In this putative class action where Students sought a refund of money from the University of Kentucky after the University switched all on-campus classes to an online format for the remainder of the spring 2020 semester, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's ruling that governmental immunity was waived and that a breach of contract claim may proceed for adjudication on the merits, holding that the Student Financial Obligation and accompanying documents were a written contract under Ky. Rev. Stat. 45A.245(1) such that governmental immunity was waived and the underlying breach of contract claims may proceed. View "University of Ky. v. Regard" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court enforcing a settlement agreement between Petitioner and Respondents, holding that the circuit court erred when it found that the parties entered into a settlement agreement by e-mail without holding a hearing on the matter.On appeal, Petitioner argued that the settlement lacked mutual assent and that the terms of the purported settlement required a written agreement. The court granted Respondents' motion to enforce the settlement agreement, finding that the parties agreed to all material terms of the agreement and formed a contract through their emails. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the paucity of the record before the circuit court required an evidentiary hearing for the court to determine whether there was a meeting of the minds regarding the terms of the agreement. View "Levine v. Rockwool International A/S" on Justia Law

Hicks Unlimited, Inc. contracted to rent uniforms for its employees from UniFirst Corporation. The contract contained an arbitration provision stating all disputes between them would be decided by binding arbitration to be conducted "pursuant to the Expedited Procedures of the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association [AAA] and shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act [FAA]." A dispute arose; UniFirst moved to compel arbitration. Hicks contended the arbitration agreement was unenforceable because it did not comply with the notice requirements of South Carolina's Arbitration Act (SCAA). The circuit court denied the motion to compel arbitration, ruling the contract did not implicate interstate commerce and, therefore, the FAA did not apply. The circuit court further ruled the arbitration provision was not enforceable because it did not meet the SCAA's notice requirements. UniFirst appealed. The court of appeals reversed, holding arbitration should have been compelled because the contract involved interstate commerce and, therefore, the FAA preempted the SCAA. The South Carolina Supreme Court found that because the contract between Hicks and UniFirst did not involve interstate commerce in fact, the order of the circuit court denying UniFirst's motion to compel arbitration was affirmed, and the court of appeals' opinion was reversed. View "Hicks Unlimited v. UniFirst" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court granting Verizon New England Inc.'s motion to dismiss this complaint related to a billing dispute over a particular telephone service contract, holding that the hearing justice erred in granting Defendant's motion to dismiss, which had been converted sub silentio to a motion for summary judgment.Plaintiff filed a complaint against Verizon alleging false representation and breach of contract stemming from a billing dispute. Verizon filed a motion to dismiss under Sup. Ct. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The hearing justice dismissed Plaintiff's complaint in its entirety with prejudice. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment below, holding that that issues of genuine material fact existed precluding summary judgment. View "Resmini v. Verizon New England Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of Supreme Court in favor of Plaintiff Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB in this case involving a dispute over payments due under a promissory note relating to Defendants' mortgage, holding that summary judgment was improperly granted under the terms of this case.Plaintiff's predecessor filed a complaint against Defendants alleging breach of contract. The hearing justice granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff. Defendants appealed, arguing that the issue of whether Plaintiff complied with the note's notice provisions was a question of material fact precluding summary judgment. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment below, holding that Plaintiff's failure to send the notice of default to the property address referred to in the note was not in accordance with the terms of the note, and therefore, summary judgment should not have been granted. View "Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB v. Cavalloro" on Justia Law

After submitting the winning bid, Eagle Rock Timber, Inc. (“Eagle Rock”), contracted with Teton County, Idaho to reconstruct a stretch of road known as “Chapin Lane.” During the course of the project, Eagle Rock claimed it discovered unsuitable base material under portions of the road. Eagle Rock maintained that Teton County’s agent, Darryl Johnson, directed Eagle Rock to remove the material and said that the county would “make it right.” However, when Eagle Rock attempted to recover an amount in excess of the original Contract Price, Teton County denied Eagle Rock’s request, stating that it had not authorized any changes to the Contract. When the parties could not resolve this dispute over the amount owed, Eagle Rock filed suit. Teton County twice moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the first motion, concluding that genuine issues of material fact existed concerning whether Johnson orally waived the writing requirement and whether Johnson had authorized Eagle Rock to remove the unsuitable base material, which could support an equitable remedy. In the County's second motion, the district court granted it, ruling that since Teton County’s agent did not have actual or apparent authority to bind Teton County, the claims asserted by Eagle Rock failed as a matter of law. Eagle Rock appealed, asserting that the district court erred because there were still genuine issues of material fact that should be resolved by a jury. Further, Eagle Rock claimed the district court’s refusal to grant leave to amend its complaint to assert a separate cause of action against Johnson personally was an abuse of discretion. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and denial of leave to amend. However, the Court affirmed the district court in not considering the ratification issue because it was beyond the scope of the pleadings at the time it was presented. View "Eagle Rock Timber, Inc. v. Teton County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the business court disposing of WW Consultants, Inc.'s (WWC) claims for contractual indemnity in favor of third-party defendants but affirmed in part as to the denial of WWC's claims for implied indemnity and contribution in favor of third-party defendants, holding that the business court erred by granting summary judgment for third-party defendants on this claim.In this case arising from a dispute involving the construction of a wastewater treatment facility in Pocahontas County, WWC, the project's design engineer, appealed the business court's rulings dismissing or granting summary judgment to three third-party defendant contractors who supplied materials for or worked on the project. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) there were material questions of fact that precluded summary judgment as to WWC's contractual indemnity claim; (2) WWC failed to plead or present facts alleging the requisite special relationships to support its implied indemnity claims; and (3) WWC failed to plead contribution claims that are recognized under the modified comparative fault statutory scheme codified at W. Va. Code 55-7-13a to -13d. View "WW Consultants, Inc. v. Pocahontas County Public Service District" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a U.S. citizen and Illinois resident of Indian origin, opened a non-resident account with the State Bank of India through one of its India-based branches. When the State Bank of India retroactively changed the terms of the account, Plaintiff sued for breach of contract. The district court dismissed his complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act applied to Bhattacharya’s claim and immunized the Bank from suit.   The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court was correct to conclude that these activities are insufficient to establish a direct effect in the United States. Plaintiff’s non-resident account is maintained in India, and the relevant transactions were with the Bank’s India-based branches. The court explained that Plaintiff did not allege that his suit related to any account held with a U.S.-based branch of the Bank or was otherwise related to any actions the Bank had taken here. Nor did he point to any agreement with the State Bank of India that established the United States as the site of performance. Accordingly, the court held that Plaintiff’s contract agreement established his account with the Indian branches of the Bank. View "Arun Bhattacharya v. State Bank of India" on Justia Law

Dr. Robert P. Rothenberg (Rob) tragically suffered a fatal heart attack prior to paying the initial premium on his term life insurance policy issued by Principal National Life Insurance Company (Principal). Principal filed this action in the district court, seeking a declaratory judgment that Appellant— the policy’s intended beneficiary—was not owed death benefits in light of the nonpayment. Appellant filed a counterclaim, asserting claims against Principal for breach of contract, vexatious denial of proceeds, and negligence, as well as claims against Appellee, the couple’s insurance broker and financial planner, for negligence. After the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Principal and Appellee, finding, in part, that the policy was not in effect at the time of Rob’s death. Appellant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in concluding (1) that the Policy was not in effect at the time of Rob’s death and (2) that, assuming the Policy was not in effect, neither Principal nor Appellee were negligent because neither owed a duty to Appellant.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Appellant did not pay the initial premium until after Rob’s death, at which time he was not in a similar state of health as when he applied for the policy. Moreover, any “privileges and rights” Rob (or Appellant) had to retroactively effectuate the Policy were terminated at Rob’s death pursuant to the Policy’s termination provision. Second, Rob’s signature on the EFT Form alone did not render the Policy effective on April 26, 2019, or earlier. View "Principal National Life Insurance Company v. Donna Rothenberg" on Justia Law

This case involves a contract dispute between an automobile-product manufacturer and one of its distributors. The distributor, Plaintiff Wesden, LLC, appealed the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of its fraud claim and summary-judgment dismissal of its breach-of-contract claim against the manufacturer, Defendant Illinois Tool Works, Inc. d/b/a ITW Evercoat (“ITW”).   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the issue here reduces to the plausibility of Wesden’s fraud claim. Construing the complaint in Wesden’s favor, the claim is that, at the September 2018 meeting, ITW promised Wesden that it could sell Auto Magic products through online marketplaces like Amazon and that ITW would not stop Wesden from doing so or otherwise appropriate those online markets for itself. The court concluded that Wesden’s complaint does not permit a reasonable inference of fraud. Wesden’s alleged facts do not allow us to reasonably infer that, in September 2018, ITW had “no intention” of adhering to its promise to permit Wesden’s sales on Amazon and similar marketplaces.   Further, ITW has invoked the statute of frauds to assert that the parties’ agreement is unenforceable. The court explained that a requirements contract still must satisfy the statute of frauds, which demands a written quantity term. Wesden has identified no written term either specifying a quantity of goods or stating that Wesden will buy all of its requirements from ITW. The contract thus fails to satisfy the statute of frauds and is therefore unenforceable. View "Wesdem v. Illinois Tool Works" on Justia Law