The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the superior court granting Defendant's motion to compel production of a complete, unreacted copy of a settlement agreement between Plaintiffs and the former codefendants who settled Plaintiffs' claims, holding that the trial justice abused her discretion in granting Defendant's motion.In granting Defendant's motion to compel production, the trial justice concluded that the amount paid in accordance with the settlement agreement was not discoverable "pursuant to Rhode Island and federal law." When Plaintiffs failed to comply with the order the superior court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court quashed the decision below and remanded the case, holding that the trial justice abused her discretion in granting Defendant's motion to compel production of a complete, unreacted copy of the settlement agreement. View "Noonan v. Sambandam" on Justia Law

Ford Motor Company (Ford) appealed from an order denying its motion to compel arbitration of Plaintiffs’ causes of action for breach of warranty, violations of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Civ. Code, Section 1790 et seq.; the Song-Beverly Act) and for fraudulent omission arising from alleged defects in a sports utility vehicle Plaintiffs’ purchased from the dealership, AutoNation Ford Valencia (AutoNation). The central question on appeal is whether Ford as the manufacturer of the vehicle, can enforce an arbitration provision in the sales contract between Plaintiffs and AutoNation to which Ford was not a party under the doctrine of equitable estoppel or as a third-party beneficiary of the contract.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded Ford cannot enforce the arbitration provision in the sales contract because Plaintiffs’ claims against Ford are founded on Ford’s express warranty for the vehicle, not any obligation imposed on Ford by the sales contract, and thus, Plaintiffs’ claims are not inextricably intertwined with any obligations under the sales contract. Nor was the sales contract between Plaintiffs and AutoNation intended to benefit Ford. View "Montemayor v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

In 2006 Ubiquity, a California-based company, contracted with North’s Illinois firm, Associates. North executed the contract in Arizona, where he lived, on behalf of Associates. Ubiquity promised to transfer 1.5% of its outstanding shares to Associates as a “commencement fee.” Ubiquity terminated the agreement two months after signing the contract and never transferred its shares. In 2013, when Ubiquity went public, North demanded specific performance, then sued Ubiquity for breach of contract in Arizona state court. The Arizona court denied Ubiquity’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.North, worried about reversal on appeal, filed an identical breach-of-contract claim in the Northern District of Illinois in 2016. Ubiquity failed to appear. The district court entered a default judgment ($7 million). Ubiquity successfully moved to vacate the default judgment and dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court explained that Ubiquity’s only connection to Illinois was that it had contracted with an Illinois entity and that North, by his own admissions, had negotiated, executed, and promised to perform in Arizona. North filed an appeal but obtained a stay while his Arizona litigation proceeded. That stay remained in effect until 2023; by then North’s contract claim was time-barred in every relevant jurisdiction.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although the district court ought to have considered transferring the case to the Central District of California (28 U.S.C. 1631) North’s own representations would have fatally undermined his transfer request. View "North v. Ubiquity, Inc." on Justia Law

Soaring Pine Capital Real Estate and Debt Fund II, LLC, filed suit against Park Street Group Realty Services, LLC; Park Street Group, LLC; and Dean Groulx, alleging multiple counts of breach of contract and fraud. Soaring Pine lent Park Street $1 million to “flip” tax-foreclosed homes in Detroit. The mortgage note had a stated interest rate of 20%, but there were fees and charges associated with the loan that, if considered interest, pushed the effective interest rate above 25%. The mortgage note also contained a "usury savings clause" stating that the note should not be construed to impose an illegal interest rate. After paying more than $140,000 in interest on the loan, Park Street discontinued further payments, arguing Soaring Pine violated the criminal usury statute, MCL 438.41, by knowingly charging an interest rate exceeding 25% and therefore was barred by the wrongful-conduct rule from recovering on the loan. Soaring Pine countered that the fees and charges associated with the loan were not interest and that the note had a usury savings clause that prevented it from charging a usurious rate. Soaring Pine further argued that, assuming it had engaged in criminal usury, it could still recover the loan principal and would only be precluded from collecting the interest. The trial court agreed with Park Street that the purported fees and expenses tied to the loan were really disguised interest, and there was no question of fact that Soaring Pine charged a criminally usurious interest rate. However, the court agreed with Soaring Pine that the usury savings clause was enforceable and that the appropriate remedy was to relieve Park Street of its obligation to pay the interest on the loan but not its obligation to repay the principal. The Michigan Supreme Court held that in determining whether a loan agreement imposes interest that exceeds the legal rate, a usury savings clause is ineffective if the loan agreement otherwise requires a borrower to pay an illegal interest rate. Seeking to collect an unlawful interest rate in a lawsuit, standing alone, was insufficient to trigger criminal liability under Michigan’s criminal usury statute. The appropriate remedy for a lender’s abusive lawsuit is success for the borrower in that lawsuit and appropriate civil sanctions, not a criminal conviction for usury. The Court reversed the appellate and trial courts to the extent they were inconsistent with the Supreme Court's holdings, and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Soaring Pine Capital Real Estate v. Park Street Group Realty" on Justia Law

In these two consolidated cases involving claims brought against the Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Inc. (ERCOT) the Supreme Court answered, among other questions, that ERCOT is a governmental unit as defined in the Texas Tort Claims Act and is thereby entitled to pursue an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction.CPS Energy sued ERCOT and several of its officers for, inter alia, breach of contract. The trial court denied ERCOT'S plea to the jurisdiction. Ultimately, the court of appeals held that ERCOT was a governmental unit entitled to take an interlocutory appeal. In the second case, Panda sued ERCOT for, inter alia, fraud. The trial court denied ERCOT's pleas to the jurisdiction. The court of appeals ultimately held that ERCOT was not entitled to sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed in the first case and reversed in the other, holding (1) ERCOT was entitled to pursue an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction; (2) the Public Utility Commission of Texas has exclusive jurisdiction over the parties' claims against ERCOT; and (3) ERCOT was entitled to sovereign immunity. View "CPS Energy v. Electric Reliability Council of Texas" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the county court in favor of the decedent's brother in this estate case, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the county court erred.Jordon R. Wiggins died, leaving two minor children and an ex-wife. In response to a claim against the estate regarding life insurance coverage that Wiggins was required under the divorce decree to maintain for the children's benefit, Wiggins's ex-wife, as guardian and next friend of the minor children, his brother, and his father, as personal representative of Wiggins's estate, entered into a settlement agreement. Thereafter, the parties jointly filed a petition for a declaration of their rights and obligations under the agreement. The county court ruled in favor of the brother, and the ex-wife appealed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the cause with directions for the county court to rescind the agreement and conduct further proceedings, holding that a mutual mistake as to the existence of a fact that was a material inducement to the contract is not ground for reformation, although it may be ground for rescission. View "In re Estate of Wiggins" on Justia Law

The case arose following an insurance dispute between Travelers Property Casualty Company of America (“Travelers”) and Ocean Reef Charters LLC (“Ocean Reef”), a Florida Limited Liability Company. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted summary judgment for Travelers, agreeing with it that federal law applied and that Ocean Reef, therefore, forfeited its insurance coverage. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that under Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co., Florida law applied. At issue is whether, under Florida’s anti-technical statute, the insurance company must prove that the breach of the Captain Warranty “contribute[d] to” the specific accident. Further, in meeting its burden of proof under Florida law, Travelers needed to introduce expert testimony in its case-in-chief about what would have been different if Ocean Reef had complied with the applicable warranties.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed on remand. The court held Travelers offered no expert witness— such as a licensed captain competent to speak to the issue—to prove that the lack of a full-time captain and crew played a role in the destruction of the yacht during Irma. The court explained that the Captain—whom Travelers did not disclose as an expert witness—could not provide his opinion on what would have happened to the My Lady if a licensed, professional captain were employed full-time. He could discuss the weather forecasts he observed. But those facts would leave the jury to speculate about what a captain would have done differently to avoid the storm under the specific circumstances of this case. View "Travelers Property Casualty Company of America v. Ocean Reef Charters LLC" on Justia Law

Through an Asset Purchase Agreement, seller Huntcole, LLC (Huntcole), transferred to buyer 4-Way Electric Services, LLC (4-Way), all property necessary to conduct the refurbishment business. The Asset Purchase Agreement did not include the building where the refurbishment business was located. Instead, Huntcole leased that building to 4-Way through a separate Lease. Three years after buying the business, 4-Way announced it was moving to a new building in a different city. It began removing large pieces of commercial equipment it believed it had purchased from Huntcole to conduct the refurbishment business. Huntcole protested and argued that because the equipment was affixed to the building, it was not transferred to 4-Way through the Asset Purchase Agreement. The trial court ruled in favor of Huntcole, finding the affixed equipment had been excluded from the Asset Purchase Agreement. After its review, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court's judgment. The Supreme Court found that based on the plain language of the Asset Purchase Agreement, 4-Way, by purchasing all assets necessary to conduct the refurbishment business, did in fact purchase the very equipment needed to conduct the business. The Asset Purchase Agreement also clearly designated the equipment as personal property and not as building improvements or fixtures. The Supreme Court concurred with the trial court that 4-Way did not have the right to cause damage to the building in a way that breached the Lease. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine the appropriate amount of damages to repair the building in accordance with the Lease, and to recalculate Huntcole's attorney fees' awards. View "4-Way Electric Services, LLC v. Huntcole, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

The Monte Vista Villas Project, on the site of the former Leona Quarry, has been in development since the early 2000s. The developers planned to close the 128-acre quarry site, reclaim it, and develop the land into a residential neighborhood with over 400 residential units, a community center, a park, pedestrian trails, and other recreational areas. In 2005, the developers entered into an agreement with Oakland to pay certain fees to cover the costs of its project oversight. The agreement provided that the fees set forth in the agreement satisfied “all of the Developer’s obligations for fees due to the City for the Project.” In 2016, Oakland adopted ordinances that imposed new impact fees on development projects, intended to address the effects of development on affordable housing, transportation, and capital improvements, and assessed the new impact fees on the Project, then more than a decade into development, when the developers sought new building permits.The trial court vacated the imposition of the fees and directed Oakland to refrain from assessing any fee not specified in the agreement. The court of appeal reversed, finding that any provision in, or construction of, the parties’ agreement that prevents Oakland from imposing the impact fees on the instant development project constitutes an impermissible infringement of the city’s police power and is therefore invalid. View "Discovery Builders, Inc. v. City of Oakland" on Justia Law

This dispute began in 2016 when Defendants sued a motorist in state court for damages stemming from an automobile accident. The motorist fled the scene of the accident, was criminally charged for failing to provide his name, address, and insurance information, and pleaded nolo contendere to a criminal misdemeanor. The motorist was insured by Allstate Fire & Casualty Insurance Company (“Allstate”). Allstate paid Defendants claims for property damages, but Defendants rejected Allstate’s offers to resolve their physical injury claims, demanding the policy limit of $50,000. The district court determined that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the lawsuit, denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). It subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of Allstate, finding that the motorist’s failure to cooperate in the underlying suit prejudiced Allstate and barred any legal obligation to pay Defendants the judgment amount of $163,822.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that it had subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that where the claim under the policy exceeds the value of the policy limit, courts considering declaratory judgments should ask whether there is a legal possibility that the insurer could be subject to liability in excess of the policy limit. The party seeking diversity jurisdiction should establish this possibility by a preponderance of the evidence. View "Allstate Fire and Casualty v. Allison Love" on Justia Law