The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered an appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, which dismissed a plaintiff's 2019 complaint against art dealers for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of warranty, and rescission in connection with his 2001 purchase of an allegedly forged painting. The district court dismissed the plaintiff's claims as time-barred and ruled that the plaintiff's fraud claim could not be granted relief. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the district court erred in concluding that he was on inquiry notice of the alleged fraud before bringing the suit. The appellate court agreed with the district court that claims for breach of warranty, negligent misrepresentation, and rescission were time-barred under New York law. However, the court concluded that the district court erred in ruling that the fraud claims were time-barred and in denying the plaintiff's request for leave to amend his complaint. The case was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Meyer v. Seidel" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Missouri issued an opinion involving a dispute between Tyler Technologies, Inc., and several individual and corporate property owners. The property owners had filed a class-action petition alleging that Tyler Technologies negligently carried out its contractual obligations to assist Jackson County with the 2023 real property assessment. The property owners claimed that Tyler Technologies' failures resulted in some class members not receiving timely notice of increased assessments and others having their property assessments increase by more than 15 percent without a physical inspection.Tyler Technologies filed a motion to dismiss the allegations, arguing that the property owners failed to allege facts showing that Tyler Technologies owed them a duty of care. The circuit court overruled the motion to dismiss, prompting Tyler Technologies to file a petition for a writ of prohibition, which the Supreme Court of Missouri issued as a preliminary writ.After a review, the Supreme Court of Missouri determined that the property owners did not provide sufficient evidence to show that Tyler Technologies owed them a duty of care. The court noted that the duties the property owners described were statutory obligations of the county assessor, not private, third-party contractors like Tyler Technologies. The court also invoked the rule of privity, which generally states that a party to a contract does not owe a duty to a plaintiff who was not a party to the contract. In the court's view, disregarding this rule would expose Tyler Technologies to excessive and unlimited liability and potentially discourage contractors from entering into service contracts due to the fear of obligations and liabilities they would not voluntarily assume.Therefore, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that Tyler Technologies was entitled to dismissal of the disputed counts of the property owners' petition. The court made its preliminary writ of prohibition permanent, barring further action from the circuit court other than dismissing the contested counts with prejudice. View "State ex rel. Tyler Technologies, Inc. v. Chamberlain" on Justia Law

In the state of California, an individual named Chad Grayot purchased a used vehicle from a car dealership with a contract that was later assigned to the Bank of Stockton. This contract included the Federal Trade Commission's 'Holder Rule' notice, which allows a consumer to assert against third party creditors all claims and defenses that could be asserted against the seller of a good or service. Grayot sought to hold the Bank responsible for refunding the money he paid under the contract based on the holder provision in the contract. The Bank argued that it could not be held responsible because it was no longer the holder of the contract as it had reassigned the contract back to the dealership. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Bank, accepting its argument. Grayot appealed this decision.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District reversed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that a creditor cannot avoid potential liability for claims that arose when it was the holder of the contract by later reassigning the contract. This interpretation of the Holder Rule is in line with the Federal Trade Commission's intent to reallocate any costs of seller misconduct to the creditor. The court sent the case back to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Grayot v. Bank of Stockton" on Justia Law

In this case from the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Three, the plaintiff, Sally Ann Haydon, a former resident of Elegance at Dublin, a residential care facility for the elderly, sued the facility and its affiliated entities for elder abuse and other claims. The defendants attempted to compel arbitration based on an arbitration clause in the resident agreement that Haydon had signed. The trial court denied the motion, finding the arbitration agreement to be unconscionable. The defendants appealed this decision.Haydon had lived at the facility for a few days and has dementia. The agreement she signed, which contained the arbitration clause, was over 40 pages long, and the arbitration clause was one of over 20 "miscellaneous" provisions at the end of the document. Haydon claimed she signed the agreement under duress and without understanding its contents.On appeal, the court found that there was a high degree of both procedural and substantive unconscionability in the arbitration clause, and therefore affirmed the trial court's decision not to enforce it. The court found procedural unconscionability in the circumstances of the agreement's formation, considering the pressure Haydon was under to sign the agreement, the lack of explanation about the arbitration clause, and the confusing presentation of the clause. The court found substantive unconscionability in the confidentiality provision of the arbitration agreement, the limitations on discovery under the applicable arbitration rules, and the requirement that parties bear their own costs and fees in connection with the arbitration. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to sever the unconscionable provisions from the arbitration clause, given the extent of the unconscionability. View "Haydon v. Elegance at Dublin" on Justia Law

In the State of Montana v. Sky M. Little Coyote, the Supreme Court of Montana dealt with an appeal by Little Coyote, who had been incarcerated and was appealing the revocation of his suspended sentence. Little Coyote argued that his time served had been incorrectly calculated and that, when correctly accounted for, his sentence had already expired before the State filed its revocation petition. The State argued that Little Coyote was bound by an agreement he had entered into regarding the time served.The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for dismissal of the State's Petition for Revocation. The court found that Little Coyote's time served had indeed been inaccurately calculated. It ruled that the parties involved had been operating under a mutual mistake regarding the time Little Coyote had served. The court held that, when correctly calculated and credited, Little Coyote's sentence had expired nearly three months before the State filed its revocation petition. Thus, the disposition imposed on Little Coyote was deemed illegal as the lower court had lacked the authority to revoke or impose a disposition after the expiration of his sentence. View "State v. Little Coyote" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho upheld a lower court's summary judgment in favor of the defendants, George and Jesse’s Les Schwab Tire Store, Inc., and two of its owners, Bruce and Richard Byram. The plaintiff, Adam Davis, had been employed as an assistant manager at Les Schwab from April 2016 till June 2019. In March 2019, there was a shortage in the cash deposits and surveillance footage showed Davis bending down out of camera view in the area where the cash deposits were kept while he was alone in the store. This led to Davis being arrested and charged with grand theft, and his employment was terminated. Although the charges against Davis were later dropped, he sued the defendants for breach of his employment contract, false arrest, defamation per se, and for knowingly giving a false report to the police. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all of Davis’s claims. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, finding no genuine issue of material fact that could support Davis’s claims. The court found that Davis was an at-will employee who could be terminated without cause and that there was no evidence to show that the defendants had acted with malice. The court also found that the plaintiff's attorney had violated Rule 11.2 by submitting arguments that were not well grounded in fact, and awarded a portion of the defendants' attorney fees to be paid by the plaintiff's counsel. View "Davis v. George and Jesse's Les Schwab Tire Store, Inc." on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa to dismiss the lawsuit of Iowa-based livestock feed seller Hawkeye Gold, LLC against China National Materials Industry Import and Export Corporation, also known as Sinoma, for lack of personal jurisdiction. Hawkeye Gold sued Sinoma to recover an unpaid default judgment it obtained against Sinoma's now-defunct wholly owned United States subsidiary, Non-Metals, Inc., for breach of a contract to purchase livestock feed. After six years of litigation, the District Court dismissed the case because it did not have personal jurisdiction over Sinoma, a decision which Hawkeye Gold appealed. The Appeals Court, after reviewing the evidence, agreed with the District Court's conclusion that Sinoma had insufficient minimum contacts with Iowa to support personal jurisdiction. The Court also rejected Hawkeye Gold's argument that Sinoma was a party to the contract or that Non-Metals was the alter-ego of Sinoma. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the District Court's denial of Hawkeye Gold's request for sanctions against Sinoma for alleged discovery violations. View "Hawkeye Gold, LLC v. China National Materials" on Justia Law

In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, several clients of Wyndham Vacation Resorts (Resorts) sought to arbitrate disputes with Resorts, but their petitions were rejected by the American Arbitration Association (AAA) because Resorts had failed to comply with AAA’s policies. The clients then sued Resorts in federal court. Resorts moved to stay the litigation and direct arbitration, but the district court denied the motion, reasoning that Resorts cannot rely on the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) to compel arbitration because it had defaulted in its obligation to arbitrate by failing to comply with AAA's policies.The appellate court held as follows: First, the three clients who originally sought to arbitrate their claims against Resorts, only to see their petitions rejected due to Resorts’ noncompliance with AAA policies, may proceed to litigation. Second, three other clients who never formally submitted their claims against Resorts to the AAA, but whose agreements with Resorts contained identical arbitration provisions, may also proceed to litigation. However, two clients who had an agreement with different Wyndham-related entities must return to the district court for further consideration of the FAA’s applicability to their dispute.The court found that the district court correctly concluded that Resorts could not compel arbitration under the FAA. However, the court found that the district court's decision was too broad regarding the other Wyndham-related entities, Development and WorldMark, because there was no evidence that they had violated the AAA’s policies. As a result, the court vacated and remanded the case for further proceedings concerning these entities. View "Bedgood v. Wyndham Vacation Resorts, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered an appeal by Colony Insurance Company against First Mercury Insurance Company related to a settlement agreement for an underlying negligence case. Both companies had consecutively insured DL Phillips Construction, Inc. (DL Phillips) under commercial general liability insurance policies. After the settlement, Colony sued First Mercury, arguing that First Mercury needed to reimburse Colony for the full amount of its settlement contribution, as it contended that First Mercury's policies covered all damages at issue. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of First Mercury, prompting Colony's appeal.In the underlying negligence case, DL Phillips was hired to replace the roof of an outpatient clinic in Texas. Shortly after completion, the roof began leaking, causing damage over several months. The clinic's owner sued DL Phillips for various claims, including breach of contract and negligence. A verdict was entered against DL Phillips for over $3.7 million. Both Colony and First Mercury contributed to a settlement agreement, and then Colony sued First Mercury, arguing it was responsible for all the property damage at issue.The appellate court held that under the plain language of First Mercury's policies and relevant case law, First Mercury was only liable for damages that occurred during its policy period, not all damages resulting from the initial roof defect. The court also found that Colony failed to present sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact about whether there was an unfair allocation of damages, which would be necessary for Colony's contribution and subrogation claims. As such, the court affirmed the district court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of First Mercury and denied summary judgment for Colony. View "Colony Insurance Company v. First Mercury Insurance Company" on Justia Law

The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed a district court's judgment, which had dismissed the claims of Jacob Ebel, John Ebel, and Ordeen Ebel (collectively, "the Ebels") for declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, breach of contract, and tortious interference. The Ebels had sought enforcement of contracts they claimed were formed when their bids for parcels of real property owned by the estate of Mark Engelhardt were accepted. The district court had dismissed the Ebels' claims, asserting that the parties did not satisfy the statute of frauds, which requires contracts for the sale of real property to be in writing. The Supreme Court found that the district court misapplied the law because the statute of frauds was not specifically pled or otherwise raised by the parties. The Supreme Court noted that under Rule 8 of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, the statute of frauds must be specifically pled as an affirmative defense. Therefore, the case was reversed on the ground that the district court incorrectly applied the statute of frauds when the defense was not properly raised. View "Ebel v. Engelhart" on Justia Law