Congress assigned implementation of the PPP to the Small Business Administration (SBA). Potential borrowers must have answered “No” to whether “any individual owning 20% or more of the equity of the Applicant [was] subject to an indictment, criminal information, arraignment, or other means by which formal criminal charges are brought in any jurisdiction, or presently incarcerated, or on probation or parole.” When completing a PPP loan application on behalf of law firm Ramey & Schwaller, L.L.P., owner William Ramey answered “No” to that question. Zions Bancorporation, NA, doing business as Amegy Bank, approved the law firm’s application and disbursed a $249,300 loan. Later, the bank learned that Ramey had actually been subject to a criminal complaint accusing him of attempted sexual assault in Harris County, Texas. So the bank held the law firm in default and froze the firm’s accounts as an offset to the loan balance. The law firm then filed this action against the bank, seeking a declaratory judgment that Ramey did not answer the application question falsely. The bank alleged a counterclaim for breach of contract. The district court granted summary judgment to the bank and dismissed the law firm’s claims.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that because Ramey was, at least, subject to “means by which formal criminal charges are brought” at the time he completed the Application, he answered Question 5 falsely on behalf of Ramey & Schwaller. Accordingly, the law firm was in default under the PPP loan documents, and the district court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of Amegy Bank. View "Ramey & Schwaller v. Zions Bancorp" on Justia Law

In this case alleging defective design and development of a commercial property the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that the running of limitations was equitably tolled while the suit was on appeal, holding that there was no tolling.The suit in this breach of contract and negligence action was eventually dismissed for failure to file a certificate of merit. Plaintiff nonsuited its claims and refiled. The court of appeals held that the certificate of merit was deficient as to the breach of contract claim but complied with the statute with respect to the negligence claim. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the certificate of merit failed to satisfy Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 150.002 as to Plaintiff's negligence claim. The Supreme Court remanded the case for a determination of whether the dismissal should be with or without prejudice. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a new suit against Defendant that included a new certificate of merit. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendant on the grounds that Plaintiff's claims were time-barred. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Plaintiff was entitled to equitable tolling. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was no tolling during the appeal of the earlier-filed lawsuit. View "Levinson Alcoser Associates, LP v. El Pistolon II, Ltd." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the decision of the district court granting a partial summary judgment construing a long-term written lease between Owner and Tenant and, after a trial, entering a judgment regarding the parties dispute over minimum rent, holding that a factual issue existed precluding summary judgment.Owner sued Tenant for breach of contract after the parties could not agree when renegotiating minimum rent, alleging express breach of contract, declaratory judgment, and breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. The district court entered partial summary judgment in favor of Owner construing the lease but held that there were material facts in dispute as to whether Owner violated the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing when renegotiating. After a trial, the court entered judgment for Owner. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the provision in the lease regarding minimum rent is ambiguous, and therefore, the court's entry of partial summary judgment on the issue must be reversed. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Brush & Co. v. W. O. Zangger & Son, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court determining that Bank breached its contract with Respondent by refusing to tender payment upon Respondent's presentation of an an original unendorsed money market certificate of deposit (CD), holding that Bank was not entitled to relief on its allegations of error.Respondent presented to Bank and demanded payment of the CD issued in 1980 by Bank and payable either to Respondent or her father. Bank denied payment, determining that there was no existing account associated with the CD. Respondent brought this action alleging breach of contract. The jury found for Respondent and awarded her damages. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in denying Bank's motion for judgment as a matter of law; (2) the circuit court did not err in refusing two proffered jury instructions; and (3) the filing of this matter was not barred by the applicable statute of limitations. View "Wesbanco Bank, Inc. v. Ellifritz" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals modified the decision of the appellate division in this case challenging the devaluation of certain securities, holding that the relevant language in the governing agreements did not impose an affirmative duty on the part of the trustee to enforce repurchase obligations.Plaintiffs were commercial banks incorporated in Germany that invested in residential mortgage-backed securities issued by securitization trusts. Defendants served as trustees for the trusts. When the securities lost significant value in 2008, Plaintiffs sued, alleging that Defendants breached multiple statutory, contractual, and fiduciary duties. Supreme Court rejected Defendants' argument that the action was barred because Plaintiffs did not comply with the requirements of the no-action clause. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding (1) failure to comply with the no-action clause did not bar this suit; and (2) this Court declines to recognize an implied contractual duty on Trustees' part to enforce the repurchase protocol obligations of other parties. View "IKB Int'l S.A. v Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

After Wynndalco Enterprises, LLC was sued in two putative class actions for violating Illinois’ Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”), its business liability insurer, Citizens Insurance Company of America, filed an action seeking a declaration that it has no obligation under the terms of the insurance contract to indemnify Wynndalco for the BIPA violations or to supply Wynndalco with a defense. Citizens’ theory is that alleged violations of BIPA are expressly excluded from the policy coverage. Wynndalco counterclaimed, seeking a declaration to the contrary that Citizens is obligated to provide it with defense in both actions. The district court entered judgment on the pleadings for Wynndalco.   The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the narrowing construction that Citizens proposes to resolve that ambiguity is not supported by the language of the provision and does not resolve the ambiguity. Given what the district court described as the “intractable ambiguity” of the provision, the court held Citizens must defend Wynndalco in the two class actions. This duty extends to the common law claims asserted against Wynndalco in the other litigation, which, as Citizens itself argued, arise out of the same acts or omissions as the BIPA claim asserted in that suit. View "Citizens Insurance Company of America v. Wynndalco Enterprises, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the decision of the appellate court reversing the judgment of the circuit court in favor of PML Development LLC on its action against the Village of Hawthorn Woods for breach of a development agreement between the parties and against the Village on its counterclaim for breach of the agreement, holding that the circuit court erred in granting judgment in favor of PML on the Village's breach of contract counterclaims.Following a bench trial, the circuit court found that both parties materially breached the agreement at issue but that the Village's first material breach excused PML from performing its contractual obligations. The appellate court reversed, concluding that neither the Village or PML could recover damages because each party materially breached the agreement. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court correctly entered judgment in favor of PML on its breach of contract claims; and (2) the circuit court erred in granting judgment in favor of PML on the Village's breach of contract counterclaims. View "PML Development LLC v. Village of Hawthorn Woods" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals reversing the order of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of Phoenix American Administrators, LLC and Phoenix American Warranty Company, Inc. in this case stemming from a contract dispute in which Plaintiff sought to recover damages from Phoenix, holding that summary judgment was prematurely granted.Phoenix was the administrator of a guaranteed asset protection waiver addendum entered into by Plaintiff during the course of his purchase of and the financing of a motor vehicle. Plaintiff sued Phoenix for breach of contract, and the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Phoenix. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that a factual dispute existed precluding summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err. View "Phoenix American Administrators, LLC v. Lee" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company's petition for a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Brian Edwards of the Jefferson Circuit Court from enforcing certain discovery orders, holding that State Farm was not entitled to the writ.Betty Irvin was involved in an automobile collision with Deborah Combs, who was insured by State Farm. Irvin brought suit, alleging a negligence claim against Combs and a third-party statutory bad faith claim under Kentucky's Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act, Ky. Rev. Stat. 304.12-230, against State Farm. The trial court bifurcated the bad faith claim against State Farm from the other claims. Later, State Farm filed this petition seeking to prevent Judge Edwards from enforcing his discovery orders on the grounds that Irvin's bad faith claim against it was not yet ripe. The court of appeals denied the writ petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err. View "State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Honorable Edwards" on Justia Law

In this putative class action where Students sought a refund of money from the University of Kentucky after the University switched all on-campus classes to an online format for the remainder of the spring 2020 semester, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's ruling that governmental immunity was waived and that a breach of contract claim may proceed for adjudication on the merits, holding that the Student Financial Obligation and accompanying documents were a written contract under Ky. Rev. Stat. 45A.245(1) such that governmental immunity was waived and the underlying breach of contract claims may proceed. View "University of Ky. v. Regard" on Justia Law