Michael Andary, conservator and guardian of Ellen Andary; Ronald Krueger, guardian of Philip Krueger; and Moriah, Inc., doing business as Eisenhower Center, brought an action against USAA Casualty Insurance Company and Citizens Insurance Company of America, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Michigan Legislature’s 2019 amendments of the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., that placed new limitations on in-home family-provided attendant care in MCL 500.3157(10) and the non-Medicare fee schedule of MCL 500.3157(7) could not be applied to limit or change plaintiffs’ rights to benefits under the insurance policies defendants had issued to them before the 2019 amendments. Andary and Krueger, suffered traumatic injuries in automobile accidents before 2019, had been provided uncapped lifetime medical care covered by personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits under insurance policies and the no-fault act in effect at the time of their injuries. Plaintiffs argued that the retroactive application of the 2019 amendments to them was improper and would also violate their constitutional rights under the Contracts Clause of Const 1963, art 1, § 10 and their due-process and equal-protection rights. Additionally, plaintiffs all challenged the prospective application of the 2019 amendments on behalf of future motor vehicle accident victims and medical providers. Defendants moved to dismiss the case, and the trial court granted defendants’ motion. Plaintiffs appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case to the circuit court. The Michigan Supreme Court found that the 2019 no-fault amendments of MCL 500.3157 did not impact services and care that were already being provided to Andary and Krueger and that had been reimbursable prior to the amendments. Andary’s and Krueger’s rights to the PIP benefits at issue in this case were both contractual and statutory in nature, and the 2019 no-fault amendments did not retroactively modify their vested contractual rights. Plaintiffs’ constitutional challenges to prospective application of the amended statutes were dismissed. View "Andary v. USAA Casualty Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Copart of Connecticut, Inc. (“Copart”) is a subsidiary of Copart, Inc., an online car-auction company that sells used, wholesale, and repairable vehicles. Copart owns several parcels of land in Lexington County, South Carolina, on which it operates “machine salvage junkyard and vehicle wash facilities.” This appeal concerns whether Copart’s insurer must defend or indemnify Copart with respect to a lawsuit filed against it in South Carolina Defendant Copart of Connecticut appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company and Liberty Insurance Corporation.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment as to Liberty’s duty to defend Copart in the Underlying Suit. The court reversed summary judgment as to Liberty’s duty to indemnify Copart with respect to the Underlying Suit and remanded to the district court for further proceedings to determine Liberty’s indemnity obligation, if any. The court explained that the duty to defend is negated here because the Livingston Plaintiffs only allege damage caused, either in whole or in part, by pollutants. But evidence arising from or related to the Underlying Suit may reveal that non-pollutants caused Plaintiffs’ damage. If, for example, relevant evidence shows that the plaintiffs’ “cloudy water” was caused only by sand and sediment, then the pollution exclusion may not apply. If this were so, Liberty may be obligated to indemnify Copart. View "Liberty Mutual Fire Ins v. Copart of CT" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against The University of Miami (Miami), alleging the school should refund a portion of the payments that she made for the Spring 2020 semester since she did not receive the expected benefit of in-person learning. Plaintiff marshaled a number of claims, including breach of express contract, breach of implied contract, and unjust enrichment. Miami filed a motion for summary judgment on each of Plaintiff’s claims, which the district court granted in full.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it is entirely valid for Plaintiff to take the position that Miami should have based its prorated refunds on a different day than it did. The problem, however, is that Plaintiff fails to present “more than a scintilla” of evidence to support her contention that Miami should have refunded 48% of the fees for the Spring 2020 semester. The court reasoned that an announcement extending spring break by itself does not support the contention that all fee-based facilities and services were suddenly unavailable to students such that Miami’s refund was inadequate. And while Plaintiff offers a report from an unsworn economist’s input as evidence, Plaintiff cannot rely on that report to show there is a genuine issue of material fact about this point. Unsworn reports may not be taken into account by a district court when it rules on a motion for summary judgment. View "Adelaide Dixon v. University of Miami" on Justia Law

The trial court entered a default judgment against Defendant Wanu Water Inc. on June 16, 2020, and on December 7, 2020, Defendant filed a motion to set aside its default and vacate the default judgment under the mandatory attorney-fault provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) (section 473(b)). The trial court denied Defendant’s motion and gave no reason for its ruling.   The Second Appellate District vacated the default judgment. The court explained that the mandatory provision requires the court to vacate the default judgment if the application is filed “no more than six months after entry of judgment,” is “in proper form,” and is accompanied by an attorney’s affidavit of fault unless the court finds the default “was not in fact caused by” the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise or neglect. Here, the trial court denied Defendant’s motion and gave no reason for its ruling. The record shows the filing was timely and was accompanied by an attorney’s affidavit of fault. Thus, the only bases for denying the motion to vacate the default judgment were that the application was not “in proper form” or that the default “was not in fact caused by” the attorney’s neglect. View "Dollase v. Wanu Water Inc." on Justia Law

In this insurance dispute, the Supreme Court held that Ariz. Rev. Stat. 20-259.01 mandates that a single policy insuring multiple vehicles provides different underinsured motorist (UIM) coverages for each vehicle rather than a single UIM coverage that applies to multiple vehicles.Plaintiff's mother died in a car crash caused by a neglectful driver. Plaintiff submitted a UIM to CSAA General Insurance Company, her mother's insurer. At the time of the accident, Plaintiff's mother's CSAA policy covered the mother's two vehicles and provided UIM coverage of $50,000 per person. When CSAA paid only $50,000 Plaintiff sought an additional $50,000 under an "intra-policy stacking" theory. After CSAA rejected the claim, Plaintiff sued for declaratory judgment, alleging breach of contract, bad faith, and a class action. CSAA moved to certify two questions. The Supreme Court answered (1) insurers seeking to prevent insureds from stacking UIM coverages under a single, multi-vehicle policy must employ section 20-259.01(H)'s sole prescribed method for limiting stacking; and (2) section 20-259.01(B) does not bar an insured from receiving UIM coverage from the policy in an amount greater than the bodily injury or death liability limits of the policy. View "Franklin v. CSAA General Insurance" on Justia Law

Dakota Energy Power Cooperative, Inc., a member of East River Electric Power Cooperative, Inc., sought to withdraw from East River and to terminate the parties’ long-term power contract so that it could purchase electricity from another source. When East River resisted, Dakota Energy sued for anticipatory breach of contract and sought a declaratory judgment providing that it had a contractual right to withdraw from East River by way of a buyout. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of East River, and Dakota Energy appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that under the UCC, the terms of a written contract “may be explained or supplemented” by certain extrinsic evidence, including “usage of trade.” Dakota Energy’s proffered trade usage evidence would effectively add an entirely new provision to the WPC. Moreover, under the UCC, “the express terms of an agreement and any applicable . . . usage of trade must be construed whenever reasonable as consistent with each other.” Here, the express terms of the WPC—which provide that the agreement will “remain in effect” until December 31, 2075, and which contain no provision allowing for an early buyout—are inconsistent with any trade usage evidence suggesting something to the contrary. Therefore, the court concluded that the WPC unambiguously requires Dakota Energy to purchase all of its electricity from East River until December 31, 2075, and that no provision in the WPC or East River’s Bylaws allows for an earlier termination of that obligation. View "Dakota Energy Coop, Inc. v. East River Electric Power Coop., Inc." on Justia Law

Certain healthcare entities entered into a lease agreement and related lease schedules with Winthrop Resources Corporation (Winthrop). Prospect ECHN, Inc. (Prospect) purchased the healthcare entities’ assets and later sought to be released from their obligations to Winthrop. After negotiations failed, Prospect filed suit against Winthrop, alleging that the schedules must be recharacterized as security interests under the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), as adopted by Minnesota. If recharacterized as security interests, Prospect owns the equipment that Winthrop had leased to it and can argue that Winthrop must return any security deposits and excess payments. If the schedules are true leases, however, Prospect owes Winthrop the amounts due under the contracts. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Winthrop, concluding that the agreement and schedules constitute true leases and that Prospect had breached them. The court awarded damages to Winthrop and determined that it was entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that although the U.C.C. demands recharacterization under its bright-line test or when so compelled by the facts of the case, it does not demand so here, where the parties negotiated a lease agreement and related schedules that skirt the line of creating security interests without crossing it. Thus, the court concluded that the district court correctly granted summary judgment in Winthrop’s favor. Further, the court found no error in the award of damages in the amount of the unpaid lease charges and other amounts due, as well as in the amount of the accelerated lease charges. View "Prospect ECHN, Inc. v. Winthrop Resources Corp." on Justia Law

Petitioner Cboe Futures Exchange (CFE) announced plans to list futures contracts based on the Cboe Volatility Index, more commonly known as the “VIX Index.” The following year, the SEC and the CFTC issued a joint order “excluding certain indexes comprised of options on broad-based security indexes”—including the VIX—“from the definition of the term narrow-based security index.” The petition, in this case, challenged the SEC’s 2020 order treating SPIKES futures as futures.   The DC Circuit granted the petition. The court explained that the SEC did not adequately explain why SPIKES futures must be regulated as futures to promote competition with VIX futures. However, the court wrote that while it vacates the Commission’s order, it will withhold issuance of our mandate for three calendar months to allow market participants sufficient time to wind down existing SPIKES futures transactions with offsetting transactions. The court explained that the Exemptive Order never mentions the futures disclosures. And at any rate, those disclosures only partially fill the void left by the absence of the Disclosure Statement. As with the Exemptive Order’s exceptions and conditions, the futures disclosures do not address any number of matters covered by the Disclosure Statement. And even when the two sets of disclosures overlap, the Disclosure Statement tends to provide much greater detail than the futures disclosures. View "Cboe Futures Exchange, LLC v. SEC" on Justia Law

PayPal users can transfer money to businesses and people; they can donate to charities through the Giving Fund, its 501(c)(3) charitable organization. Kass created a PayPal account and accepted PayPal’s 2004 User Agreement, including a non-mandatory arbitration clause and allowing PayPal to amend the Agreement at any time by posting the amended terms on its website. In 2012 PayPal amended the Agreement, adding a mandatory arbitration provision. Users could opt out until December 2012. In 2016, PayPal sent emails to Kass encouraging her to make year-end donations. Kass donated $3,250 to 13 charities through the Giving Fund website. Kass alleges she later learned that only three of those charities actually received her gifts; none knew that Kass had made the donations. Kass claims that, although Giving Fund created profile pages for these charities, it would transfer donated funds only to charities that created a PayPal “business” account; otherwise PayPal would “redistribute” the funds to similar charities.Kass and a charity to which she had donated filed a purported class action. The district court granted a motion to compel arbitration, then affirmed the arbitrator’s decision in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit vacated. In concluding that Kass had consented to the amended Agreement, the district court erred by deciding a disputed issue of fact that must be decided by a trier of fact: whether Kass received notice of the amended Agreement and implicitly agreed to the new arbitration clause. View "Kass v. PayPal Inc." on Justia Law

A healthcare provider contended it was underpaid for substance abuse treatment that it rendered to 29 patients. Seeking to recover the difference directly from the insurance company, the provider filed suit alleging the insurer entered into binding payment agreements during verification of benefits and authorization calls with the provider and otherwise misrepresented or concealed the amounts it would pay for treatment. The trial court entered summary judgment against the provider. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the court did not err in determining one or more elements of the provider’s causes of action could not be established. View "Aton Center v. United Healthcare Ins. Co." on Justia Law