In this appeal from the district court, Plaintiffs A.A. and Kirk Amos Delivery and Courier, LLC (“Kirk Delivery”) challenged an order of the district court compelling the arbitration of various claims that Plaintiffs seek to pursue against Amazon Logistics, Inc. (“Amazon”).  Conceding that each of their claims against Amazon falls within the scope of a binding commercial contract made between Kirk Delivery and Amazon in 2019 — and that an arbitration clause governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”) is set forth within that contract — Plaintiffs contend, in relevant part, that arbitration is not required due to the FAA’s exemption for “contracts of employment” with “transportation workers.”   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the binding commercial contract is a business services deal struck between two corporate entities, not a “contract of employment” — the FAA’s so-called “transportation worker” exemption is inapplicable in these circumstances. The FAA thus mandates arbitration of all Plaintiffs’ claims. View "Ahaji Amos v. Amazon Logistics, INC." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court affirming the judgment of the superior court dismissing for lack of jurisdiction High Watch Recovery Center, Inc.'s administrative appeal challenging the decision of the Department of Public Health approving a certificate of need application submitted by Birch Hill Recovery Center, LLC, holding that the appellate court erred.Birch Hill submitted a certificate of need application to the Office of Health Care Access requesting public approval to establish a substance abuse treatment facility in Kent. The Department and Birch Hill entered into an agreed settlement constituting a final order wherein the Department approved Birch Hill's application subject to certain conditions. High Watch, which operated a nonprofit substance abuse treatment facility, intervened and appealed the final order. The superior court dismissed the appeal on the grounds that the Department's decision was not a final decision in a contested case and that High Watch was not aggrieved by the decision. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the appellate court did not err in determining that High Watch's petition requesting intervenor status in the public hearing on Birch Hill's certificate of need application was not a legal sufficient request for a public hearing for the purposes of Conn. Gen. Stat. 19a-639a(e). View "High Watch Recovery Center, Inc. v. Dep't of Public Health" on Justia Law

Kendall Hunt Publishing Company (Kendall Hunt) filed suit against The Learning Tree Publishing Corporation (Learning Tree) in district court in Iowa, where Kendall Hunt is located. The complaint alleged, as relevant here, claims of copyright infringement, tortious interference with contract, and unfair competition. The district court1 granted Learning Tree’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, concluding that the California corporation lacked minimum contacts with Iowa.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that Learning Tree’s contacts with Iowa were as follows: it maintains a nationally available website through which an Iowa resident purchased the allegedly infringing work. This conduct was not “uniquely or expressly aimed at” Iowa, however, particularly in light of the fact that Learning Tree did not advertise in Iowa and its litigation-anticipated sale to a Kendall Hunt employee occurred in Iowa. Although Kendall Hunt argued in its brief that this online sale was sufficient to create jurisdiction in Iowa, our court subsequently decided on similar facts that a single online sale did not establish personal jurisdiction over Defendant. The remaining specific-jurisdiction analysis factors do not tip the balance in Kendall Hunt’s favor. The court concluded that because Learning Tree’s connections with Iowa were not such that it would reasonably have anticipated being haled into court there, the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over the corporation. View "Kendall Hunt Publishing Company v. The Learning Tree Publishing Corporation" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals in this case concerning whether Apache Corporation breached its purchase-and-sale agreements (PSAs) with Sellers, holding the court of appeals erred by failing to apply the default common-law rule of contractual construction to the parties' dispute and incorrectly construed other contractual provisions at issue.In the PSAs at issue, Sellers sold seventy-five percent of their working interests in 109 oil-and-gas leases to Apache. The trial court rendered final judgment for Apache on the grounds that Sellers had no evidence of damages and could not prevail on their claims. The court of appeals reversed in part. At issue was whether the default rule for treating contracts that use the words "from" or "after" a specified date to measure a length of time should be applied in this case. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals as to the issues that the parties presented for review, holding that the parties' agreement in this case implicated the default rule without displacing it. View "Apache Corp. v. Apollo Exploration, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, on behalf of a putative class of students, sued Southern Methodist University (“SMU”) for refusing to refund tuition and fees after the university switched to remote instruction during the COVID-19 pandemic. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim.   The Fifth Circuit reversed that decision in light of King v. Baylor University, 46 F.4th 344 (5th Cir. 2022), which was issued after the district court’s ruling and which teaches that Hogan adequately pled a breach-of-contract claim. Alternatively, the district court held that Texas’s Pandemic Liability Protection Act (“PLPA”) retroactively bars Plaintiff’s claim for monetary relief and is not unconstitutionally retroactive under the Texas Constitution. That latter ruling raises a determinative-but-unsettled question of state constitutional law, which the court certified to the Texas Supreme Court: Does the application of the Pandemic Liability Protection Act to Plaintiff’s breach-of-contract claim violate the retroactivity clause in article I, section 16 of the Texas Constitution? View "Hogan v. Southern Methodist Univ" on Justia Law

Defendant Union Mutual Fire Insurance Company appealed a superior court grant of summary judgment to plaintiff CC 145 Main, LLC, in a declaratory judgment action regarding the interpretation of an insurance policy exclusion. CC 145 Main owned an apartment building and purchased a “Businessowners Coverage” insurance policy that included “all risk” property insurance, which provided that Union Mutual would “pay for direct physical loss of or damage to” the covered property, unless coverage was specifically limited or excluded by the policy. The insured property sustained damage when a tenant poured cat litter down a toilet, clogging an interior pipe and causing water to overflow from a shower and toilet. The property required significant cleaning and repair, and tenants were required to temporarily relocate. CC 145 Main filed a claim with Union Mutual for water damage, which Union Mutual denied pursuant to a provision in the insurance policy excluding coverage for damage caused by “[w]ater that backs up or overflows or is otherwise discharged from a sewer, drain, sump, sump pump or related equipment.” CC 145 Main filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the water exclusion does not apply to its claim. Union Mutual filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the damage at issue was caused by water that overflowed from “drains” within the meaning of the exclusion. The trial court concluded it was unclear whether the word “drain” in the water exclusion applied to shower and toilet drains and, therefore, the water exclusion was ambiguous and had to be construed in favor of CC 145 Main. Defendant challenged the trial court’s ruling that the policy’s water damage exclusion was ambiguous and its decision to construe the policy, therefore, in favor of CC 145 Main. But finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "CC 145 Main, LLC v. Union Mutual Fire Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Ramaco Resources suffered a coal silo collapse and submitted a claim for losses to Federal Insurance Company. When Federal denied the claim, Ramaco sued. After a twelve-day trial, a jury awarded Ramaco $7.6 million in contract damages and prejudgment interest. The jury also awarded $25 million under West Virginia’s Hayseeds doctrine, which permits an insured party to claim consequential damages when it prevails after suing to collect on its insurance policy. But post-trial, the district court reduced Ramaco’s contract damages and interest to $1.8 million and entirely rejected the Hayseeds damages as a matter of state law. The district court also conditionally granted a new trial on the Hayseeds award, reasoning that—even if Hayseeds damages were theoretically permissible—the jury’s $25 million award was punitive and thus invalid. Ramaco appealed.   The Fourth Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part. The court reversed the district court’s reduction of contract damages and prejudgment interest because the insurance policy’s plain language and the trial evidence support the jury’s original $7.6 million award. And the court reversed the district court’s wholesale rejection of Hayseeds damages. But the court affirmed its conditional grant of a new Hayseeds damages trial. The court explained that West Virginia law requires courts to give insurance policies their plain, ordinary meaning whenever possible. Here, the policy’s plain language extended the period of restoration until Ramaco’s operations were restored to the level of generating the net profits that would have existed but for the collapse. To determine that level, a court must consider both throughput and expenses. The district court did not. View "Ramaco Resources, LLC v. Federal Insurance Company" on Justia Law

An Asset Purchase Agreement provided that the sellers could receive variable payments (Earn-Out Consideration) if the post-merger company (IAS) achieved specific benchmarks. Section 2.6(c) specifies that IAS had to provide the sellers with the computation for each period, to become final unless they submitted a “notice of disagreement.” Any disagreement would be settled according to Section 2.3(e),” which refers to resolution by an accounting firm. Section 11.17, however, directs the parties generally to use non-binding mediation, followed by litigation if mediation fails.IAS determined that the company did not meet its targets. The sellers claim that IAS intentionally prevented the company from hitting its targets. Negotiations failed. The sellers sued for breach of contract and tortious interference; later, they filed a notice of disagreement and sought a declaration that the lawsuit was outside the scope of sections 2.3(e) and 2.6(d). IAS sought to compel arbitration under 2.3(e). The district court held that the Agreement contained a valid agreement to arbitrate. An accounting firm subsequently determined that the sellers had no right to Earn-Out Consideration. The district court entered judgment for IAS.The Third Circuit vacated. The Purchase Agreement contains an agreement to submit narrow disputes to an accounting firm for expert determination, not arbitration. Although the statement of IAS’s financial benchmarks becomes final after the expert completes its accounting analysis, the authority to resolve legal questions—like whether IAS violated the duty of good faith— remains with the courts. View "Sapp v. Industrial Action Services LLC" on Justia Law

Bazemore, a Papa John’s delivery driver, sued under the Fair Labor Standards Act, alleging that the company had under-reimbursed his vehicle expenses. Papa John’s moved to compel arbitration, attaching a declaration from its “Director of People Services” that Papa John’s requires all new employees to sign an arbitration agreement as a condition of employment. She asserted that Bazemore signed the agreement electronically on October 10, 2019, by signing in using a user ID and password, then scrolling through the entire agreement and checking a box in order to sign. Bazemore swore under penalty of perjury that he “had never seen” the agreement and that he had seen his manager login for Bazemore and other delivery drivers “to complete training materials” for them. The court denied Bazemore’s request for targeted discovery as to whether he had actually signed the agreement and granted the motion to compel arbitration.The Sixth Circuit reversed. Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 4, the party seeking arbitration must prove that such an agreement exists. Kentucky law governs whether Bazemore entered into an agreement and provides that an electronic signature is legally valid only when “made by the action of the person the signature purports to represent”—which is a question of fact. Bazemore’s testimony that he never saw the agreement was enough to create a genuine issue as to whether he signed it. View "Bazemore v. Papa John's U.S.A., Inc." on Justia Law

Boulevard RE Holdings, LLC (Boulevard) sued Mixon Insurance Agency, Inc. (Mixon), alleging breach of contract and negligent procurement of insurance. Mixon moved for summary judgment. The district court granted Mixon’s motion. Boulevard appealed that order. On appeal, Boulevard challenged the district court’s conclusions that Mixon had no duty to know or discover whether Boulevard was a mortgagee under Missouri law and that Mixon’s actions did not cause Boulevard’s alleged damages.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court reasoned that even assuming that the district court erred in concluding that Mixon did not have a duty to know or discover whether Boulevard was a mortgagee, summary judgment in favor of Mixon was proper because Boulevard cannot show Mixon caused its alleged damages. Noncompliance with the policy, not Mixon’s failure to notify, barred recovery. Therefore, Bell is inapplicable. The district court did not err in granting Mixon’s motion for summary judgment. View "Boulevard RE Holdings, LLC v. Mixon Insurance Agency, Inc." on Justia Law