This dispute began in 2016 when Defendants sued a motorist in state court for damages stemming from an automobile accident. The motorist fled the scene of the accident, was criminally charged for failing to provide his name, address, and insurance information, and pleaded nolo contendere to a criminal misdemeanor. The motorist was insured by Allstate Fire & Casualty Insurance Company (“Allstate”). Allstate paid Defendants claims for property damages, but Defendants rejected Allstate’s offers to resolve their physical injury claims, demanding the policy limit of $50,000. The district court determined that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the lawsuit, denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). It subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of Allstate, finding that the motorist’s failure to cooperate in the underlying suit prejudiced Allstate and barred any legal obligation to pay Defendants the judgment amount of $163,822.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that it had subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that where the claim under the policy exceeds the value of the policy limit, courts considering declaratory judgments should ask whether there is a legal possibility that the insurer could be subject to liability in excess of the policy limit. The party seeking diversity jurisdiction should establish this possibility by a preponderance of the evidence. View "Allstate Fire and Casualty v. Allison Love" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a 2019 lease by Respondents the City of Sandpoint (“the City”) to The Festival at Sandpoint (“The Festival”), a nonprofit corporation, to operate a multi-day music concert series in War Memorial Field Park. The Festival had a long-standing policy of prohibiting festival patrons from bringing weapons, including firearms, into the event. On August 9, 2019, Scott Herndon and Jeff Avery purchased tickets to the festival and attempted to enter. Avery openly carried a firearm and Herndon possessed a firearm either on his person or in a bag (the record was unclear on this point). Security personnel for the event denied entry to both. After discussions with a City police officer and the City’s attorney, who was coincidentally attending the same event in his private capacity, Herndon and Avery eventually left the music festival and received a refund for their tickets. Appellants Herndon, Avery, the Idaho Second Amendment Alliance, Inc., and the Second Amendment Foundation, Inc. subsequently sued the City and The Festival, asserting several claims, including seeking injunctive relief prohibiting the Respondents from violating the Idaho and United States Constitutions, particularly the Second Amendment and the Idaho Constitution’s provision securing the right to keep and bear arms in public for all lawful purposes. The district court ultimately granted the Respondents’ motions for summary judgment, awarded both the City and The Festival attorney fees and costs, and dismissed all the Appellants’ claims with prejudice. The issue raised on appeal was whether a private party who leased public property from a municipality may govern those who come and go from the property during the lease. The Idaho Supreme Court responded in the affirmative, and affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Herndon v. City of Sandpoint" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Hughes Communications India Private Limited (“Hughes India”) appealed from a district court judgment dismissing its indemnification claims against The DirecTV Group, Inc. (“DirecTV”). The case arises out of an asset purchase agreement in which DirecTV spun off fourteen subsidiaries, including Hughes India (the “Agreement”). The Agreement requires DirecTV to indemnify Hughes India for certain contractually defined “Taxes” that accrued before the closing of the spin-off transaction and “Proceedings” that were initiated prior to the closing date. Hughes India sought a declaration that DirecTV must indemnify it for unpaid license fees, interest, and penalties imposed by India’s Department of Telecommunications (the “DOT”). The district court granted summary judgment for DirecTV, concluding that the license fees were not subject to indemnification because they were neither Taxes nor the result of Proceedings against Hughes India as defined by the Agreement. Hughes India appealed.   The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. The court agreed with Hughes India that under the plain terms of the Agreement, the license fees are Taxes, and the Provisional License Fee Assessment (the “Provisional Assessment”) issued by the DOT initiated a Proceeding against Hughes India. The court concluded that DirecTV is obligated to indemnify Hughes India for license fees, interest, and penalties accrued for tax periods ending on or before closing and for those amounts related to the Provisional Assessment issued for fiscal years 2001 to 2003, which was the only Proceeding initiated before closing. View "Hughes Communications India Private Limited v. The DirecTV Group, Inc." on Justia Law

NuVasive, Inc. manufactures medical products and equipment to treat spinal diseases. In central Florida, NuVasive sold its products through an exclusive distribution agreement with Absolute Medical, LLC. Under the agreement, Absolute Medical employed independent-contractor sales representatives who marketed and sold NuVasive’s products to doctors and medical practices in the region. NuVasive sued Absolute Medical, Soufleris, AMS, and two of Absolute Medical’s sales representatives who began working for AMS for breaching the exclusive. The district court enforced a dispute resolution clause in the agreement, ordering NuVasive and Absolute Medical to arbitrate NuVasive’s breach-of-contract claim seeking money damages. Absolute Medical, Soufleris, AMS, and the sales representatives appealed the district court’s order granting NuVasive’s motion to vacate the arbitration panel’s final award.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court did not err by equitably tolling the three-month filing deadline and considering NuVasive’s motion as timely. The court explained that the district court’s findings of fact were not clearly erroneous, and they supported the district court’s conclusion that NuVasive satisfied both prongs of the equitable tolling analysis. Defendants’ conduct presented extraordinary circumstances, and NuVasive was diligent once it learned that there was reason to pursue vacatur. Further, the court held that the district court did not err by vacating the final award. The district court correctly concluded that the fraud was materially related to that issue. Finally, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to direct a rehearing by the arbitration panel. View "Nuvasive, Inc. v. Absolute Medical, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

The three plaintiffs in this case had each rented rooms at an extended-stay motel for some time. They fell behind on their rent and were threatened with immediate eviction. They sued to stop that from happening, claiming that they were in a landlord-tenant relationship with the motel and could not be evicted without dispossessory proceedings in court. The motel argued that it had signed agreements with the plaintiffs that foreclosed their claims because, among other things, the agreement stated that their relationship was one of “Innkeeper and Guest,” and “not . . . Landlord and Tenant.” The trial court agreed with plaintiffs, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. After its review, the Georgia Supreme Court vacated the appellate court's opinion and remanded with direction for the trial court to determine the parties' relationship under the proper legal framework. View "Efficiency Lodge, Inc. v. Neason, et al." on Justia Law

Bennett, an oral and maxillofacial surgeon, purchased three disability income insurance policies from National in 1984, 1991, and 1995. Under the policies, monthly benefits were payable for life if he was totally disabled due to injury; if due to sickness, benefits would only be paid until the age of 65. National initially approved Bennett’s 2014 claim that he was totally disabled due to an injury sustained when thrown from his horse. In June 2015, National notified him of its determination that his disability was due to sickness, not an injury. National continued to pay disability benefits until September 2018, the policy year Bennett turned 65 years old.Bennett sued. The trial court granted National summary judgment, concluding his claims were barred by the statutes of limitation — four years for breach of contract and two years for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing–both of which accrued when National issued an unconditional denial of liability in June 2015. The court of appeal reversed, agreeing with Bennett that his causes of action did not accrue until all elements — including actual damages — were complete. Bennett suffered no harm as of June 2015, because National continued to pay disability benefits. Only in September 2018 — when National began withholding benefits, and Bennett thereby incurred damages — did his causes of action accrue. View "Bennett v. Ohio National Life Assurance Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought this action against West Bend Mutual Insurance Company (“West Bend”) after West Bend refused to pay claims for uninsured/underinsured (“UM/UIM”) benefits under an insurance policy that insured Plaintiffs. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of West Bend. Plaintiffs contended the district court erred in concluding that British Columbia law rather than Iowa law determines the extent of Plaintiffs’ recoverable damages under the Policy.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that while Plaintiffs assert contract conflict of laws principles set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (“Restatement”) require that Iowa law determine the extent of their recovery, Hall v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co specifically held that no conflict of laws problem exists when the tortfeasor is only subject to personal jurisdiction in courts that would apply identical law. Further, the court wrote that Section 516A.1 only requires that insurance companies offer the type of coverage at issue in this case. The statute does not define what it means for an insured to be “legally entitled to recover” damages from an uninsured or underinsured motorist such that it could abrogate Hall. Finally, the court found that the plain language of this provision provides only that West Bend may “reduce” its otherwise applicable coverage by certain other amounts available. Where, as here, the insurer has no liability under the Policy’s coverage provisions, the Available Insurance Provision does not operate as an affirmative grant of coverage extending to what are otherwise uncovered losses. View "Gregg Geerdes v. West Bend Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals in this insurance dispute over damages allegedly caused by the poor construction of an in-ground pool, holding that this Court overrules the portions of Wisconsin Pharmacy Co. v. Nebraska Cultures of California, Inc., 876 N.W.2d 72 (Wis. 2016), stating that "property damages" must be to "other property" for purposes of determining an initial grant of coverage in a commercial general liability (CGL) policy.Due to the damages caused by the cracking of Homeowner's pool, Homeowner was forced to demolish the entire pool structure and construct a new one. Two insurers on appeal had issued CGL policies to the pool's general contractor, and a third insurer issued a CGL policy to the supplier of the pump mix used for the pool's construction. All three insurers sought a declaration that their policies did not provide coverage to Homeowner. The Supreme Court held, under the circumstances of this case, that none of the insurers were entitled to summary judgment and accordingly remanded the cause back to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "5 Walworth, LLC v. Engerman Contracting, Inc." on Justia Law

CEATS, Inc. is a non-practicing intellectual property company that owns patents for technologies used in online ticketing. TicketNetwork, Inc. and Ticket Software LLC (together “Ticket”) maintain an online marketplace for tickets to live events. More than a decade ago, CEATS filed a patent-infringement lawsuit against Ticket and other providers (the “2010 Lawsuit”). CEATS and Ticket settled that suit. The settlement agreement gave Ticket a license to use CEATS’s patents in exchange for a lump-sum payment from Ticket and for ongoing royalty payments from Ticket and its affiliates (the “License Agreement”). CEATS continued its litigation against the remaining non-settling defendants, but the jury in that case found that CEATS’s patents were invalid. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed that part of the Sanctions Order that imposes joint and several monetary liability against CEATS. The court vacated those parts of the Sanctions Order that impose joint and several monetary liability against the Individuals, that impose the Licensing Bar, and that deny CEATS’s tolling request. The court vacated the Calculation Order and remanded for further proceedings. The court explained that here CEATS told the district court that a discovery violation “must be committed willfully or in bad faith for the court to award the severest remedies available under Rule 37(b).” CEATS also argued that it did not violate the Protective Order willfully or in bad faith because the “communications . . . were clearly inadvertent.” That argument was enough to put the district court on notice that CEATS opposed any definition of “bad faith” that includes inadvertent conduct. View "CEATS v. TicketNetwork" on Justia Law

Over the course of twenty-two months, Plaintiff-—a childhood victim of lead poisoning—assigned his rights to nearly one million dollars in structured settlement payments to factoring companies for pennies on the dollar. Through six transfer agreements that he lacked the capacity to understand, Plaintiff relinquished his rights to monthly payments with a total aggregate value of $959,834.42 spread over the course of about twenty-six years for a series of immediate lump-sum cash payments that amounted to $268,130. Plaintiff sued Transamerica Annuity Service Corporation and Transamerica Life Insurance Company (collectively, “Transamerica”), the entities that issued and funded his periodic payments before he assigned them. Plaintiff asserted two claims against Transamerica: one for breach of contract under New York law and the other for exploitation of a vulnerable adult under Florida’s Adult Protective Services Act (“FAPSA”), Florida Statute Section 415.1111.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff’s FAPSA claim fails under the plain language of the statute. In his operative complaint, Plaintiff does not allege that Transamerica intended to deprive him of the use of his funds. Instead, Plaintiff asserts that Transamerica “allowed” (or “facilitated”) his exploitation by the factoring companies, which resulted in an unauthorized taking of his assets. Based on the facts that Plaintiff pleaded, Transamerica’s actions simply do not amount to “exploitation,” as that term is defined in FAPSA. Because Plaintiff has failed to state a violation of FAPSA, the court affirmed the district court’s with-prejudice dismissal of his FAPSA claim. View "Lujerio Cordero v. Transamerica Annuity Service, et al" on Justia Law