Norfolk Southern Railway Company (Norfolk Southern) petitioned for review of a decision of the Surface Transportation Board (STB or Board), the successor agency to the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) charged with authorizing certain rail carrier transactions under the Interstate Commerce Act. Norfolk Southern is a rail carrier that owns a 57.14 percent share of the Norfolk & Portsmouth Belt Line Railroad Company (Belt Line), the operator of a major switching terminal in Norfolk, Virginia. Norfolk Southern’s majority interest goes back to 1982, when its corporate family acquired and consolidated various rail carriers with smaller ownership interests in the Belt Line. Norfolk Southern’s competitor, CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSX), owns the remainder of the Belt Line’s shares (42.86 percent). This case involves a different question raised before the Board for the first time:  whether the ICC/Board approvals of Norfolk Southern’s subsequent corporate-family consolidations in 1991 and 1998 authorized Norfolk Southern to control the Belt Line. The Board again answered no. Norfolk Southern petitioned for review.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the Board’s decision regarding the 1991 and 1998 transactions is neither arbitrary nor capricious. The Board reasonably sought to avoid an absurd interpretation of 49 C.F.R. Section 1180.2(d)(3)’s corporate-family exemption that would allow a carrier to gain control of a new entity without following the Board’s review requirements and then “cure that unauthorized acquisition by reorganizing the corporate family.” The Board reasonably rejected Norfolk Southern’s claim that, by reshuffling the pieces of its corporate family, it acquired control authority of the Belt Line sub silentio. View "Norfolk Southern Railway Company v. STB" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Gregg Beldock contracted to purchase four solar assets in development from VWSD, LLC. Following allegations of breach, VWSD sold three of the solar assets to a third party, Green Lantern. Beldock filed a complaint against VWSD alleging breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment, and against Green Lantern and its president alleging tortious interference with contract and unjust enrichment. VWSD counterclaimed for breach of contract. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of all three defendants on Beldock’s claims and in part in favor of VWSD on its counterclaim. The Vermont Supreme Court agreed with the trial court’s grant of summary judgment regarding all claims against Green Lantern and its president and the implied-covenant claim against VWSD. However, because portions of the contract were ambiguous and a genuine dispute of material facts remained, the Court concluded summary judgment was inappropriate for Beldock’s breach-of-contract and unjust-enrichment claims against VWSD and VWSD’s counterclaim for breach of contract. Accordingly, judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Beldock v. VWSD, LLC et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the district court's judgment awarding attorney fees in this action brought over a dispute between a general contractor and a property owner related to a residential construction contract but otherwise affirmed the judgment, holding that there was no statute or uniform course of procedure that allowed recovery of attorney fees on this record.After Property Owner failed to pay a construction lien General Contractor filed a breach of contract action and sought to foreclosure on the lien. Property Owner counterclaimed. The district court entered judgment in favor of General Contractor. Thereafter, the district court granted prejudgment interest in the amount of $49,946 and attorney fees in the amount of $115,473. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment in part, holding that the district court (1) erred in awarding attorney fees pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 52-157 of the Nebraska Construction Lien Act; and (2) Property Owner was not entitled to relief on her remaining allegations of error. View "BCL Properties, Inc. v. Boyle" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the county court denying a motion to rescind and unwind a agreement entered into to settle Maronica B.'s personal injury claim against Davion Brewer and his automobile insurance carrier, holding that the county court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.Maronica sustained serious injuries when a car that Davion was driving and in which Maronica was a passenger collided with a school bus. Maronica's mother and then-conservator applied to the county court for permission to settlement Maronica's claims against Davion and his insurer. The county court authorized the settlement. Thereafter, Maronica's father, the successor conservator, moved to rescind and unwind the agreement on the grounds that the settlement potentially limited Maronica's recovery against non-settling parties. The county court denied the motion. The Supreme Court vacated the county court's order and dismissed this appeal, holding that the county court did not have subject matter jurisdiction. View "In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of Maronica B." on Justia Law

Penn-Star Insurance Company (Penn-Star) appealed a trial court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment. The Mississippi Supreme Court found after review of the trial court record that because the commercial general liability policy at issue did not cover the sustained losses, the trial court’s order was reversed, judgment was rendered in favor of Penn-Star, and this case was remanded to the trial court for consideration of the remaining issues. View "Penn-Star Insurance Company v. Thompson, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was arrested and released on a surety bond provided by Big Bubba’s. Plaintiff was formally charged with the same offense in April 2016, but due to an epileptic seizure, he was hospitalized before receiving notice of the indictment. As a result, he was incapacitated for several months, but according to Plaintiff, his wife stayed in touch with Big Bubba’s on his behalf. Big Bubba’s filed a petition with the trial court, requesting an arrest warrant for Plaintiff on the grounds that he had failed to fulfill his contractual obligations by neglecting to check in and provide contact information. The trial court granted the request, and Plaintiff was arrested pursuant. Plaintiff sued Big Bubba’s, alleging that it violated their agreement and caused him to be wrongfully arrested by presenting misleading information to the court. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s Memorandum and Recommendation and granted Big Bubba’s motion to dismiss. On appeal, Plaintiff contends that his false imprisonment and contract claims were wrongly dismissed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court as to Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim, and the court reversed and remanded his contract claim. The court explained that while Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim was properly dismissed, his contract claim was not. The district court held that principals, such as Plaintiff, who seek to contest a surrender, are “limited to the remedy” set out in Tex. Occ. Code Section 1704.207(b)–(c). Thus the court concluded that Plaintiff is not limited to this remedy and therefore reverse the dismissal of his claim. View "Jeanty v. Big Bubba's" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and his colleague secured provisional patents for a medical device and created a new company, Caisson Interventional, LLC. He sold it to LivaNova USA, Inc. in order to develop and bring it to market. When LivaNova shut down the project, he sued. The district court granted summary judgment for LivaNova. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that LivaNova breached section 4.3 of the UPA. The parties dispute the meaning of LivaNova’s obligation to be “consistent with the efforts and level of care and business decisions [LivaNova] and its affiliates employ generally.” Plaintiff emphasized the obligation to act “consistent with” the (1) efforts, (2) levels of care, and (3) business decisions employed in LivaNova’s other projects. LivaNova stressed the authorization to act as it “generally” does.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that evidence that LivaNova treated similarly situated companies differently than it treated Caisson might carry Plaintiff’s claim past summary judgment. But Plaintiff points to no such evidence in the record—Caisson’s particularities undercut Plaintiff’s premise that a “general approach” to its development can be inferred from LivaNova’s other projects. When Plaintiff argued that Caisson was treated differently than other projects, LivaNova presented evidence that Caisson was different than other projects. With only apples-to-oranges comparisons available on this record, Plaintiff cannot establish a “general” approach to developing the unique Caisson device and thus cannot show inconsistency with the UPA’s requirements. In short, the court held that the device did not work well enough to trigger a contractual obligation. View "Todd Mortier v. LivaNova USA, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgment granted by the trial court in favor of a school corporation that contractually agreed to make biannual payments to a company for access to a wind turbine, holding that the contract was void and unenforceable.Randolph Eastern School Corporation (RESC) contractually agreed to make biannual payments to Performance Services, Inc. for a wind-turbine project. As part of the contract, Performance agreed to provide RESC with financial benefits tied to the net revenue of the turbine. RESC, which never made any payments to Performance, brought this declaratory judgment action seeking to void the contract on the grounds that it constituted an illegal investment. The trial court granted RESC's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the contract constituted an unauthorized investment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the contract between RESC and Performance was void and unenforceable because it constituted an investment unauthorized by statute. View "Performance Services, Inc. v. Randolph Eastern School Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Petitioner's petition seeking relief from fraudulent transfers Respondent made to hinder collection of her judgments against him, holding that Petitioner adequately alleged facts that, if true, entitled her to relief under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act (UFTA), Mo. Rev. Stat. 428.005 to 428.059.On appeal, Petitioner argued that she alleged facts that, if taken as true, demonstrated that she was Respondent's creditor and that he made two transfers with the actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud her and, regarding one of the transfers, without receiving an equivalent value in exchange and either was insolvent or became insolvent as a result of the transfer. The Supreme Court agreed and remanded the case, holding that Petitioner adequately pleaded a claim for relief under both Mo. Rev. Stat. 428.024.1(1) and Mo. Rev. Stat. 928.029.1. View "Konopasek v. Konopasek" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging seven causes of action against TFMI. Plaintiff alleged he entered into two oral contracts with TFMI for which he has not been paid – one for his management of TFMI farms located in Arizona and New Mexico (out-of-state management services) and the other for consulting services he rendered in connection with the management of TFMI orchards located in California (instate consulting services). The trial court entered judgment in favor of TFMI and against Schmidt.   The Fifth Appellate District reversed the trial court’s judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint alleging seven causes of action against TFMI. The court held that the trial court erred in applying California law instead of Illinois law in determining whether to enforce the forum selection provision. The court held that in the interests of justice, it is best to remand the case to the trial court for reconsideration of the issue. Moreover, the parties themselves did not apply the correct law in arguing for or against the motion to quash and, thus, may not have submitted evidence they might now consider relevant to the court’s determination. Accordingly, the court explained it believes the trial court should entertain and consider additional briefing and evidence from each of the parties concerning the application of Illinois law to the question of whether the trial court should exercise, or decline to exercise, jurisdiction over claims involving the assigned Summit Gold invoices. View "Schmidt v. Trinut Farm Management" on Justia Law