This appeal arises from litigation involving a public construction project to build the Central Region 9th Street Span K-8 school in downtown Los Angeles. The Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD or District) and Suffolk Construction Company, Inc. (Suffolk), entered into a development and construction agreement (contract), for the development and building of the school. Suffolk later entered into subcontracts with various subcontractors, including R.J. Daum Construction Company (Daum) and Fisk Electric Company (Fisk). Throughout the project, various problems arose, which caused delay and disruption and resulted in increased costs to Suffolk, Daum and Fisk. Suffolk sued LAUSD, alleging breach of the contract, implied contractual indemnity, and seeking declaratory relief. The jury found that Suffolk substantially performed its contract and that LAUSD breached the implied warranty of correctness by providing plans and/or specifications for the concrete footing design that was not correct. Further, the jury determined Suffolk’s damages for the concrete issue decided in phase 1 (TIA 5).   The Second Appellate District found that the phase 1 verdict must be reversed and remanded for retrial on the ground that the special jury instruction based on Public Contract Code section 1104 was improper. The reversal of the phase 1 liability verdict requires that the phase 2 trial of damages for TIA 5 (related to the concrete cracking issue) must also be reversed and remanded for retrial. Finally, the court held that the trial court erred in granting JNOV on the phase 2 jury verdict. Thus, the decision granting the JNOV is reversed with direction to reinstate the jury verdict on that issue. View "Suffolk Construction Co. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff signed an online arbitration agreement before starting work at a car dealership. He had to sign if he wanted a job: the car dealership presented it as a take-it-or-leave-it mandatory condition. Plaintiff signed the arbitration contract, and the dealership hired him. The employment relationship turned out to be unsuccessful: Plaintiff sued the dealership for firing him. The dealership moved to compel arbitration. The trial court ruled the arbitration contract was unconscionable.   The Second Appellate District reversed. The court held that Plaintiff suffered no substantive unconscionability, which is indispensable to the unconscionability defense. The court held that, to some extent, the contract-at-issue seems to be a common form, at least for some car dealerships. Second, all four agreements containing the arbitration clauses extended for more than a page of print. Third, the font size and functional readability of the contracts here did not seem to trouble Plaintiff.   Further, the court explained that Plaintiff argues this language implies to laypeople that it bars filing a charge with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The court found that Plaintiff’s argument fails on two counts. As Plaintiff himself notes, there is clear language to the contrary: “I understand and agree that nothing in this agreement shall be construed so as to preclude me from filing any administrative charge with, or from participating in any investigation of a charge conducted by, any government agency such as the Department of Fair Employment and Housing and/or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.” More fundamentally, arguments about prolix legalese go to procedural and not substantive unconscionability. View "Basith v. Lithia Motors, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff signed an arbitration agreement with Empire Nissan, Inc. Nissan fired Fuentes, she sued, and Nissan moved to compel arbitration. The trial court found the arbitration agreement unconscionable and denied the motion.   The Second Appellate District reversed and directed the trial court to compel arbitration, holding that this contract lacks substantive unconscionability. The court explained that Plaintiff must show both procedural and substantive unconscionability to establish the defense. These two elements need not be present to the same degree. Rather we evaluate them on a sliding scale. The more substantively oppressive the contract terms, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to conclude that the contract is unenforceable. Conversely, the more deceptive or coercive the bargaining tactics employed, the less substantive unfairness is required. The court explained that tiny and unreadable print indeed is a problem, but is a problem of procedural unconscionability. Accordingly, the court explained that it cannot double count it as a problem of substantive unconscionability. View "Fuentes v. Empire Nissan, Inc." on Justia Law

A False Claims Act qui tam action was filed under seal against SHH and its nursing facilities, alleging that SHH provided unreasonable and unnecessary services to claim the highest possible Medicare reimbursement. Three co-relators also alleged that SHH retaliated against them for internally reporting fraudulent billing practices. SHH received a Department of Justice notification that it was the subject of a fraudulent claims investigation, requesting information about recent terminations of SHH employees, including the relators. It did not explicitly refer to the retaliation allegations.Two years later, SHH obtained liability coverage. Allied's claims-made policy applies only to claims first made during the policy period. SHH's application checked "none" when asked to “provide full details of all inquiries, investigations, administrative charges, claims, and lawsuits filed” within the last three years. SHH checked “no” to whether “[SHH], any Subsidiary, any Executive or other entity proposed for coverage kn[ew] of any act, error or omission which could give rise to a claim, suit or action.” An application exclusion, incorporated into the policy, stated that if such information existed, any inquiry, investigation, administrative charge, claim, or lawsuit arising therefrom or arising from such violation, knowledge, information, or involvement is excluded from coverage.The qui tam action was unsealed. SHH notified Allied and sought coverage for defense costs. Allied denied coverage. SHH sued. SHH later settled the relators' retaliation claim ($2.2 million) and finalized a $10 million settlement for the claims-submissions violations. The district court granted SHH partial summary judgment, awarding $2,336,786.35. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The plain language of SHH’s policy excluded coverage. View "SHH Holdings, LLC v. Allied World Specialty Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In this case, a purchase agreement provided provided that the parties were obligated to close a real-estate sale unless the buyer -- Lafayette Land Acquisitions II, LLC ("Lafayette Land") -- rejected the deal in writing before the end of the due-diligence period. Although the parties disputed when that period began, and how long it lasted, it was undisputed that Lafayette Land never rejected the deal. Therefore, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded the parties were obligated to close. Because the Circuit Court held otherwise, judgment was reversed and remanded. View "Lafayette Land Acquisitions II, LLC v. Walls" on Justia Law

In this mineral lease dispute, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that a lease deadline and untimely scheduled drilling date were irrelevant for invoking a force majeure clause and thus reversing the trial court's judgment and remanding the case, holding that the court of appeals erred.In reversing the trial court's judgment, the court of appeals determined that fact issues existed both as to whether the force majeure clause applied and as to each element of the lessee's tortious-interference claims. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding (1) construed in context, the phrase "Lessee's operations are delayed by an event of force majeure" does not refer to the delay of a necessary drilling operation already scheduled to occur after the deadline for perpetuating the lease; (2) the force majeure clause in this case did not save the lease; and (3) to the extent the lessee's tortious-interference claims were predicated on the force majeure clause's saving the lease, a take-nothing judgment is rendered in part. View "Point Energy Partners Permian, LLC v. MRC Permian Co." on Justia Law

In this action concerning a lease renewal for property on which a cell tower was built the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court and the court of appeals in favor of a cell phone service company and dismissing this action brought by property owners, holding that there was no error.In 1988, the cell phone company entered into a thirty-year lease of the subject property that included a thirty-year renewal option. In 2018, when the lease came up for renewal, the rent was substantially below market, and the company gave written notice of renewal to the property owners. Because the company did not immediately pay the renewal rent the property owners brought suit arguing that the option had not been validly exercised. The district court granted judgment for the cell phone company, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the property owners were not entitled to relief on their allegations of error. View "Pitz v. U.S. Cellular Operating Co. of Dubuque" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court concluding that the parties' signed voluntary declaration of paternity (VDP) should be set aside because of the parties' fraud and a mutual mistake but that Taylor Scott should nevertheless be adjudicated the child's father, holding that there was no error.Sarah Benson and Taylor Scott, an unmarried couple, signed a VDP representing that Scott was the father of Benson's child when both parties know that Scott was not the child's biological father. When Benson later cut off contact between Scott and the child Scott filed a complaint seeking joint legal and physical custody. In response, Benson challenged the VDP. The district court set aside the VDP but concluded that, under the Utah Uniform Parentage Act, Scott should be adjudicated to be the child's father. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in looking to the factors set forth in Utah Code 78B-16-608 to disregard the genetic test results that would have excluded Scott as the child's father. View "Scott v. Benson" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court ruling that Insured's claim of unfair claim settlement practices in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 176D and 93A was barred by the choice-of-law provision of the marine insurance policy he purchased from Great Lakes Insurance SE (GLI), holding that the district court erred.Insurer, the insurer of Insured's forty-seven-foot catamaran sailing vessel, brought a declaratory judgment action to determine whether the "constructive total loss" of Insured's vessel was covered under the relevant policy. Insured brought a counterclaim alleging violations of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 176D, 3(9) and ch. 93A, 9(3A). The district court ruled that pursuant to the policy's choice-of-law provision, New York law barred Insured's Massachusetts counterclaim because New York law does not provide for a chapters 176D and 93A claim. The First Circuit reversed, holding (1) Insured's statutorily-based counterclaim was extra-contractual; (2) the plain language of the choice-of-law provision was not broad enough to unambiguously encompass an extra-contractual claim; and (3) any ambiguity in the policy must be construed in favor of Insured. View "Great Lakes Insurance SE v. Andersson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the superior court in favor of Defendant following the court's summary judgment and grant of motions to strike in favor of Defendant, holding that the hearing justice erred when he granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to count five of Plaintiff's complaint.Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging five counts against Defendant stemming from the purchase and lease of a commercial property. A hearing justice granted Defendants' motions to strike an expert disclosure and an affidavit. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment in part, holding that the hearing justice (1) properly granted Defendant's motion to strike the affidavit; but (2) erroneously granted summary judgment as to count five of the complaint. View "Donnelly Real Estate, LLC v. John Crane Inc." on Justia Law