Mobile Infirmary Association d/b/a Mobile Infirmary Medical Center ("Mobile Infirmary") appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Quest Diagnostics Clinical Laboratories, Inc. ("Quest"). Quest and Mobile Infirmary entered into a Laboratory Management Agreement ("the LMA"), in which Quest agreed to manage Mobile Infirmary's onsite clinical laboratory facilities and to provide clinical testing services used by Mobile Infirmary's medical staff to diagnose and treat patients. The LMA also contained indemnity provisions. In 2015, James Ward went to Mobile Infirmary's emergency room after suffering weakness, dizziness, loss of fluids, a mild cough, and severe body aches. Ward was eventually diagnosed with diabetic ketoacidosis. When his condition did not improve, Ward was moved into the intensive-care unit, at which point his doctor ordered him to undergo glucose finger-sticks and a basic metabolic panel every four hours to help monitor his serum glucose, kidney function, acid/base status, and electrolytes. According to Mobile Infirmary, those basic metabolic panels were supposed to be performed by Quest, but they were allegedly canceled by one of Quest's employees. At some point, he suffered an "anoxic brain injury" and later died "as a result of multisystem organ failure secondary to severe sepsis and septic shock." Ingrid Mia Ward ("Mia"), Ward's wife and the personal representative of his estate, commenced a wrongful-death action against Mobile Infirmary and other defendants responsible for Ward's treatment and care. Quest was not named as a party to Mia's action. Mobile Infirmary informed Quest of the action and, as the case progressed, apprised Quest of the status of the proceedings, including its negotiations with Mia for potential settlement of the lawsuit. Mia and Mobile Infirmary ultimately settled the wrongful-death action. Before Mia's claims against Mobile Infirmary were dismissed pursuant to a joint motion of those parties, Mobile Infirmary filed a third-party complaint against Quest in which it sought contractual and equitable indemnity related to its defense and settlement of Mia's action. Quest filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court granted in part by dismissing Mobile Infirmary's equitable- indemnity claim. The Alabama Supreme Court found that nowhere in the LMA did the parties expressly agree or clearly provide a formula that, in the event there was a claim that arises out of partial liability or concurrent acts by both parties, indemnification will be required for a proportionate share. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "Mobile Infirmary Association v. Quest Diagnostics Clinical Laboratories, Inc." on Justia Law

The assignees of two Medicare Advantage Organizations seek reimbursements from insurance companies that they allege qualify as primary payers of beneficiaries’ medical expenses. The insurance companies argued, and the district courts agreed, that the assignees’ claims are barred because both assignees failed to satisfy a procedural requirement: a contractual claims-filing deadline in one case and a statutory requirement of a pre-suit demand in the other. The assignees contend that the procedural requirements are preempted by the Medicare Secondary Payer Act.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court reasoned that Florida’s pre-suit demand requirement does not meet this relatively high bar. The statutory notice requirement and corresponding 30-day cure period are procedural requirements that may result in a brief delay. But the Florida law does not prevent or meaningfully impede the reimbursement of Medicare Advantage Organizations that Congress sought to facilitate. So, the provision does not create an unconstitutional obstacle to the purposes or operation of the Medicare Secondary Payer Act. View "MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC v. United Automobile Insurance Company" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court granting partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff in this foreclosure case, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.Defendant signed a promissory note in favor of Plaintiff that consolidated numerous debts that Defendant owed Plaintiff in connection with various joint real estate projects. The promissory note was secured by a mortgage on certain real estate. When Defendant did not respond to a notice of default and demand for payment under the promissory note Plaintiff brought this action seeking injunctive relief and damages. Eventually, a second hearing justice granted Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on counts one and two of her six-count complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the second hearing justice properly applied the law of the case doctrine when granting Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment. View "DiMaggio v. Tucker" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court affirming the judgment of the trial court denying a property owner's motion for summary judgment in the underlying dispute with a contractor arising from a construction project, holding that the trial court correctly denied Defendants' motion for summary judgment.Defendants hired Plaintiff to serve as a general contractor to renovate a home located on Greenwich property. Defendants later terminated their contractual relationship with Plaintiff. Plaintiff served mechanics' liens on Defendants and brought this action to foreclose its lien. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the trial court was required to give res judicata effect to the findings of the trial court in a prior action between Plaintiff and one of Defendants' subcontractors. The trial court denied Defendants' summary judgment motion, determine that all four required elements of res judicata were not met. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court did not err in holding that the presumption of privity that the Supreme Court held to apply in Girolametti v. Michael Horton Associates, Inc., 208 A.3d 1223 (Conn. 2019), did not apply to the instant case. View "Strazza Building & Construction, Inc. v. Harris" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court denying Borrower's motion for a new trial in this appeal arising from a suit on a note and guaranty after Borrower allegedly defaulted on a loan, holding that Borrower was entitled to a new trial.After Lender moved for summary judgment and set the motion for an oral hearing the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in the hearing the hearing being canceled. The trial court unilaterally moved the hearing to its submission docket and, without further notice, went forward on the date of the originally scheduled oral hearing. The trial court granted summary judgment to Lender. Borrower moved for a new trial on the grounds that he had not received an amended notice of the hearing date after the original hearing was canceled. The trial court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Borrower did not receive the adequate notice as required the trial court erred in granting summary judgment and in refusing to grant a new trial upon Borrower's request. View "Price v. Series 1 - Virage Master LP" on Justia Law

Stryker develops, manufactures, and sells spinal implants and products, and employed Abbas from 2013-2022. Abbas purports to have worked exclusively within Stryker’s finance department. Stryker claims that Abbas worked in various roles, including in sales. Abbas regularly used significant amounts of Stryker’s confidential information and trade secrets and supported Stryker’s litigation efforts. Abbas entered into confidentiality, noncompetition, and nonsolicitation agreements with Stryker when he commenced his employment, and again in 2022.Alphatec competes with Stryker. Stryker alleges that Alphatec "systematically misappropriate[s] Stryker[’s] confidential information, trade secrets, customer goodwill, and talent” and is litigating against Alphatec and former Stryker employees in several cases. Abbas resigned from Stryker to take a newly-developed position with Alphatec, a sales role, “crafted to protect Stryker’s confidential information.” Stryker sued for breach of contract and misappropriation of trade secrets.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the issuance of a preliminary injunction on behalf of Stryker. The district court crafted the injunction to preserve the status quo, reserving the possibility that other prospective jobs might be consistent with Abbas's employment agreement. It is not an impermissible industry-wide ban. Stryker is likely to succeed on the merits, based on findings that Abbas worked for Stryker in both sales and finance; Abbas had unfettered access to Stryker’s most sensitive sales and financial information, Stryker’s sales representatives, and key customer decision-makers; the Alphatec position involved work similar to the work Abbas performed for Stryker; and Abbas supported Stryker on litigation matters. View "Stryker Employment Co., LLC v. Abbas" on Justia Law

Travis Iversen appealed a judgment entered in favor of appellee, Larson Latham Huettl, LLP (hereafter “LLH”), and an order denying relief from judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 59(j). Iversen was an attorney employed by LLH from February 2019 until July 2021. Iversen asserts that Tyrone Turner, an LLH partner, told Iversen that “you can only do the work that we give you.” After Iversen terminated his employment with LLH, LLH requested that Iversen refund it $35,772.63 for overpayment. LLH argues that Iversen owes this debt to LLH because he had not been credited with sufficient billable hours to justify the compensation he received under the employment agreement. Iversen refused to pay the deficiency, and LLH then sued Iversen. The district court issued a memorandum opinion granting LLH’s motion for summary judgment. Before judgment was entered, Iversen filed a “motion for reconsideration” citing N.D.R.Civ.P. 59(j). The district court denied Iversen’s motion. Iverson argued that several genuine issues of material fact remained, precluding summary judgment. He also argued the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion under Rule 59(j). Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and the order denying Iversen’s Rule 59(j) motion. View "Larson Latham Huettl, LLP v. Iversen" on Justia Law

L&C Expedition, LLC (“L&C”) appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of International Fidelity Insurance Company (“IFIC”) and denying summary judgment to L&C. L&C contracted with Unlimited Excavating (“Unlimited”) to perform work on a residential development project. Unlimited completed its work in November 2016 and received final payment in July 2017. In 2019, L&C learned of major problems in the construction and notified Unlimited it needed to make repairs. Unlimited did not make the repairs and L&C demanded IFIC arrange for performance of Unlimited’s work per the terms of the performance bond. IFIC refused to arrange for performance. L&C subsequently initiated suit against IFIC in May 2020 arguing L&C is entitled to recover $393,000 under the terms of the performance bond. The performance bond provided the following: “[a]ny suit under this bond must be[] [i]nstituted before the expiration of two years from the date on which final payment under the subcontract falls due.” The parties do not dispute the district court’s finding L&C initiated its action outside the limitation period provided within the terms of the bond. L&C argued the district court erred in finding a contractual limitation on the period to assert a claim was enforceable, erred in failing to apply N.D.C.C. § 9-08-05 to preclude modification of the applicable statute of limitations, and erred in interpreting N.D.C.C. § 22-03-03 as providing an exception to the prohibition against modifying the applicable statute of limitations. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "L&C Expedition, et al. v. Swenson, Hagen and Co., et al." on Justia Law

G Companies Management, LLC, a California limited liability company, appealed an order staying its cross-complaint against LREP Arizona, LLC, based on the forum selection clause in a loan agreement between the parties. The cross-complaint alleged multiple causes of action, all based on the assertion that the interest rates charged in the loan agreement were usurious under California law, and G Companies contended the trial court erred because a forum selection clause was not enforceable if doing so would deprive a California resident of the protections of the state's fundamental public policy. The trial court held enforcement of the selection clause was appropriate because: (1) the loan transaction was substantially related to the chosen forum (Arizona); and (2) California had a complicated relationship with usury and allowed unlimited interest rates to be charged in numerous circumstances. LREP contended the court’s decision was correct because the “many exceptions” to California’s interest rate limits demonstrate that the prohibition of usury “is not a fundamental policy” in California. To this, the Court of Appeal disagreed and therefore reversed. "By virtue of its inclusion in article XV, section 1, of our Constitution, and because it cannot be waived, we find that California’s usury law does reflect a significant public policy. It prohibits money lending at rates higher than specified, even while recognizing numerous exceptions to those rate limitations. The complexity of the law does not imply a lack of commitment to the policy. To the contrary, such a fine-tuned approach suggests that significant effort has gone into determining the circumstances under which interest rate limitations are necessary for the protection of Californians." View "G Companies Management, LLC v. LREP Arizona LLC" on Justia Law

In 2018, Albert Mione (“Mione”) was in a collision while operating his motorcycle. Mione’s motorcycle was insured by Progressive Insurance, under a policy that did not include UM/UIM coverage. Albert and his wife Lisa jointly owned a car, which was insured by Erie Insurance on a single-vehicle policy that included UM/UIM coverage with stacking. Mione’s adult daughter Angela also lived in the couple’s home, and she too owned a car, which Erie insured on a single-vehicle policy (“Angela’s policy”). Both of the Erie policies contained household vehicle exclusions barring UM/UIM coverage for injuries sustained while operating a household vehicle not listed on the policy under which benefits are sought. The courts below held that the exclusions were valid and enforceable, citing the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 1998 decision in Eichelman v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 711 A.2d 1006 (Pa. 1998). The Miones, contended that the lower courts erred in applying Eichelman, arguing that the Supreme Court sub silentio overruled that decision in Gallagher v. GEICO Indemnity Co., 201 A.3d 131 (Pa. 2019). The Supreme Court rejected the Miones’ argument, and affirmed. View "Erie Insurance Exch. v. Mione, et al." on Justia Law