The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting a motion to compel arbitration in this insurance dispute, holding that the district court correctly granted the motion to compel arbitration brought by the underwriters of Green Enterprises, LLC's insurance policy, all syndicates at Lloyd's of London (Underwriters).After a fire destroyed one of its plants, Green, a Puerto Rican recycling company, filed an insurance claim. Underwriters denied the claim, after which Green brought this lawsuit. Underwriters filed a motion to compel arbitration under an arbitration clause in the parties' contract. The district court granted the motion and dismissed Green's claims without prejudice. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court properly granted the motion to compel. View "Green Enterprises, LLC v. Hiscox Syndicates Limited at Lloyd's of London" on Justia Law

Consolidated appeals stemmed from an employment dispute between Dr. Margot G. Potter and her former employer, Women's Care Specialists, P.C. ("Women's Care"), and out of a dispute between Potter and three Women's Care employees: Dr. Karla Kennedy, Dr. Elizabeth Barron, and Beth Ann Dorsett ("the WC employees"). In case no. CV-21-903797, Potter alleged claims of defamation, tortious interference with a business relationship, and breach of contract against Women's Care. In case no. CV-21-903798, Potter alleged claims of defamation and tortious interference with a business relationship against the WC employees. After the trial court consolidated the cases, Women's Care and the WC employees filed motions to compel arbitration on the basis that Potter's claims were within the scope of the arbitration provision in Potter's employment agreement with Women's Care and that the arbitration provision governed their disputes even though Potter was no longer a Women's Care employee. The trial court entered an order denying those motions. Women's Care and the WC employees separately appealed; the Alabama Supreme Court consolidated the appeals. In appeal no. SC-2022-0706, the Supreme Court held that Potter's breach of-contract claim and her tort claims against Women's Care were subject to arbitration. The Court therefore reversed the trial court's order denying Women's Care's motion to compel arbitration. In appeal no. SC-2022-0707, the Supreme Court held that Potter's tort claims against the WC employees were subject to arbitration. The Court therefore reversed the trial court's order denying their motion to compel arbitration, and remanded both cases for further proceedings. View "Women's Care Specialists, P.C. v. Potter" on Justia Law

MUSA Properties, LLC ("MUSA"), and R.K. Allen Oil Co., Inc. ("Allen Oil"), entered into a real-estate sales contract in which MUSA agreed to purchase from Allen Oil a gasoline service station and convenience store ("the property"). The terms of the sales contract were not fulfilled, and the property was not transferred to MUSA. Allen Oil filed a lawsuit against MUSA, alleging various causes of action based on the sales contract; MUSA filed various counterclaims in response. MUSA also filed in probate court a notice of lis pendens describing the property. In an interlocutory order, the circuit court later determined that MUSA did not have a right to or interest in the property, and, upon the motion of Allen Oil, the circuit court entered an order expunging the lis pendens notice. MUSA then petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for mandamus relief, to direct the circuit court to vacate its order expunging the lis pendens notice. Finding that Allen Oil's argument did not provide a convincing basis for the Supreme Court to suspend application of the doctrine of lis pendens and deny MUSA's mandamus petition, the Court granted the petition and issued the writ directing the circuit court to vacate its order expunging the lis pendens notice. View "Ex parte MUSA Properties, LLC" on Justia Law

The Ohio Valley Conference ("the OVC") appealed a judgment dismissing its official-capacity and individual-capacity claims against Randall Jones, the Chair of the Board of Trustees of Jacksonville State University ("JSU"), and Don C. Killingsworth, Jr., the President of Jacksonville State University. The OVC was a men's and women's collegiate athletic conference that began in 1948. The OVC Constitution contained two relevant provisions concerning resignation of membership from the conference. In addition to alleging that JSU had failed to pay the conference-resignation fee described in Article 4.5.3 of the OVC Constitution, the OVC also asserted that JSU owed the conference money for tickets to certain conference championship basketball tournament tickets. JSU, Jones, and Killingsworth filed a joint motion to dismiss the OVC's complaint. With respect to the OVC's claims against JSU, defendants argued that the Alabama State Board of Adjustment ("the BOA") had "exclusive jurisdiction" over those claims. With respect to any claims the OVC asserted against Jones and Killingsworth in their official capacities, defendants argued the claims were barred by State immunity under § 14 of the Alabama Constitution. With respect to any claims the OVC asserted against Jones and Killingsworth in their individual capacities, defendants argued the OVC had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and they maintained that the claims were barred by the doctrine of State-agent immunity. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded the OVC's claims against Jones and Killingsworth in their official capacities seeking payment for the liquidated amount of the conference-resignation fee and for the value of the tickets JSU received for the OVC's 2021 conference championship basketball tournament did not constitute claims against the State, and, therefore, they were not barred by State immunity. Accordingly, the circuit court erred in dismissing the OVC's official-capacity claims against Jones and Killingsworth. However, the Court found the OVC failed to state individual-capacity claims against Jones and Killingsworth for which relief could be granted because Jones and Killingsworth lacked any duty apart from their official positions to make the payments the OVC sought to recover and because the OVC's complaint did not supply the factual allegations necessary to support those individual-capacity claims. View "Ohio Valley Conference v. Jones, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's holding that, as a matter of law, a statutory "safe-harbor" provision applied and relieved an operator of oil-and-gas wells from any obligation to pay interest in the amounts withheld, holding that the safe-harbor provision applied as a matter of law.At issue was the "safe harbor" provision that permits operators to withhold payments without interest under certain circumstances. In reliance with the safe harbor provision the operator in this case withheld production payments it was contractually obligated to make to one of the wells' owners. The owner brought suit seeking to recover the payments with interest. The operator made the payments but without interest. The trial court concluded that the safe-harbor provision allowed the operator to withhold the funds. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the operator established as a matter of law that it was entitled to withhold distribution of production payments without interest under the statutory safe-harbor provision of Tex. Nat. Res. Code 91.402(b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B)(ii). View "Freeport McMoRan Oil & Gas LLC v. 1776 Energy Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

In this interlocutory appeal involving the application of a statutory immunity waiver in a lawsuit alleging breach of a contract to construct university housing the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's ruling that the university was not immune from suit, holding that the court of appeals erred.In 2014, Texas Southern University (TSU) executed a contract with Pepper Lawson Horizon International Group, LLC (PLH) to work as the contractor on a project to construct student housing. PLH later sued TSU for breach of contract. TSU asserted sovereign immunity to suit as a defense despite PLH's pleadings expressly invoking the immunity waiver in Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 114.003, arguing that section 114.003 was inapplicable because PLH failed to plead a claim covered by the waiver provision. The trial court denied TSU's plea to the jurisdiction, but the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in concluding that PLH failed to plea a cognizable Chapter 114 claim. View "Pepper Lawson Horizon Int'l Group, LLC v. Tex. Southern University" on Justia Law

This diversity case arises out of the theft—possibly by a group of third-party contractors—of 1,380 memory cards that belonged to Global Network Management, LTD., and were stored in a data center operated by Centurylink Latin American Solutions, LLC. Global Network sued Centurylink for implied bailment, breach of contract implied in law, and breach of contract implied in fact to hold Centurylink liable for the theft of the memory cards. The district court dismissed all of the claims with prejudice, and Global Network now appeals.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that the district court correctly dismissed the contract implied in law and contract implied in fact claims. But Global Network plausibly alleged that Centurylink possessed the memory cards at the time of the theft, and as a result, the implied bailment claim survives at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage. The court explained that according to Centurylink, Global Network’s ability to visit the servers means that it did not possess the servers exclusively, and as a result, no bailment relationship was formed. But this argument does not carry the day at this stage of the proceeding, where the standard is plausibility and not probability. The court noted that it does not hold there was an implied bailment as a matter of fact or law; it only held that Global Network plausibly alleged an implied bailment. View "Global Network Management, Ltd. v. CenturyLink Latin American Solutions, LLC" on Justia Law

The law firm of Brown Goldstein Levy LLP (“BGL”) and one of its partners (collectively, “Appellants”) filed suit against their insurer, Federal Insurance Company (“Appellee”), when it refused to provide coverage for costs Appellants incurred after the Government investigated the partner, executed a search warrant at BGL’s office, and notified the partner that his representation of certain clients may present a conflict of interest. The district court dismissed Appellants’ complaint, holding that there was no “Claim,” as that term is defined in the insurance policy, and alternatively that any costs Appellants incurred were excluded from the policy’s definition of “loss.”   The Fourth Circuit affirmed, concluding that there is no “Claim.” Neither the search warrant application nor the resulting search warrant is “written demand[s] or written request[s] for . . . nonmonetary relief . . . against an Insured” as required by the Policy. Therefore, the Search Warrant Claim fails because Appellants cannot state a claim for relief. The Target Conflict Letter makes no demand or request for relief against an Insured. The Government’s request to be notified promptly as to how the partner intends to proceed is not a request for “the redress or benefit, esp. equitable in nature (such as an injunction or specific performance), that a party asks of a court.” The Conflict Letters are not “Claims.” The court explained that despite Appellants’ attempts to characterize them as “demands,” they are not. Therefore, Appellants cannot state a claim as to the Partner Claim. View "Brown Goldstein Levy LLP v. Federal Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Elkside Development, LLC (Elkside) owned and operated the Osprey Point RV Resort in Lakeside, Oregon. Part of Elkside’s business model involved selling membership contracts that conferred free use of the campground, among other benefits. In April 2017, Barnett Resorts LLC, an Oregon limited liability company operated by member-managers Stefani and Chris Barnett, purchased Elkside. Shortly after the purchase, the Barnetts sent a letter to all campground members, identifying them as “owners” of the resort, and indicating that they would not honor Elkside’s membership contracts. Plaintiffs, a group of 71 people who, collectively, were party to 39 membership contracts with Elkside, brought suit alleging a variety of claims against Stefani and Chris Barnett individually, and against the company, Barnett Resorts LLC. On appeal, this case raised three issues relating to: (1) a breach of contract claim; (2) an intentional interference with contract claim; and (3) a statutory claim of elder abuse, based on the fact that the majority of the membership contracts had been held by plaintiffs over the age of 65. As to the claims against the Barnetts individually, the trial court granted summary judgment for defendants, relying on ORS 63.165 and Cortez v. Nacco Materials Handling Group, 337 P3d 111 (2014). Plaintiffs argued, in part, that whether ORS 63.165 shielded the Barnetts from liability required considering whether their actions were entirely in support of the LLC, or whether they were, instead, in furtherance of a non-LLC individual motive. The Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. The Oregon Supreme Court allowed review and reversed in part the Court of Appeals and the trial court. Specifically, the Supreme Court reversed as to the elder abuse claim, affirmed as to the breach of contract claim, and affirmed the intentional interference claim by an equally divided court. View "Adelsperger v. Elkside Development LLC" on Justia Law

The Village alleged that the defendants breached a 2003 recorded annexation agreement executed by the Trustee that was then the legal owner of the property, which now consists of an annexed 114-acre subdivision. The Village alleged that the defendants were subject to the annexation agreement as successors to the Trustee when they purchased undeveloped portions of the property from Plank, which had acquired the property from the Trustee. The Village alleged that the defendants refused its request for a letter of credit in the amount proportionate to the number of lots the defendants owned in the subdivision, to secure the completion of roads in the subdivision.The defendants argued that, although the annexation agreement was a covenant that ran with the land, it did not confer successor status to an entity that purchased only a portion of the property subject to annexation, as opposed to the whole of the property. The Appellate Court reversed the dismissal of the action. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Reading the annexation agreement as a whole, the court found that its plain language required its provisions to be binding and enforceable on the parties’ successors. Defendants are successors in title to the landowner who agreed to those obligations. The obligations imposed upon any particular purchaser depend upon the obligations of the original developer that remain unsatisfied with respect to the specific parcel sold. View "Village of Kirkland v. Kirkland Properties Holdings Co., LLC I" on Justia Law