Esplanade Productions, Inc. sued The Walt Disney Company and affiliated entities (collectively Disney) for breach of an implied-in-fact contract, breach of confidence and unfair competition, alleging Disney had used the creative ideas of Esplanade’s principal, Gary Goldman, in Disney’s animated motion picture Zootopia without compensating Esplanade. The trial court sustained without leave to amend the demurrer of Disney regarding the individual elements of the works and the works as a whole, finding they were not substantially similar as a matter of law. The court overruled Disney’s demurrer as to the title “Zootopia.” The court granted the motion for summary judgment filed by Disney, ruling there was no evidence the creators of Disney’s Zootopia had access to Goldman’s work and, even if there was evidence of access, any inference of copying was rebutted by the undisputed evidence a Disney employee had independently created the title “Zootopia.” On appeal from the judgment entered in favor of Disney, Esplanade challenged the trial court’s demurrer ruling and the grant of summary judgment.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that there is simply no evidence that Disney producers would have had reason to discuss an animation project, nor is there evidence that they would have occasion to share that information with those working on Zootopia. Esplanade’s access argument relies solely on speculation and conjecture arising from the fact that some of the individuals involved occasionally provided feedback on one another’s work. That is insufficient as a matter of law to establish access. View "Esplanade Productions v. The Walt Disney Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the trial court denying Hoosier Contractors, LLC's motion for summary judgment, denying Sean Gardner's motion for partial summary judgment, and denying Hoosier's motion to decertify a class of Hoosier's similarly situated customers, holding that Gardner, on behalf of himself and as class representative, lacked standing to bring his counterclaim against Hoosier.When Gardner asked Hoosier to inspect the roof of his home Hoosier made Gardner sign a contract for Hoosier to perform any needed work. When Gardner refused to let Hoosier repair his roof Hoosier brought this action for breach of contract. Gardner filed a counterclaim, on behalf of himself and a class of similarly situated customers, alleging that the contract violated the Indiana Home Improvement Contractors Act and that the violations were deceptive acts under the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act. The Supreme Court held (1) Gardner lacked standing to bring his counterclaim against Hoosier, and this disposition mooted the class-action issues; and (2) the court of appeals properly affirmed the denial of Gardner's motion for partial summary judgment as to Hoosier's breach of contract claim. View "Hoosier Contractors, LLC v. Gardner" on Justia Law

Mingtel, a Texas-based company, ordered two batches of computer tablets from Shenzen Synergy Digital, a Chinese company, hoping to resell them through the Home Shopping Network (“HSN”). The first batch bombed on HSN, with customers complaining about slow speeds and flawed screens. Mingtel then rejected the second batch out of hand. Synergy sued for breach of contract; Mingtel countersued, alleging Synergy provided nonconforming goods. The district court sided with Synergy.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court found Mingtel did not examine the tablets as soon as practicable because it failed to inspect them when they arrived in the United States. Instead of testing those capabilities upon the tablets’ arrival in the United States, Mingtel shipped them directly to HSN’s warehouse and examined them only after they were sold and returned by customers. The court explained that it agreed with the district court that, given those facts, Mingtel did not timely inspect the tablets. It follows that Mingtel did not provide Synergy with a notice of nonconformity within a reasonable time. The court wrote that Mingtel was obligated to pay for the tablets and take delivery of them. Because it failed to do so, the district court properly found Mingtel liable. View "Shenzen Synergy Digital v. Mingtel" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court enforcing a settlement agreement between Duane Bender and Rebecca Estates, LLC (collectively, Bender) and Stacey Rosman providing for Bender's purchase of Rosman's property near Shepherd, holding that the district court did not err.Bender filed suit against Rosman alleging trespass and tortious interference with contract and seeking to quiet title. Prior to trial, the parties reached a settlement agreement providing for the purchase of Rosman's property by Bender. The district court issued an order enforcing the settlement agreement for the price of $202,000. Bender appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by concluding that Rosman was entitled to specific performance of the settlement agreement. View "Bender v. Rosman" on Justia Law

The parents work for the School District. Through the District, they contracted for a self-funded health insurance plan. The District, not an outside insurer, bears sole financial responsibility for the payment of plan benefits. The District is also the plan administrator and named fiduciary but contracted with United HealthCare to serve as the third-party claims administrator, with the authority to deny or approve claims. The plan is a governmental plan, so the Employee Retirement Income Security Act does not apply, 29 U.S.C. 1003(b)(1). In 2017, daughter Megan—covered under her parents’ policy—suffered a mental health emergency. United approved Megan for 24 days of inpatient treatment and informed the family that it would not approve additional days. Her parents and Megan’s doctors disagreed and appealed internally within United. They elected to continue Megan’s inpatient treatment. They received a final denial of coverage notice, leaving most of Megan’s treatment expenses uncovered.The family sued United for breach of contract, bad faith, punitive damages, and interest under Wisconsin’s prompt pay statute but did not join the District as a defendant. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. There was no contractual relationship between the plaintiffs and United. Wisconsin law does not permit them to sue United for tortious bad faith absent contractual privity. Wisconsin’s prompt pay statute applies only to insurers. View "Daniels v. United Healthcare Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Weyerhaeuser NR Company (“NR”) entered into a manufacturing agreement with Simsboro Coating Services, LLC (“Simsboro”). That agreement required Simsboro to acquire commercial general liability insurance, which it obtained from Defendants-Appellees Burlington Insurance Company (“BIC”) and Evanston Insurance Company (“EIC”). It further required that “Weyerhaeuser and its Subsidiaries” be named as additional insureds. However, NR’s parent company, Weyerhaeuser Company (“W. Co.”), was never added to the insurance policies that Simsboro obtained from EIC and BIC. This insurance coverage dispute arose after several personal injury lawsuits were filed against Simsboro and W. Co. in state court. After those lawsuits settled, W. Co. and NR sued BIC and EIC, demanding that they defend and indemnify W. Co. and NR. EIC and BIC then filed Rule 12(b)(6) motions, which were granted by the district court.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Weyerhaeuser’s breach of contract claims. The court concluded that Defendants had no duty to defend or indemnify W. Co. and NR as additional insureds or as third-party beneficiaries to the CGL Policies or Excess Policy. The court explained that it was satisfied that BIC and EIC had no duty to defend W. Co. and NR as thirdparty beneficiaries. The indemnification inquiry, however, is fact intensive and may incorporate extrinsic evidence. The district court explained that because NR is listed on the CGL Policies as an additional insured and the CGL Policies might cover Simsboro’s indemnification obligation arising from the Agreement, NR might be a third-party beneficiary of the policies with respect to indemnification. View "Weyerhaeuser v. Burlington Insurance" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court in favor of Plaintiff and declaring that the City of Woonsocket improperly terminated Plaintiff's employment with the Woonsocket Police Department in violation of R.I. Gen. Laws 42-28.6-4 of the Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights (LEOBOR), holding that there was no error.The order appealed from declared that the city's termination of Plaintiff's employment was unlawful in violation of section 42-28.6-4 of the LEOBOR and that the City must comply with LEOBOR's procedural requirements if it wished to terminate Plaintiff's employment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice properly determined that the City improperly terminated Plaintiff's employment and improperly deprived him of the requisite notice and hearing. View "Sosa v. City of Woonsocket" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the district court finding that the city council of the City of Fremont (Council) and the City of Fremont (City) lacked reasonable sufficient evidence to terminate a contract with the Dodge County Humane Society for animal control, holding that the district court lacked petition in error jurisdiction to review the decision.At a regularly scheduled meeting, the Council approved a motion authorizing Fremont's mayor to terminate the contract for animal control. The Humane Society later filed a petition in error alleging that the Council and the City had no cause to terminate the contract. Thereafter, the district court entered a temporary injunction / temporary restraining order in favor of the Humane Society. The County and City moved to dismiss, asserting that the Council's decision to authorize the mayor to send a letter was not an action that could support a petition in error. The district court sustained the petition in error and ordered the contract to be reinstated. The Supreme Court vacated the order below, holding (1) the Council did not exercise a judicial or quasi-judicial function in voting on the motion to send the disputed letter to the Humane Society; and (2) therefore, the district court lacked jurisdiction to review this action. View "Dodge County Humane Society v. City of Fremont" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the district court granting Defendant's motion for a directed verdict in this breach of contract action and remanded the cause for a new trial, holding that the district court erred by granting a directed verdict on statute of frauds grounds.Defendant, a limited liability company, asked Plaintiff, a certified public accountant (and his professional corporation), to provide accountancy services in connection with Defendant's development of a residential neighborhood. After Plaintiff provided the agreed-upon services and Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff brought suit for breach of an oral contract. The district court granted Defendant's motion for a directed verdict, concluding that the parties' oral agreement was unenforceable because it fell under Neb. Rev. Stat. 36-202(1), a provision of the statute of frauds requiring agreements "not to be performed within one year" to be in writing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a reasonable jury could find the parties formed an enforceable contract; (2) because the contract did not have to be in writing under section 36-202(1), the district court erred in granting a directed verdict on that ground; and (3) there was no other basis upon which to grant a directed verdict. View "Bruce Lavalleur, P.C. v. Guarantee Group, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Continental Casualty Company and Valley Forge Insurance Company (collectively, “the insurers”) and Winder Laboratories, LLC and Steven Pressman (collectively, “the insureds”) appeal and cross-appeal from the district court’s judgment in this insurance coverage dispute. In short, the parties’ insurance agreements required the insurers to defend the insureds against certain third party lawsuits. After being sued by non-party Concordia Pharmaceuticals Inc., S.A.R.L. (“Concordia”), the insureds sought coverage under the policies. The insurers agreed to defend the insureds against Concordia, subject to a reservation of rights, including the right to seek reimbursement of defense costs incurred for claims not covered by the policies. The insurance agreements themselves, however, did not provide for reimbursement.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. First, the court agreed that the insurers did not have a duty to defend the insureds in the underlying action. To supplement this analysis, the court held that the duty to defend was extinguished when the district court’s ruling was issued. Second, the court agreed that the insurers do not have a right to reimbursement because the reservation of rights letters did not create a new contract, the insurers’ unjust enrichment argument is untenable, and the court wrote that it does not believe the Supreme Court of Georgia would upend the State’s insurance law framework by establishing a right to reimbursement for an insurer who has no contractual right to recoupment. View "Continental Casualty Company, et al v. Winder Laboratories, LLC, et al" on Justia Law