North American issued two insurance policies for the life of J.C. On November 9, 2018, it issued a policy that named an irrevocable trust managed by the trustee as beneficiary. It issued a policy that named J.C.’s wife, as beneficiary. Each contained an essentially identical clause that excluded suicide from coverage under the policy. That clause read, “SUICIDE — If the Insured commits suicide, while sane or insane, within two years from the Policy Date, Our liability is limited to an amount equal to the total premiums paid.” In a motion for a judgment on the pleadings, the beneficiaries argued that “the entire lawsuit is predicated on [North American’s] erroneous position that the contract term ‘suicide’ is synonymous with the expression ‘suicide by cop,’ which is a term of art that actually refers to justifiable homicide.” The district court agreed that “[t]he plain meaning of the term ‘suicide’ encompasses the act of killing oneself—not the killing of a person by another” and granted the motion.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded finding that the ordinary meaning of “suicide” includes suicide-by-cop. The court explained that here, where the beneficiaries agree with the allegations in North American’s complaint due to the procedural posture of the case, no factual question exists. The ordinary meaning of “suicide” certainly covers J.C.’s specific behavior in pointing his gun at police officers to provoke them into shooting and killing him as part of his plan to end his own life. Thus, the district court erred in ruling to the contrary. View "North American Company for Life and Health Insurance v. Michelle Caldwell, et al" on Justia Law

In 2006, Price approached Marcone about using e-commerce in the appliance parts industry. Price and Marcone entered into a non-disclosure agreement while evaluating the concept, but no partnership resulted. Price then created PartScription. Both companies sell appliance replacement parts online. In 2017, Price restarted talks with Marcone. In 2018, Marcone’s CEO proposed that PartScription and Marcone form a “50-50” partnership. Price accepted, and they shook hands on the idea. Price drafted a term sheet for the contemplated partnership. The first line sheet states “PartScription and Marcone (PSM) have agreed to form a partnership/joint venture to serve the independent hardware industry.” Negotiations continued. During a conference call, Marcone representatives purportedly “stated that they approved of the terms,” and offered one change regarding a joint bank account. Days later Price sent a follow-up email saying that his notes indicated “Marcone ha[d] approved the terms outlined in the draft PSM term sheet” and asking whether they needed to memorialize the agreement. No further memorialization took place. Marcone's representatives became unresponsive.In 2021, PartScription filed suit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. PartScription’s complaint fails to plausibly allege a valid contract; any amendment would be futile. The only documentation speaks of general goals— not obligations—and fails to identify definite and certain binding terms. View "KAP Holdings, LLC v. Mar-Cone Appliance Parts Co." on Justia Law

Defendant argued that the district court erroneously held that a life insurance policy issued by Plaintiff Jackson National Life Insurance Company (“Jackson”) to third-party K.C., and subsequently sold by K.C. to Defendant, was void and unenforceable under Georgia law as an illegal human life wagering contract. K.C. acquired the policy, which listed “K.C.” as the insured and named K.C.’s estate as the beneficiary in 1999. At the time, K.C. was HIV positive, and he had a relatively short life expectancy. A few months after he purchased the policy, K.C., with the assistance of a viatical insurance broker, sold the policy to Defendant and named Defendant as its primary beneficiary.   When Defendant learned about K.C.s death, he made a claim for the death benefit under the policy. Jackson declined to pay the benefit and initiated this action seeking a declaration that the policy was void ab initio under Georgia law as an illegal human life wagering contract. The district court concluded that the policy was void and unenforceable under Georgia law, and it entered judgment in favor of Jackson. Defendant appealed, arguing that K.C.’s unilateral intent to sell the policy to a third party without an insurable interest in his life was insufficient to declare the policy void under Georgia law.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed and vacated the judgment entered by the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings, including a determination as to whether Defendant’s claim to benefits under the policy is barred by laches. View "Jackson National Life Insurance Company v. Sterling Crum" on Justia Law

Wells Fargo Bank made a loan to Talisker Finance, Inc. Under the loan agreement, Talisker gave Wells Fargo a security interest in three parcels of land owned by Talisker’s affiliates. To ensure that Talisker’s affiliates had good title to the parcels, Wells Fargo bought title insurance from Stewart Title Guaranty Company. Talisker defaulted, but it couldn’t deliver good title to part of the land promised as collateral. The default triggered Wells Fargo’s right to compensation under the title insurance policy. Under that policy, Stewart owed Wells Fargo for the diminution in the value of the collateral. But the amount of the diminution was complicated by the presence of multiple parcels. The district court concluded that the lost parcel didn’t affect the value of the other parcels. After review, the Tenth Circuit concurred: because their values remained constant, the district court properly found that the diminution was simply the value of the collateral that Talisker’s affiliates didn’t own. View "Wells Fargo Bank v. Stewart Title Guaranty Company" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered in the negative a certified question regarding whether a provision in a commercial insurance policy, governed by Ohio law, providing coverage for a "direct 'loss'" to certain property covers a claim based on business shutdowns caused by COVID-19 (Covid), holding that the term "direct loss" did not include Plaintiff's Covid-related loss of the use of its offices for business purposes.Plaintiff, which owned and operated an audiology practice in northeast Ohio, held an all-risk commercial-property insurance policy issued by Defendant. Plaintiff filed suit alleging that Defendant had breached the contract by refusing to provide coverage for its Covid-related claim on the ground that there was no "direct physical loss or damage" to covered property. The federal court granted Defendant's motion for certification. The Supreme Court answered (1) the term "direct 'loss'" requires that there be some loss or damage to covered property that is physical in nature, and any potential exception to this rule did not apply in this case; and (2) therefore, the term "direct 'loss'" did not include Plaintiff's Covid-related loss of the ability to use covered property for business purposes. View "Neuro-Communication Services v. Cincinnati Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Appellants, who were maimed in a hot air balloon accident in southeastern Pennsylvania in 2015, pursued appellate challenges to the District of Maryland’s rulings against them and in favor of T.H.E. Insurance Company (the “Insurer”) in an insurance coverage dispute. In federal court proceedings initiated in Maryland, Appellants sued certain of the Insurer’s named insureds, and a business called New Horizon Balloon Team (collectively, the “Insureds”) — for the gruesome injuries Appellants’ sustained in the balloon accident (the “damages lawsuit”). While the damages lawsuit was pending, the Insurer initiated these insurance coverage proceedings in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, naming as defendants the three Insureds, plus Appellants. The district court awarded summary judgment in favor of the Insurer’s contention with respect to a $100,000 coverage limit for each balloon passenger. The Memorandum Opinion also rejected both of Appellants’ bad faith claims. Appellants appealed those rulings.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Applying Maryland principles of res judicata in this dispute, the court was satisfied that the coverage issue presented by the Insurer in these proceedings is not barred by the settlement agreement in the damages lawsuit. As such, the court agreed with the district court that Appellants are not entitled to a summary judgment award on the coverage issue on res judicata grounds. Further, the district court thus did not err in ruling Appellants were inside the balloon’s basket at the time of their injuries. As such, Appellants were “passengers” under the Policy and Coverage B’s limit of $100,000 per passenger applies. View "T.H.E. Insurance Company v. Melyndia Davis" on Justia Law

This dispute over UM coverage arose from a motor vehicle accident wherein an uninsured motorist struck and killed Macy Lee Alvey, III, who was in the course and scope of his employment with Rony’s Towing & Recovery, LLC (“Rony’s Towing”). The Louisiana Supreme Court granted this writ to determine whether the failure to include the insurer’s name on an uninsured/underinsured motorist (“UM”) coverage selection form rendered it invalid. Because inclusion of the insurer’s name was an express requirement on the face of the UM form itself, the Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeal that the failure to include such information resulted in an invalid waiver of coverage. View "Berkeley Assurance Co. v. Willis, et al." on Justia Law

A collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) required RoadSafe Traffic Systems, Inc. to contribute to four employee benefits Funds. The Funds sued for unpaid contributions, alleging that the CBA unambiguously requires contributions for all hours worked by covered employees, regardless of the type of work performed. RoadSafe countered that the CBA unambiguously requires contributions only for construction and highway work. The district court granted summary judgment to RoadSafe. The issue on appeal was whether the CBA obligates RoadSafe to make contributions to the Funds for all or only specified types of work   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that by its plain language, Article V of the CBA limits RoadSafe’s contribution obligations to “Building Construction” and “Highway/Heavy” categories of work. Because work coded as NON or “shop hours” is not within the definitions of either “Building Construction” or “Highway/Heavy,” the CBA does not require RoadSafe to make contributions for the coded work. Therefore, the district court properly granted summary judgment to RoadSafe. View "Cons. Laborers Welfare Fund v. RoadSafe Traffic Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court in favor of Appellee on his claims for conversion and unjust enrichment, holding that the trial court erred in denying Appellant's motion for a directed verdict on the conversion and unjust enrichment claims.Appellee filed suit against Appellant and others, asserting claims for breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, civil conspiracy, and unjust enrichment. During trial, Appellant moved for a directed verdict on Appellee's conversion and unjust-enrichment claims. The trial court denied the motion. Thereafter, the jury returned verdicts against Appellant on the conversion and unjust enrichment claims. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) there was insufficient evidence as a matter of law to support Appellee's claims of conversion and unjust enrichment against Appellant; and (2) therefore, the trial court erred in denying Appellant's motion for a directed verdict on these claims. View "Bunta v. Superior VacuPress, LLC" on Justia Law

In April 2012, Bobby Gibson signed a contingency fee contract with Barry Wade Gilmer and the Gilmer Law Firm regarding a legal malpractice case. When the contract was signed, Seth Little, an associate of the Gilmer Law Firm, was assigned to the case. During the summer of 2013, Little left the Gilmer Law Firm and began working for Chuck McRae at the McRae Law Firm. Little continued to work on Gibson’s case while employed at the McRae Law Firm. A settlement was ultimately reached in Gibson’s case, but the McRae Law Firm never received any money. McRae hired Michelle Biegel and Bettie Ruth Johnson to sue Gilmer over the attorneys’ fees generated by the settlement of the legal malpractice case. Later, Gilmer filed a lawsuit against McRae, Little, Biegel, and Johnson, alleging, among other claims, that McRae, Biegel, and Johnson committed civil conspiracy. Gilmer’s suit was ultimately dismissed, and this appeal followed. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Gilmer’s October 2, 2017 complaint and the trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees. The Court also concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Gilmer’s amended motion to amend. Finally, the Supreme Court found that Gilmer was procedurally barred from raising the issue of whether the trial court abused its discretion by assigning the costs of the interlocutory appeal to Gilmer. View "Gilmer v. McRae, et al." on Justia Law