The Supreme Court vacated the order of the county court denying a motion to rescind and unwind a agreement entered into to settle Maronica B.'s personal injury claim against Davion Brewer and his automobile insurance carrier, holding that the county court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.Maronica sustained serious injuries when a car that Davion was driving and in which Maronica was a passenger collided with a school bus. Maronica's mother and then-conservator applied to the county court for permission to settlement Maronica's claims against Davion and his insurer. The county court authorized the settlement. Thereafter, Maronica's father, the successor conservator, moved to rescind and unwind the agreement on the grounds that the settlement potentially limited Maronica's recovery against non-settling parties. The county court denied the motion. The Supreme Court vacated the county court's order and dismissed this appeal, holding that the county court did not have subject matter jurisdiction. View "In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of Maronica B." on Justia Law

Penn-Star Insurance Company (Penn-Star) appealed a trial court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment. The Mississippi Supreme Court found after review of the trial court record that because the commercial general liability policy at issue did not cover the sustained losses, the trial court’s order was reversed, judgment was rendered in favor of Penn-Star, and this case was remanded to the trial court for consideration of the remaining issues. View "Penn-Star Insurance Company v. Thompson, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was arrested and released on a surety bond provided by Big Bubba’s. Plaintiff was formally charged with the same offense in April 2016, but due to an epileptic seizure, he was hospitalized before receiving notice of the indictment. As a result, he was incapacitated for several months, but according to Plaintiff, his wife stayed in touch with Big Bubba’s on his behalf. Big Bubba’s filed a petition with the trial court, requesting an arrest warrant for Plaintiff on the grounds that he had failed to fulfill his contractual obligations by neglecting to check in and provide contact information. The trial court granted the request, and Plaintiff was arrested pursuant. Plaintiff sued Big Bubba’s, alleging that it violated their agreement and caused him to be wrongfully arrested by presenting misleading information to the court. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s Memorandum and Recommendation and granted Big Bubba’s motion to dismiss. On appeal, Plaintiff contends that his false imprisonment and contract claims were wrongly dismissed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court as to Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim, and the court reversed and remanded his contract claim. The court explained that while Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim was properly dismissed, his contract claim was not. The district court held that principals, such as Plaintiff, who seek to contest a surrender, are “limited to the remedy” set out in Tex. Occ. Code Section 1704.207(b)–(c). Thus the court concluded that Plaintiff is not limited to this remedy and therefore reverse the dismissal of his claim. View "Jeanty v. Big Bubba's" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and his colleague secured provisional patents for a medical device and created a new company, Caisson Interventional, LLC. He sold it to LivaNova USA, Inc. in order to develop and bring it to market. When LivaNova shut down the project, he sued. The district court granted summary judgment for LivaNova. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that LivaNova breached section 4.3 of the UPA. The parties dispute the meaning of LivaNova’s obligation to be “consistent with the efforts and level of care and business decisions [LivaNova] and its affiliates employ generally.” Plaintiff emphasized the obligation to act “consistent with” the (1) efforts, (2) levels of care, and (3) business decisions employed in LivaNova’s other projects. LivaNova stressed the authorization to act as it “generally” does.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that evidence that LivaNova treated similarly situated companies differently than it treated Caisson might carry Plaintiff’s claim past summary judgment. But Plaintiff points to no such evidence in the record—Caisson’s particularities undercut Plaintiff’s premise that a “general approach” to its development can be inferred from LivaNova’s other projects. When Plaintiff argued that Caisson was treated differently than other projects, LivaNova presented evidence that Caisson was different than other projects. With only apples-to-oranges comparisons available on this record, Plaintiff cannot establish a “general” approach to developing the unique Caisson device and thus cannot show inconsistency with the UPA’s requirements. In short, the court held that the device did not work well enough to trigger a contractual obligation. View "Todd Mortier v. LivaNova USA, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgment granted by the trial court in favor of a school corporation that contractually agreed to make biannual payments to a company for access to a wind turbine, holding that the contract was void and unenforceable.Randolph Eastern School Corporation (RESC) contractually agreed to make biannual payments to Performance Services, Inc. for a wind-turbine project. As part of the contract, Performance agreed to provide RESC with financial benefits tied to the net revenue of the turbine. RESC, which never made any payments to Performance, brought this declaratory judgment action seeking to void the contract on the grounds that it constituted an illegal investment. The trial court granted RESC's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the contract constituted an unauthorized investment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the contract between RESC and Performance was void and unenforceable because it constituted an investment unauthorized by statute. View "Performance Services, Inc. v. Randolph Eastern School Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Petitioner's petition seeking relief from fraudulent transfers Respondent made to hinder collection of her judgments against him, holding that Petitioner adequately alleged facts that, if true, entitled her to relief under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act (UFTA), Mo. Rev. Stat. 428.005 to 428.059.On appeal, Petitioner argued that she alleged facts that, if taken as true, demonstrated that she was Respondent's creditor and that he made two transfers with the actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud her and, regarding one of the transfers, without receiving an equivalent value in exchange and either was insolvent or became insolvent as a result of the transfer. The Supreme Court agreed and remanded the case, holding that Petitioner adequately pleaded a claim for relief under both Mo. Rev. Stat. 428.024.1(1) and Mo. Rev. Stat. 928.029.1. View "Konopasek v. Konopasek" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging seven causes of action against TFMI. Plaintiff alleged he entered into two oral contracts with TFMI for which he has not been paid – one for his management of TFMI farms located in Arizona and New Mexico (out-of-state management services) and the other for consulting services he rendered in connection with the management of TFMI orchards located in California (instate consulting services). The trial court entered judgment in favor of TFMI and against Schmidt.   The Fifth Appellate District reversed the trial court’s judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint alleging seven causes of action against TFMI. The court held that the trial court erred in applying California law instead of Illinois law in determining whether to enforce the forum selection provision. The court held that in the interests of justice, it is best to remand the case to the trial court for reconsideration of the issue. Moreover, the parties themselves did not apply the correct law in arguing for or against the motion to quash and, thus, may not have submitted evidence they might now consider relevant to the court’s determination. Accordingly, the court explained it believes the trial court should entertain and consider additional briefing and evidence from each of the parties concerning the application of Illinois law to the question of whether the trial court should exercise, or decline to exercise, jurisdiction over claims involving the assigned Summit Gold invoices. View "Schmidt v. Trinut Farm Management" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the superior court granting Defendant's motion to compel production of a complete, unreacted copy of a settlement agreement between Plaintiffs and the former codefendants who settled Plaintiffs' claims, holding that the trial justice abused her discretion in granting Defendant's motion.In granting Defendant's motion to compel production, the trial justice concluded that the amount paid in accordance with the settlement agreement was not discoverable "pursuant to Rhode Island and federal law." When Plaintiffs failed to comply with the order the superior court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court quashed the decision below and remanded the case, holding that the trial justice abused her discretion in granting Defendant's motion to compel production of a complete, unreacted copy of the settlement agreement. View "Noonan v. Sambandam" on Justia Law

Ford Motor Company (Ford) appealed from an order denying its motion to compel arbitration of Plaintiffs’ causes of action for breach of warranty, violations of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Civ. Code, Section 1790 et seq.; the Song-Beverly Act) and for fraudulent omission arising from alleged defects in a sports utility vehicle Plaintiffs’ purchased from the dealership, AutoNation Ford Valencia (AutoNation). The central question on appeal is whether Ford as the manufacturer of the vehicle, can enforce an arbitration provision in the sales contract between Plaintiffs and AutoNation to which Ford was not a party under the doctrine of equitable estoppel or as a third-party beneficiary of the contract.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded Ford cannot enforce the arbitration provision in the sales contract because Plaintiffs’ claims against Ford are founded on Ford’s express warranty for the vehicle, not any obligation imposed on Ford by the sales contract, and thus, Plaintiffs’ claims are not inextricably intertwined with any obligations under the sales contract. Nor was the sales contract between Plaintiffs and AutoNation intended to benefit Ford. View "Montemayor v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

In 2006 Ubiquity, a California-based company, contracted with North’s Illinois firm, Associates. North executed the contract in Arizona, where he lived, on behalf of Associates. Ubiquity promised to transfer 1.5% of its outstanding shares to Associates as a “commencement fee.” Ubiquity terminated the agreement two months after signing the contract and never transferred its shares. In 2013, when Ubiquity went public, North demanded specific performance, then sued Ubiquity for breach of contract in Arizona state court. The Arizona court denied Ubiquity’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.North, worried about reversal on appeal, filed an identical breach-of-contract claim in the Northern District of Illinois in 2016. Ubiquity failed to appear. The district court entered a default judgment ($7 million). Ubiquity successfully moved to vacate the default judgment and dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court explained that Ubiquity’s only connection to Illinois was that it had contracted with an Illinois entity and that North, by his own admissions, had negotiated, executed, and promised to perform in Arizona. North filed an appeal but obtained a stay while his Arizona litigation proceeded. That stay remained in effect until 2023; by then North’s contract claim was time-barred in every relevant jurisdiction.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although the district court ought to have considered transferring the case to the Central District of California (28 U.S.C. 1631) North’s own representations would have fatally undermined his transfer request. View "North v. Ubiquity, Inc." on Justia Law