The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the superior court in favor of Defendant following the court's summary judgment and grant of motions to strike in favor of Defendant, holding that the hearing justice erred when he granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to count five of Plaintiff's complaint.Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging five counts against Defendant stemming from the purchase and lease of a commercial property. A hearing justice granted Defendants' motions to strike an expert disclosure and an affidavit. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment in part, holding that the hearing justice (1) properly granted Defendant's motion to strike the affidavit; but (2) erroneously granted summary judgment as to count five of the complaint. View "Donnelly Real Estate, LLC v. John Crane Inc." on Justia Law

Appellants Robert and Kelly Franks sought automobile insurance from Appellee, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company in 2013 for their two vehicles. Appellants included underinsured motorist coverage (“UIM”) in their policy but completed a form rejecting stacked UIM coverage in compliance with Section 1738(d)(2) of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (“MVFRL”). Absent such waiver, stacked coverage would be the default. Appellants removed one of the original vehicles and added a third vehicle to the policy effective 2014, and again rejected stacked UIM coverage. They made another change to the policy in 2015, removing the other of the original insured vehicles with a different car. No additional form rejecting stacked UIM coverage was offered or sought to be completed on the occasion of the removal of the last vehicle, and the ongoing premiums paid by Appellants reflected the lower rate for non-stacked UIM overage on two vehicles. Robert was injured in an accident caused by the negligence of a third party. That party had insufficient liability coverage to cover Robert's injuries. Appellants initiated a claim for UIM benefits under their policy with State Farm, but the parties disagreed on the limit to their benefits. Appellants contended with the last change to the policy, there was no valid waiver of stacked UIM coverage, resulting in a default stacked coverage mandated by statute. The issue presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review in this matter was whether the Superior Court erred as a matter of law by holding that removal of a vehicle from a multiple motor vehicle insurance policy, in which stacked coverage had previously been waived, did not require a renewed express waiver of stacked coverage pursuant to Section 1738(c). The Supreme Court concluded the Superior Court did not err and affirmed its judgment. View "Franks, et al. v. State Farm Mutual" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs own a large ten-thousand-square-foot house in Austin, Texas. They insured their home with Crestbrook Insurance Company. Their policy included “Biological Deterioration or Damage Clean Up and Removal” coverage (“mold coverage”). In April 2019, Plaintiffs discovered a widespread mold infestation in their home. Although Crestbrook covered many of their losses, it denied a generalized claim for mold growing in Plaintiffs’ walls and heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system. On cross-motions for summary judgment, a magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation in favor of Crestbrook, and the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s conclusions. At issue on appeal is whether the optional mold coverage Plaintiffs purchased in their Crestbrook policy, which provided $1.6 million in mold damage insurance in exchange for $4,554.53 in additional premiums, covers a generalized mold loss.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court incorrectly applied the Texas insurance coverage burden-shifting framework. However, Crestbrook is entitled to summary judgment regardless. The court wrote that the insurance company has demonstrated that a generalized mold claim is excluded under the policy. Plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing that an exception to the exclusion in their insurance contract brings their claim back within coverage View "Buchholz v. Crestbrook" on Justia Law

Law firm Halscott Megaro, P.A. (“Halscott Megaro” or “the firm”) sued former clients and their guardians (collectively “former clients”), seeking to recover unpaid legal fees and expenses. A district court dismissed the action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court took judicial notice of a North Carolina State Bar Disciplinary Hearing Commission (“Commission”) decision that found the firm’s lead partner misled the former clients and engaged in other unethical conduct. The court then held the firm was precluded from relitigating issues decided by the Commission. It held that Halscott Megaro failed to plausibly plead claims for which relief could be granted. Halscott Megaro appealed, arguing the district court improperly considered matters outside the pleadings and failed to accept its allegations and all reasonable inferences from them as true in concluding that the Commission’s decision as to its lead partner bound the law firm.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed and held that the district court committed no reversible error in granting the former clients’ motion to dismiss or in denying the law firm’s motion for recusal. The court wrote that it agreed with the district court’s conclusion that the Commission was acting in a judicial capacity when it entered its discipline order against Megaro. The court also agreed that Megaro received a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues and due process protections. Further, the court held that the firm’s allegations of impartiality were not related to any particular facts, sources or statements. A presiding judge is not required to recuse himself simply because of unsupported or highly tenuous speculation. View "Halscott Megaro, P.A. v. Henry McCollum" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Gary Margolis appealed a trial court’s grant of defendant Daily Direct LLC’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff, a resident of Vermont, entered into two contracts with defendant, whose principal place of business was in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Under the contracts, defendant agreed to transport two motorcycles from Vermont to Las Vegas, Nevada, and then from Salt Lake City, Utah back to Vermont on scheduled dates in July 2021 in exchange for plaintiff’s prepayment. The contracts each contained identical forum-selection clauses, which identified Milwaukee, Wisconsin as the exclusive forum for any litigation under the contract. On May 12, defendant informed plaintiff that it had made a clerical error and would not fulfill its obligations under the contracts. Defendant did not revoke its repudiation and did not perform under the contracts. Plaintiff hired someone else to transport the motorcycles for the dates and locations described in the contracts with defendant for a total cost of $11,512.62. In June 2022, plaintiff sued defendant in Vermont for breach of contract, violation of the Vermont Consumer Protection Act, and unjust enrichment. Defendant moved to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) for improper venue, arguing that the forum-selection clauses in the contracts were valid and therefore the complaint should be dismissed for plaintiff to refile in an appropriate court in Milwaukee. Plaintiff countered that defendant anticipatorily repudiated the contracts thereby discharging plaintiff of his duty to comply with the forum-selection clauses. The trial court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss without specify the legal basis for the dismissal, concluding merely that dismissal was appropriate because “[p]laintiff, having sued on a contract, [could not] avoid the contract’s forum[-]selection clause.” Finding no reversible error in the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Margolis v. Daily Direct LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals in this insurance dispute, holding that an insurance policy does not incorporate by reference the payout limits in an underlying service agreement.Two employees that were severely burned in a workplace accident at an ExxonMobil Corporation refinery sought compensation for their injuries and settled for a collective amount over $24 million. When two of Exxon's insurers, National Union Fire Insurance Company and Starr Indemnity & Liability Insurance Company, denied Exxon coverage under their umbrella policies Exxon sued both insurers for breach of contract. The trial court sided with Exxon, ruling that National Union was obligated to reimburse Exxon. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Exxon was not insured under National Union's umbrella policy. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Exxon was an insured under National Union's umbrella policy, and the court of appeals erred in ruling otherwise; and (2) because the court of appeals' holding with respect to Starr's policy was predicated on a similar error, judgment in favor of Starr must also be reversed. View "ExxonMobil Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the orders of the trial court granting TotalEnergies E&P USA, Inc.'s motion to stay an American Arbitration Association (AAA) arbitration and denying MP Gulf of Mexico, LLC's motion to compel that arbitration, holding that the parties clearly and unmistakably delegated to the AAA arbitrator the decision of whether the parties' controversy must be resolved by arbitration.In this dispute arising over interests in a group of oil-and-gas leases Total E&P sought a declaration construing the parties' "Cost Sharing Agreement." On the same day, Total E&P initiated an arbitration proceeding asking the International Institute to determine the parties' rights under their "Chinook Operating Agreement." MP Gulf subsequently initiated the AAA arbitration proceeding. Total E&P filed a motion to stay the arbitration, which the trial court granted. The court of appeals reversed and compelled AAA arbitration. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the parties agreed to delegate the arbitrability issue to the arbitrator. View "TotalEnergies E&P USA, Inc. v. MP Gulf of Mexico, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment to Defendants as to some of Plaintiff's claims and the judgment entered on the defense verdicts on Plaintiff's remaining defamation claims, holding that Plaintiff had not shown grounds for reversal.Plaintiff, the former principal at St. Joseph's Catholic School, brought this action against Father Josephs Pins, St. Joseph's Church, and the Diocese of Des Moines after her employment was terminated, alleging fraud and defamation by all defendants and breach of contract against Father Pins. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants as to Plaintiff's fraud, breach of contract, and defamation claims, and then a jury returned defense verdicts on the remaining defamation claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff was not entitled to reversal on his allegations of error. View "Konchar v. Pins" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court refusing to certify Appellant's case as a class action, holding that, based on the facts and circumstances of this case, the district court did not abuse its broad discretion.Appellant, a horse breeder and owner, brought this putative class action claiming that Prairie Meadows Racetrack and Casino, Inc. breached contracts governing the distribution of winnings among owners and breeders of successful horses. The district court ultimately denied certification. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no abuse of discretion in the district court's determination that Appellant was not an appropriate class representative and that certification was inappropriate. View "Benda v. Prairie Meadows Racetrack & Casino Inc." on Justia Law

Wilburn Lord, Jr. agreed to sell SEL Business Services, LLP and Skip Lloyd (collectively, SEL) a building in Rolling Fork, Mississippi, for $60,000. SEL moved into the building and alleged to have begun making improvements and paying the taxes. But Lord never followed through with the sale. Instead, Lord sold the building to Sharkey Issaquena Community Hospital, a community hospital operated by Sharkey and Issaquena Counties (collectively, Hospital Defendants). SEL initially sought to enjoin the sale. In an amended complaint, in addition to seeking the injunction, SEL alleged Lord breached his contract with SEL to sell the building. SEL requested specific performance. Alternatively, SEL alleged detrimental reliance and promissory estoppel. SEL finally requested, “should the Court find that specific performance, promissory estoppel and/or equitable estoppel are somehow inapplicable and/or the Contract should not otherwise be enforced based on the principles of equity and/or other grounds/for other reasons, . . . [that] the Court disgorge all funds paid to Defendants and/or otherwise award all monetary damages available under Mississippi law.” Both Lord and the Hospital Defendants moved for summary judgment, claiming the statute of frauds barred not only SEL’s contract-based claim for specific performance but also any “derivative” equitable claims. Both the chancery and Court of Appeals relied on Barriffe v. Estate of Nelson, 153 So. 3d 613 (Miss. 2014) to conclude that the statute of frauds barred not just claims for equitable liens but all potential equitable remedies. The Mississippi Supreme Court granted SEL’s petition for writ of certiorari to overrule the erroneous Barriffe decision and to reinstate the Supreme Court’s long-standing equitable principles. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Specifically, the Court reversed the chancellor’s dismissal of SEL and Lloyd’s equitable claims against Lord. The Court affirmed the chancellor’s judgment of dismissal as to the remaining defendants. The case was remanded to the chancery court for further proceedings. View "SEL Business Services, LLC v. Lord, et al." on Justia Law