noted that the Fund sought almost $80,000 in liquidated damages, even though its actual damages (lost interest) are readily ascertainable and were only $3,952. Nitro’s late payments did not result in any claim being denied. Nitro never agreed to the liquidated damages provisions; the Fund unilaterally created its delinquent employer procedures under its governing document. The district court did not err by finding these liquidated damages provisions to be punitive and declining to enforce them. View "Plumbers & Pipefitters Local 625 v. Nitro Construction Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Boor and Edson owned Brava, which had intellectual property and technical knowledge related to composite roofing. Wildhawk inquired about purchasing Brava. Boor proposed “an exclusive license for manufacturing current roofing products” with “a right of first refusal on all new product [d]evelopments.” The parties executed asset purchase and license agreements. Wildhawk paid $4 million and obtained an automatic license to “any Improvements” to the technology, whether patentable or not. Before executing the agreement, the parties removed a “New Product” section as required by Wildhawk’s lender but entered into an oral agreement for a right of first refusal. Wildhawk retained Boor and Edson as paid consultants, with non-compete agreements.Boor notified Wildhawk: “As per our handshake agreement” we offer you first right of refusal “on the below products.” The parties entered into a confidentiality and nondisclosure agreement regarding “possible R&D ‘new or enhanced product’ agreements.” They negotiated but failed to reach an agreement. Boor and Edson formed Paragon while Boor was still employed by Wildhawk. Paragon began producing the new products.Wildhawk sued. The district court granted Wildhawk a preliminary injunction, prohibiting Paragon from manufacturing or selling composite roofing. The Eighth Circuit vacated. Wildhawk had a fair chance of proving the defendants violated the agreement but the district court erred in rejecting an equitable estoppel defense. Wildhawk waited until Paragon had been producing the products for 10 months before making its claim, failing to show either reasonable diligence or harm that cannot be compensated by damages. View "Wildhawk Investments, LLC v. Brava I.P., LLC" on Justia Law

Before the South Carolina Supreme Court in this appeal was the trial court's dismissal of respondent Jeanne Beverly's claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. Beverly brought claims against Grand Strand Regional Medical Center, LLC. Blue Cross Blue Shield of South Carolina (BCBS) was a mutual insurance company that provided health insurance coverage through Member Benefits Contracts to its Members. Beverly was a BCBS Member. In 2005, Grand Strand and BCBS entered into a contract labeled "Institutional Agreement." The Institutional Agreement contained a clause entitled, "No Third Party Beneficiaries," that provided in part, "This Agreement is not intended to, and shall not be construed to, make any person or entity a third party beneficiary." Grand Strand and BCBS were the only parties to the Institutional Agreement. Grand Strand made two promises to BCBS in the Institutional Agreement that Beverly contended created rights she and other BCBS Members could enforce. Beverly was injured in an automobile accident on September 6, 2012. The same day, she received health care services at a Grand Strand emergency room for injuries she sustained in the accident. Beverly alleges she provided Grand Strand proof of her status as a BCBS Member. Some time later, Beverly received a bill directly from Grand Strand for $8,000. Beverly alleges the $8,000 bill does not reflect the discount Grand Strand promised in the Institutional Agreement. Beverly filed this action on behalf of herself and a class of similarly situated BCBS Members who were denied the right to have their bills processed and discounted according to Grand Strand's promises in the Institutional Agreement. The primary question before the Supreme Court was whether the "no beneficiary" clause in the Institutional Agreement overrode an otherwise manifestly clear purpose of the contracting parties to provide a direct benefit to non-contracting parties. "Mindful that we are reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal order—not an order on the merits—we hold it does not." The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' opinion reversing the 12(b)(6) dismissal. The case was remanded to circuit court for discovery and trial. View "Beverly v. Grand Strand Regional Medical Center, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2011, during the course and scope of his employment as a shipwright, Claimant Robert Arlet slipped and fell on an icy sidewalk on the premises of his employer, Flagship Niagara League (Employer), sustaining injuries. Employer had obtained a Commercial Hull Policy from Acadia Insurance Company (Insurer). Through the policy, Insurer provided coverage for damages caused by the Brig Niagara and for Jones Act protection and indemnity coverage for the “seventeen (17) crewmembers” of the Brig Niagara. Employer had also at some point obtained workers’ compensation insurance from the State Workers’ Insurance Fund (SWIF). Insurer paid benefits to Claimant under its Commercial Hull Policy’s “maintenance and cure” provision. Claimant filed for workers’ compensation benefits. Employer asserted Claimant’s remedy was exclusively governed by the Jones Act. Employer also filed to join SWIF as an additional insurer in the event the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA) was deemed to supply the applicable exclusive remedy, and Employer was found to be liable thereunder. SWIF denied coverage, alleging Employer’s policy was lapsed at the time of Claimant’s injury. Thereafter, Claimant filed an Uninsured Employers Guaranty Fund (UEGF) claim petition, asserting the fund’s liability in the event he prevailed, and Employer was deemed uncovered by SWIF and failed to pay. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) found that as a land-based employee, Claimant did not meet the definition of seaman under the Jones Act and was, therefore, entitled to pursue his workers’ compensation claim. The issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review was one of first impression: the right of an insurer to subrogation under the WCA. The Supreme Court concluded Insurer’s Commercial Hull Policy did not cover Claimant, because Claimant was not a “seaman” or crew member. The WCA’s exclusive remedy applied, but Insurer was seeking subrogation for payment it made on a loss it did not cover. "[T]he 'no-coverage exception' to the general equitable rule precluding an insurer from pursuing subrogation against its insured comports with the purposes and public policy supporting the rule and hereby adopt it as the law of this Commonwealth. ... any equitable rule precluding an insurer from seeking subrogation against its insured is best tempered by the exception adopted herein today." View "Arlet v. WCAB (L&I)" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court enforcing a settlement agreement between Petitioner and his insurer, Respondent Allstate Company, and denying Petitioner's request to amend his complaint or allow the filing of a new complaint, holding that there was no error.The settlement agreement at issue related to water damages occurring at Petitioner's real property. Petitioner failed to execute and return the agreement, after which Respondent filed a motion to enforce settlement. Petitioner then filed a motion to amend the complaint or, in the alternative, allow the filing of a new complaint. The circuit court granted Respondent's motion to enforce the settlement and denied Petitioner's motion to amend. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err as to any of its challenged rulings. View "Donahue v. Mammoth Restoration & Cleaning" on Justia Law

Charter created a program for resolving and ultimately arbitrating employment-related disputes. Individuals who received an offer from Charter were required to complete a web-based onboarding process as a condition of employment; they were prompted to review and accept various policies and agreements, including the arbitration agreement and the program guidelines. After agreeing to submit all employment-related disputes with Charter to arbitration, Ramirez was hired in July 2019. In May 2020, Charter terminated Ramirez. Ramirez filed suit, alleging multiple claims under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and wrongful discharge. Charter moved to compel arbitration and sought attorney fees in connection with its motion pursuant to the arbitration agreement.The court denied Charter’s motion to compel arbitration, finding that the requirement was substantively unconscionable because it shortened the statute of limitations for FEHA claims, failed to restrict attorney fee recovery to only frivolous or bad faith FEHA claims (contrary to FEHA), and impermissibly provided for an interim fee award for a party successfully compelling arbitration. The court of appeal affirmed. The arbitration agreement was a contract of adhesion, which establishes a minimal degree of procedural unconscionability, and the agreement contained a high degree of substantive unconscionability. The arbitration agreement is permeated by unconscionability and cannot be enforced. View "Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc." on Justia Law