The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Seller in this case stemming from the economic disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.Specifically at issue was, in light of the disruptions caused by COVID-19 pandemic, whether the doctrines of impracticability of performance or frustration of purpose temporarily excused the purchaser of a cleaning services franchise and the purchaser's co-owners from their obligation to pay the outstanding portion of the purchase price of the franchise. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the property seller. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the record did not support a rational finding that the pandemic cause date continued payment of the franchise purchase price to be impracticable or frustrated the principal purpose of the contract; and (2) the parties intended that the obligation to pay would not be conditioned on the franchise's financial performance beyond the first six months following the sale. View "Le Fort Enterprises, Inc. v. Lantern 18, LLC" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the federal district court dismissing Plaintiff's complaint alleging contract claims against Defendant, holding that Plaintiff insufficiently pled that her claims met the amount in controversy required by 28 U.S.C. 1332(a).Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island asserting diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiff asserted claims for breach of contract, breach of implied warranty, and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, alleging that her claims exceeded the statutory amount-in-controversy requirement. The district court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff did not meet her burden of establishing the amount in controversy required for diversity jurisdiction. View "Andersen v. Vagaro, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioners Geoff Cole and Admiral’s Experience, Inc. sought a writ of mandate to compel the trial court to calendar their timely motion for summary judgment for a hearing before the start of trial. The Court of Appeal notified the parties it was considering issuing a peremptory writ in the first instance (Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc., 36 Cal.3d 171(1984)), and read and considered the informal response and request for judicial notice from real party in interest Matt Zeiner (Zeiner). Petitioners also field a reply brief, which Zeiner requested to strike. In 2018, a dispute arose between petitioners and Zeiner after a trailer petitioners rented from Zeiner was destroyed. In January 2019, Zeiner initiated the underlying lawsuit against petitioners seeking to recover for the loss of the trailer. The Court of Appeal granted the request for judicial notice, denied Zeiner’s request to strike the reply brief, and concluded that petitioners were entitled to peremptory writ relief. The Court published its decision to provide guidance on the deadline for filing a summary judgment motion that is served electronically. View "Cole v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgments of the district court dismissing part of Plaintiff's putative class action for failure to state a claim and entering summary judgment disposing of the remainder of his claims, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.In his complaint, Plaintiff argued that an increased coverage limit on his house and premium violated the terms of his contract with Amica Mutual Insurance Company and that he and other Amica insureds paid too much to insure their homes. The district court dismissed the breach of contract and implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims and then granted summary judgment for Amica on the unjust enrichment, money had and received, and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A claims. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was no reversible error in the proceedings below. View "Gottlieb v. Amica Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Evanston Insurance Company appealed the judgment following a bench trial on an insurance-coverage dispute. After determining that Evanston failed to timely rescind the policy and that a policy exclusion did not apply, the district court required Evanston to continue defending Desert State Life Management against a class action arising from its former CEO’s embezzlement scheme. Though the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that rescission was untimely, it disagreed about the likely application of New Mexico law on applying policy exclusions. Judgment was thus affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Evanston Insurance Company v. Desert State Life Management, et al." on Justia Law

Doe alleges that she was sexually assaulted by a massage therapist during a massage at a San Rafael Massage Envy retail location. She filed suit against the Arizona-based franchisor that licenses the “Massage Envy” brand name (MEF), and the independently owned San Rafael franchise where the assault allegedly occurred. MEF moved to compel arbitration on the basis of a “Terms of Use Agreement” presented to Doe when she checked in for a massage she had booked at the franchise location. The trial court concluded that there was no agreement to arbitrate between Doe and MEF.The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting MEF’s argument that the “Terms of Use Agreement,” which was available to Doe via a hyperlink on the electronic tablet she was given at the franchise, was a valid and enforceable “clickwrap” agreement of the sort that courts routinely enforce. Doe did not have reasonable notice that she was entering into any agreement with MEF, much less notice of the terms of the agreement. The transaction was nothing like the typical transactions in which clickwrap agreements are used; Doe went to a physical location, where she was already a member, and was handed a tablet to check in for a massage. View "Doe v. Massage Envy Franchising, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a lawsuit against Allianz Life Insurance Company of North America (“Allianz”) in Plaintiff’s capacity as a trustee of the Zupnick Family Trust 2008A (“Trust”). Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that an Allianz life insurance policy (“Zupnick Policy”), which Plaintiff contends is owned by the Trust, remains in effect. The district court concluded that the Trust was not the actual owner of the Zupnick Policy under New York law because any assignment of the policy to the Trust failed to comply with the Zupnick Policy’s provision that assignment would be effective upon Allianz’s receipt of written notice of the assignment. The district court held that the Trust lacked contractual standing to sue on the Zupnick Policy, and granted Allianz’s motion to dismiss. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that failure to comply with the provisions of a life insurance policy requiring written notice of assignment cannot, under New York law, render an assignment ineffective.   The Second Circuit certified the question to the Court of Appeals because the argument turns on a question of state law for which no controlling decision of the New York Court of Appeals exists. The court certified the following question: Where a life insurance policy provides that “assignment will be effective upon Notice” in writing to the insurer, does the failure to provide such written notice void the assignment so that the purported assignee does not have contractual standing to bring a claim under the Policy? View "Brettler v. Allianz Life Insurance Company of North America" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court striking Arch Insurance Company's conversion and unjust enrichment claims, holding that the circuit court did not err in concluding that Arch was incapable of demonstrating a priority right to the disputed funds at issue in this case as a matter of law.FVCbank provided Dominion Mechanical Contractors, Inc. with a revolving line of credit. Arch, a surety company, issued contract surety bonds for some of Dominion's projects. Due to Dominion's later financial troubles, FVCbank froze Dominion's accounts. Arch and Dominion sued, claiming conversion and unjust enrichment. The circuit court granted FVCbank's motion to strike Arch's claims, finding that because FVCbank had a priority interest in Dominion's accounts, there was no legal claim for unjust enrichment or conversion. The circuit court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) correctly concluded that FVCbank's interest in Dominion's deposit accounts took priority over Arch's interest as a matter of law; and (2) properly dismissed the claims with prejudice. View "Arch Insurance Co. v. FVCbank" on Justia Law

Monterey is an independent public agency responsible for analyzing Monterey County's water resources. Cal-Am is an investor-owned water utility providing water to over 100,000 residents on the Monterey Peninsula. Marina, a public agency, provides water for the City of Marina and neighboring Monterey Peninsula communities. In 1995 the State Water Resources Control Board ordered Cal-Am to stop drawing water from the Carmel River and develop an alternate water supply. In 2009 Marina, Monterey, and Cal-Am agreed to develop and construct a regional desalinization project to extract brackish water from beneath Monterey Bay, purify it, and deliver it to consumers. In 2010-2011, the parties entered into several agreements. The project was never built. The parties engaged in negotiation and mediation, ending in January 2012 without resolution.In September 2012, Cal-Am submitted a claim under the California Government Claims Act. Litigation followed. In 2019, the trial court entered summary adjudication against Monterey, finding that a negligence cause of action was barred by the two-year statute of limitations and against Cal-Am under the Government Claims Act. The court of appeal reversed. The trial court erred in finding that the “harm” accrued in 2010. There were triable issues of fact as to express waiver and as to the applicability of alternatives to the Claims Act. View "California-American Water Co. v. Marina Coast Water Districtw" on Justia Law

Section 20.5 of North Carolina’s 2017 Farm Act contains provisions making it illegal to enter into two types of contractual agreements: (1) any settlement agreement conditioned on an agricultural producer’s union affiliation (the Settlement Provision) and (2) any agreement that would require an agricultural producer to process dues checkoffs for its farmworker-employees (the Dues Provision). The Farm Labor Organizing Committee and others (collectively, FLOC) contend that these prohibitions violate the First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. FLOC initiated this action against the Attorney General of North Carolina and the Governor of North Carolina (collectively, the State). The district court held that the Settlement Provision violated the Constitution and so enjoined it, but upheld the constitutionality of the Dues Provision, and then held that neither provision violated Section 1981.   The Fourth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court as to the Settlement Provision and vacated the accompanying injunction, but affirmed in all other respects. The court explained that a rational basis supports Section 20.5. Agriculture is North Carolina’s largest industry, which makes it a subject of great interest for state legislators. The state also embraces its right-to-work policies and has worked repeatedly to strengthen them. In addition to these general bases for enacting Section 20.5, both challenged provisions respond to discrete legislative concerns. Further, the Settlement Provision prohibits parties from conditioning a settlement agreement on an agricultural producer’s union affiliation. Thus, the court rejected the broad reading advanced by FLOC and adopted by the district court that this statutory provision bars any settlement agreement between an agricultural producer and labor union. View "Farm Labor Organizing Committee v. Joshua Stein" on Justia Law