The Supreme Court held that in order to compel arbitration against a union employee, the claim must have been clearly and unmistakably waived in arbitration provisions in the collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) governing the parties, and to be clear and unmistakeable the claim must be included either by statute or specific cause of action in the arbitration provisions of the CBA.Plaintiff brought this intentional employer tort action under Ohio Rev. Code 2745.01. The trial court denied Defendant's ensuing motion to stay the proceedings and to compel arbitration. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that because the parties' CBA made no mention of Ohio Rev. Code 2745.01 or intentional torts, Plaintiff had not waived his right to pursue such a claim in a judicial forum. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Plaintiff's claim for an intentional tort was not mentioned in the CBA, Defendants did not clearly and unmistakably agree to prohibit resolution of the claim in court. View "Sinley v. Safety Controls Technology, Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the ruling of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of a general liability insurer (Insurer) and dismissing Insured's complaint seeking full coverage of its defense when the company faced a trade secrets lawsuit brought by a competitor, holding that Insured was entitled to summary judgment on the duty to defend.Insured brought this action after Insurer only paid for some of Insured's defense. Insurer counterclaimed seeking a declaratory judgment of absolution from policy coverage. During discovery, both parties moved to compel responses. A magistrate judge denied Insurer's request for information exchanged between Insured and its lawyers and then stayed discovery until it ruled on cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court then granted summary judgment for Insurer. The First Circuit held (1) the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Insurer, and Insured was entitled to summary judgment on the duty to defend; (2) on the reasonableness of the defense, the case is remanded for further proceedings; and (3) the district court correctly granted Insurer's motion to compel. View "Lionbridge Technologies, LLC v. Valley Forge Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered a certified question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concerning the amount of motor vehicle liability insurance coverage, if any, that Insurer must provide to a non-employee permissive user of an insured vehicle who caused personal injuries to an employee of a named insured under a standard commercial automobile insurance policy.The Fourth Circuit determined that an employee indemnification and employer's liability's exclusion in the policy at issue was void and unenforceable under the mandatory omnibus requirements of W. Va. Code 33-6-31(a). The Supreme Court answered (1) the void exclusion may not be invoked to limit the amount of coverage available to a permissive user of a vehicle insured by Insurer's policy; and (2) Insurer must afford the permissive user with liability coverage up to the full limits available under the insurance policy for any proven damages. View "Ball v. United Financial Casualty Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Allstate Vehicle and Property Insurance Company's decision to rescind an insurance policy purchased for a derelict house Homeowner intended to remodel, holding that questions of material fact existed precluding summary judgment.After a fire occurred, damaging the house and some of its contents, Allstate announced that it was rescinding the homeowners' insurance policy issued to Homeowner, asserting that Homeowner digitally signed an application in which he falsely answered a request as to whether he would occupy the house within thirty days. Plaintiffs, including Homeowner, sued Allstate for breach of contract and unfair trade practices. The circuit court granted Allstate's motion to rescind the policy, concluding that there was no factual dispute that Homeowner had made false statements on his insurance application. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that questions of material fact existed regarding whether Plaintiff's answer to Allstate's thirty-day-occupancy question was false and whether the question was material to Allstate's issuance of the policy. View "McDowell v. Allstate Vehicle & Property Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Pakistan International Airlines (“PIA”) failed to transport the body of N.B. to Pakistan for burial due to a miscommunication by employees of Swissport USA, PIA’s cargo loading agent. N.B.’s family members sued PIA and Swissport in New York state court under state law; PIA removed the action to the district court. Following cross-motions for summary judgment and an evidentiary hearing, the district court held that Plaintiffs’ claims are preempted by the Montreal Convention and dismissed the suit. On appeal, Plaintiffs argued that the Montreal Convention, which preempts state-law claims arising from delayed cargo, does not apply because human remains are not “cargo” for purposes of the Montreal Convention and because their particular claims are not for “delay.”   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that human remains are cargo for purposes of the Montreal Convention; and on the facts found by the district court, the claims arise from delay. The claims are therefore preempted by the Montreal Convention. The court further wrote that it was Plaintiffs who cut off PIA’s ability to perform under the terms of the waybill. That decision was understandable given the need to bury N.B. quickly, and it cannot be doubted that Plaintiffs found themselves in a hard situation. But their only recourse against PIA and Swissport was a claim under the Montreal Convention, a claim which they have consistently declined to assert. View "Badar v. Swissport USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff a commercial-real-estate broker specializing in tenant representation sued Newmark Southern Region, LLC (Newmark)—an international real-estate brokerage and advisory firm. Plaintiff alleged eight state law claims, including breach of contract. Newmark counterclaimed, alleging only breach of contract. The district court dismissed each of Plaintiff’s claims at the pleading stage, with the exception of his claim for breach of contract. Following the district court’s judgment against him, Plaintiff appealed. In addition to seeking reversal of the judgment, Plaintiff also sought reversal of the district court’s dismissal of his various claims at the pleading stage.   The Fourth Circuit concluded that this situation warrants vacatur and remand for dismissal without prejudice. The court reasoned that first Plaintiff and Newmark agree that complete diversity did not exist between them at the time of filing, given the North Carolina citizenship of at least one limited partner of Newmark Holdings, L.P.—a great-grandparent entity to Newmark. Consequently, the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims against Newmark pre-consolidation, so it lacked the power to consolidate the lawsuits in the first place.   Further, neither side of this dispute lacked the means to ascertain Newmark’s citizenship at any point. Whether mutual contentment with the federal forum or genuine obliviousness brought the parties to this unfortunate juncture, the court explained that it will not condone the exercise of jurisdiction where it did not truly exist. View "Timothy Capps v. Newmark Southern Region, LLC" on Justia Law

After Defendant’s Arkansas home burned to the ground, her insurer, Hiscox Dedicated Corporate Member Limited (a "capital provider" to an underwriting syndicate doing business within the Lloyd's of London insurance marketplace), declined to pay her for her loss and instead rescinded the insurance policy because she had made material misrepresentations in her insurance application. Hiscox then sued Defendant in federal court, seeking a declaratory judgment that it had properly rescinded the policy and had no obligation to Defendant. The district court agreed with Hiscox and granted it summary judgment.   The relevant question is whether Defendant "had a foreclosure, repossession, bankruptcy or filed for bankruptcy during the past five (5) years." Defendant maintains that the district court erred in concluding that the phrase "had a foreclosure" meant the initiation of foreclosure proceedings.   The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court agreed with Defendant that the question is ambiguous. Under Arkansas law, the court read the question in its "plain, ordinary, and popular sense," as "the common usage of terms should prevail". Further, the court wrote it sees no indication in any case that the parties meant to adopt Arkansas statutes as the standard to determine the meaning of the words in the application question. View "Hiscox Dedicated Corp Member v. Suzan Taylor" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Keene Auto Body, Inc. appealed a circuit court order that dismissed its complaint against defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. Keene Auto Body, acting as an assignee of Caleb Meagher, who insured his vehicle through State Farm, sued State Farm for breach of contract for failing to cover the full cost of repairs to the insured’s vehicle. State Farm moved to dismiss the suit on grounds that, because of an anti-assignment clause in the insured’s policy, the insured’s assignment of his breach of contract claim to Keene Auto Body was not valid, and that, even if it was, Keene Auto Body did not sufficiently state a claim for breach of contract. The trial court granted the motion. The New Hampshire Supreme Court found the anti-assignment clause at issue here was ambiguous, and construed it against the insurer. Therefore, the clause did not prohibit the insured from assigning his post-loss claim to Keene Auto Body. Given this holding, the Supreme Court determined Keene Auto Body's factual allegations were sufficient to survive State Farm's motion to dismiss. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Keene Auto Body, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court determining that J. Clancy, Inc. had performed under a contract for renovations of a Spearfish hotel and that Khan Comfort, LLC had breached the contract by failing timely to make payments, holding that there was no error.J. Clancy brought this action alleging claims for nonpayment under a series of implied-in-fact contracts. Following a trial, the circuit court awarded Khan a judgment against J. Clancy for overpayment. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the parties had entered into an express contract for the renovations. After a remand, the circuit court found that J. Clancy had fully performed under the terms of the contract and that Khan had breached the contract. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court's actions on remand were within the parameters of its decision-making authority; (2) the circuit court did not err in finding on remand that J. Clancy had fully performed; and (3) the record supported the court's findings of fact on damages. View "J. Clancy, Inc. v. Khan Comfort, LLC" on Justia Law

Ordahl LLC (“Ordahl”) appeals from a district court order granting Arlene Lykken, Bruce Lykken, Paul Lykken, and Sandra Teske’s (“the Lykkens”) motion for summary judgment and denying Ordahl’s motion for summary judgment. Ordahl and the Lykkens executed a purchase agreement for the sale of 12 acres of land and an easement on adjacent property to the north of the parcel. Under the terms of the purchase agreement, Ordahl was required to provide a $10,000 earnest money payment. After the purchase agreement was signed, the Lykkens anticipatorily breached the agreement. Ordahl brought suit seeking a declaratory judgment declaring that Ordahl’s relief was not limited to the return of its earnest money. Ordahl claimed it was not required to terminate the parties’ agreement and was entitled to enforce the terms of the agreement through the equitable doctrine of specific performance. The Lykkens counterclaimed seeking reformation of the purchase agreement. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in determining the purchase agreement required Ordahl to terminate the agreement and limited Ordahl to a recovery of its earnest money. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded this case for consideration of whether Ordahl should have prevailed on its equitable claim to enforce the terms of the parties’ agreement through specific performance and, if necessary, consider the Lykkens’s request for reformation of the agreement. View "Ordahl v. Lykken, et al." on Justia Law