The Supreme Court vacated the order of the district court finding that the city council of the City of Fremont (Council) and the City of Fremont (City) lacked reasonable sufficient evidence to terminate a contract with the Dodge County Humane Society for animal control, holding that the district court lacked petition in error jurisdiction to review the decision.At a regularly scheduled meeting, the Council approved a motion authorizing Fremont's mayor to terminate the contract for animal control. The Humane Society later filed a petition in error alleging that the Council and the City had no cause to terminate the contract. Thereafter, the district court entered a temporary injunction / temporary restraining order in favor of the Humane Society. The County and City moved to dismiss, asserting that the Council's decision to authorize the mayor to send a letter was not an action that could support a petition in error. The district court sustained the petition in error and ordered the contract to be reinstated. The Supreme Court vacated the order below, holding (1) the Council did not exercise a judicial or quasi-judicial function in voting on the motion to send the disputed letter to the Humane Society; and (2) therefore, the district court lacked jurisdiction to review this action. View "Dodge County Humane Society v. City of Fremont" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the district court granting Defendant's motion for a directed verdict in this breach of contract action and remanded the cause for a new trial, holding that the district court erred by granting a directed verdict on statute of frauds grounds.Defendant, a limited liability company, asked Plaintiff, a certified public accountant (and his professional corporation), to provide accountancy services in connection with Defendant's development of a residential neighborhood. After Plaintiff provided the agreed-upon services and Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff brought suit for breach of an oral contract. The district court granted Defendant's motion for a directed verdict, concluding that the parties' oral agreement was unenforceable because it fell under Neb. Rev. Stat. 36-202(1), a provision of the statute of frauds requiring agreements "not to be performed within one year" to be in writing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a reasonable jury could find the parties formed an enforceable contract; (2) because the contract did not have to be in writing under section 36-202(1), the district court erred in granting a directed verdict on that ground; and (3) there was no other basis upon which to grant a directed verdict. View "Bruce Lavalleur, P.C. v. Guarantee Group, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Continental Casualty Company and Valley Forge Insurance Company (collectively, “the insurers”) and Winder Laboratories, LLC and Steven Pressman (collectively, “the insureds”) appeal and cross-appeal from the district court’s judgment in this insurance coverage dispute. In short, the parties’ insurance agreements required the insurers to defend the insureds against certain third party lawsuits. After being sued by non-party Concordia Pharmaceuticals Inc., S.A.R.L. (“Concordia”), the insureds sought coverage under the policies. The insurers agreed to defend the insureds against Concordia, subject to a reservation of rights, including the right to seek reimbursement of defense costs incurred for claims not covered by the policies. The insurance agreements themselves, however, did not provide for reimbursement.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. First, the court agreed that the insurers did not have a duty to defend the insureds in the underlying action. To supplement this analysis, the court held that the duty to defend was extinguished when the district court’s ruling was issued. Second, the court agreed that the insurers do not have a right to reimbursement because the reservation of rights letters did not create a new contract, the insurers’ unjust enrichment argument is untenable, and the court wrote that it does not believe the Supreme Court of Georgia would upend the State’s insurance law framework by establishing a right to reimbursement for an insurer who has no contractual right to recoupment. View "Continental Casualty Company, et al v. Winder Laboratories, LLC, et al" on Justia Law

In March 2020, Concord Baptist Church of Jefferson City, Inc. (Concord Baptist) sustained damage to its facilities in a severe storm. After disagreements with its insurer, Church Mutual Insurance Company (Church Mutual), regarding the amount of loss, Concord Baptist initiated this action, alleging breach of contract and vexatious refusal to pay. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Church Mutual, concluding that the undisputed facts demonstrated that Concord Baptist failed to comply with a cooperation clause contained in the insurance policy, which precluded coverage. Concord Baptist appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that because Concord Baptist admits that it materially breached the policy, the court need not address Concord Baptist’s argument regarding whether the failure to submit to an EUO was a material breach. However, the court noted that Missouri courts have found a material breach where an insured failed to submit to an EUO before commencing an action against the insurer. Regarding the second element, whether Church Mutual suffered substantial prejudice from Concord Baptist’s material breach, the court agreed with the district court that the undisputed facts show that it did. Finally, as to the third element, whether Church Mutual exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to procure Concord Baptist’s cooperation, the court again agreed with the district court that the undisputed facts demonstrate Church Mutual’s diligence. View "Concord Baptist Church of Jefferson City v. Church Mutual Insurance Company" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court in this appeal concerning damage caused to an airplane owned by Plaintiff, holding that this Court had jurisdiction and that there was no error in the damages award and decision to award prejudgment interest.In the first appeal in this negligence case the Supreme Court remanded the case for a new trial on the limited issue of damages on the ground that the circuit court prejudicially erred in instructing the jury on damages. On remand, the court awarded Plaintiff $131,735 in damages, prejudgment interest, and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) this Court had appellate jurisdiction; (2) the circuit court did not err in the method it chose to calculate Plaintiff's damages; and (3) the circuit court did not err in awarding prejudgment interest. View "Wright v. Temple" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court in favor of the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (PRHTA) and its executive directors (collectively, Appellees) and dismissing this complaint brought by sixty-nine current and former employees of the PRHTA (collectively, Appellants), holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion.Appellants brought this action challenging the PRHTA's decision no longer to give effect to a regulation providing Appellants with additional compensation. Specifically, Appellants claimed that the decision was contrary to P.R. Act No. 66-2014, giving rise to violations of the Contracts Clause and Due Process Clause. The district court granted summary judgment for the PRHTA on the federal constitutional claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Appellants' claims under Puerto Rico law. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in concluding that Appellants could not establish their federal constitutional claims; and (2) did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise jurisdiction over Appellants' remaining Puerto Rico law claims. View "Vazquez-Velazquez v. P.R. Highway & Transportation Authority" on Justia Law

McKendree University, like other Illinois colleges, closed its campus and switched to remote instruction in March 2020 due to the risks of COVID-19. McKendree already ran an online degree program in addition to its on-campus degree program. McKendree did not refund its in-person students for any portion of their tuition or fees. The plaintiffs. enrolled in McKendree’s on-campus program at the time of the shutdown, sued for breach of contract and unjust enrichment.The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of the suit, noting its recent precedent holding that certain evidence—including a university’s course catalogs, class registration system, and pre-pandemic practices—can suffice under Illinois law to allege the existence of an implied contract between a university and its students for in-person instruction and extracurricular activities. The complaint in this case is “enough—if barely—to state a claim at the pleading stage.” Under Illinois law, the relationship between students and universities is contractual and the parties’ obligations under the contract are “inferred from the facts and conduct of the parties, rather than from an oral or written agreement.” View "Delisle v. McKendree University" on Justia Law

This dispute involves several insurers and one defendant insurer’s alleged duty to defend a lawsuit brought against a general contractor of a residential building project. The district court entered partial summary judgment, holding that the defendant insurer had a duty to defend the general contractor in the underlying action for construction defects. The court also issued a stay of other issues raised by the parties, and administratively closed the case. After the defendant insurer filed the present appeal, the underlying action was resolved in a settlement agreement.   The Fourth Circuit concluded that it lacks jurisdiction to consider the present interlocutory appeal challenging the defendant insurer’s duty to defend the general contractor. Therefore, the court dismissed the appeal. The court explained that while the relief granted in the district court’s order originally may have been prospective in nature, the resolution of the underlying action has eliminated from that order any forward-looking mandate. Thus, the court explained that the order before the court in this appeal currently lacks the character of an injunction and does not require the court to consider any question separate from issues that may be appealed after entry of a final judgment in the district court. View "Westfield Insurance Company v. Selective Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s summary judgment of his claims against Safeco Insurance Company of Indiana (“Safeco”) for violating Section 541 and Section 542 of the Texas Insurance Code.   The Fifth Circuit explained that in 2017, the Texas legislature amended Section 542, raising an important issue of Texas insurance law as to which there is no controlling Texas Supreme Court authority, and the authority from the intermediate state appellate courts provides insufficient guidance. Thus, the court certified the following question of state law to the Supreme Court of Texas: In an action under Chapter 542A of the Texas Prompt Payment of Claims Act, does an insurer’s payment of the full appraisal award plus any possible statutory interest preclude recovery of attorney’s fees? View "Rodriguez v. Safeco" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court determining that Plaintiff could not recover under a commercial general-liability (CGL) insurance policy issued by United Specialty Insurance Company, holding that when a CGL insurance policy excludes coverage for injuries arising out of an "assault or battery," the subjective intent of the person who committed the assault or battery is irrelevant.Brown County Care Center, an adult care facility, contracted with United for CGL insurance. The policy excluded coverage for bodily injury arising from "any actual, threatened or alleged assault or battery." Plaintiff was living at the Center when he was attacked by another resident, who was later found by the trial court to be not guilty of felonious assault by reason of insanity. Plaintiff sued, and he and the Center entered into a settlement. Plaintiff later brought a declaratory judgment action against United to collect on the judgment. The trial court determined that Plaintiff could not recover under the policy. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the attack on Plaintiff qualified as a civil-law assault; and (2) because the policy excluded coverage for bodily injuries arising for civil assaults the trial court did not err in its judgment. View "Krewina v. United Specialty Insurance Co." on Justia Law