Service hired Forwarders as its agent in 2010. The Agreement had a three-year term, a continuous one-year renewal option, and a mutual nonrenewal provision. A 2013 amendment stated that the Agreement would renew perpetually for consecutive one-year terms, unless Service, in its sole discretion, notifies Forwarders of its intention to terminate the Agreement 30 days before the annual expiration date. The amendment, however, left undisturbed the Agreement’s provision that Service shall not be deemed to be in default unless Forwarders has provided written notice of an alleged material breach and has given Service an opportunity to cure, after which Forwarders may terminate. “[T]ermination of this Agreement by [Forwarders] for any other reason shall be deemed a termination without cause.”Forwarders sought a declaratory judgment that the amended Agreement was terminable at will. Service conceded that the amended Agreement was of indefinite duration and that Illinois law presumes that such contracts are terminable at will but argued the presumption was rebutted because the Agreement provided that Forwarders could end the Agreement only if Service failed to timely cure a material breach after notification. The court granted judgment on the pleadings that the termination was lawful. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The amended Agreement lacks a clear statement that the contract can only be terminated based upon the occurrence of certain conditions or events. Service has not rebutted the Illinois law presumption that this contract of indefinite duration is terminable at will. View "Beach Forwarders, Inc. v. Service By Air, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Zubair Kazi, through co-plaintiff KFC of Pueblo, Inc., owned the only Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant in Pueblo, Colorado. In 2019 Defendant KFC US, LLC licensed a second Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant in Pueblo. Kazi believed that KFC acted improperly in how it went about licensing this second restaurant and sued KFC for breach of contract, bad faith (breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing), promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment. His lawsuit went to trial on his bad-faith claim only, and the jury found in his favor. KFC appealed. The Tenth Circuit held that Kazi’s claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was barred by Kentucky law because KFC’s alleged bad faith did not undermine any benefit or protection afforded to Kazi by his franchise agreement with KFC. The court therefore vacated the judgment and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of KFC and against Kazi and KFC of Pueblo, Inc. View "Kazi, et al. v. KFC US" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are twenty-six former employees of International Business Machines Corporation (“IBM”) who signed separation agreements requiring them to arbitrate any claims arising from their termination by IBM. The agreements set a deadline for initiating arbitration and included a confidentiality requirement. Plaintiffs missed the deadline but nonetheless tried to arbitrate claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”). Their arbitrations were dismissed as untimely. They then sued IBM in district court, seeking a declaration that the deadline is unenforceable because it does not incorporate the “piggybacking rule,” a judge-made exception to the ADEA’s administrative exhaustion requirements. Shortly after filing suit, Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment and attached various documents obtained by Plaintiffs’ counsel in other confidential arbitration proceedings. IBM moved to seal the confidential documents. The district court granted IBM’s motions to dismiss and seal the documents. On appeal, Plaintiffs argued that (1) the filing deadline in their separation agreements is unenforceable and (2) the district court abused its discretion by granting IBM’s motion to seal.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court first wrote that the piggybacking rule does not apply to arbitration and, in any event, it is not a substantive right under the ADEA. Second, the court held that the presumption of public access to judicial documents is outweighed here by the Federal Arbitration Act’s (“FAA”) strong policy in favor of enforcing arbitral confidentiality provisions and the impropriety of counsel’s attempt to evade the agreement by attaching confidential documents to a premature motion for summary judgment. View "In re IBM Arb. Agreement Litig." on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a thoracic surgeon. After the stock market crash now known as the “Great Recession” of 2008, Plaintiff’s sister recommended Gregory Acosta and Diamond Bar Executive Benefit Programs & Insurance Services, Inc. (the Acosta entities) as a potential financial planning service. In 2008, the Acosta entities and Securities America had contracts with Pacific Life Insurance Company (Pacific Life) that authorized them to act as a broker (or “producer”) for Pacific Life. Plaintiff later sued Acosta, the Acosta entities, Kestra, Securities America, and Pacific Life. Plaintiff asserted claims for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, financial elder abuse, and violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL). He alleged his damages were $495,254.78. Plaintiff argued that the trial court inappropriately entered summary judgment for Pacific Life on his negligence and UCL claims because Pacific Life remains liable to Plaintiff.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s decision granting summary judgment for Pacific Life. The court explained that the law and the undisputed evidence, in this case, indicate that it is the broker who typically conducts this suitability analysis. Variable life insurance policies are a “variable product,” and a different Insurance Commissioner regulation requires “brokers and agents selling variable products [to] comply with suitability standards.” The court further explained that section 2534.2(c) does not obligate an insurance company to conduct its own independent suitability analysis, regardless of whether the broker has also conducted one. Moreover, Pacific Life’s conduct—whether labeled “direct” or “vicarious” in the eyes of the law—falls completely within the terms of the release. View "Fischl v. Pacific Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Inmarsat Global Limited and related entities(collectively, “Inmarsat”) operate a satellite network providing communications services to remote locations, including ships at sea. Inmarsat sells the services at retail to end-users and at wholesale to distributors. Speedcast International Limited was a leading Inmarsat distributor, purchasing Inmarsat’s services and providing them to its own customers. Speedcast is the debtor in the bankruptcy. Several contracts governed the business relationship among the parties. Their last contract terminated all of the creditors’ claims against the debtor except for narrowly defined “Permitted Claims.” The creditors sought a reversal of the district and bankruptcy court’s conclusion that a particular claim was not a permitted one.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Termination Agreement’s definitions of Released Claims and Permitted Claims are unambiguous. Consequently, the court wrote that it need not consider any extrinsic evidence. The court found Inmarsat’s pricing argument unpersuasive. The Shortfall Amount is not a payment for services delivered by Inmarsat to Speedcast. The SAA provides that the Shortfall Amount is part of the performance that Speedcast promised “[i]n exchange for” Inmarsat agreeing to grant a 30% discount. The Shortfall Amount, in turn, is not levied on the services that Inmarsat delivered to Speedcast; it is levied due to the customers Speedcast failed to provide. View "Inmarsat Global v. SpeedCast Intl" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Ernest Bock, LLC (“Bock”) initially obtained an $11.8 million judgment for breach of contract against Defendants in New Jersey state court. Bock then filed this federal suit in the District of Nevada, alleging that Defendants, assisted by other named Defendants, engaged in an elaborate series of allegedly improper asset transfers to insulate those assets from the New Jersey judgment. While the federal suit was pending, a New Jersey appellate court vacated the underlying judgment and remanded for further proceedings, including discovery, to determine whether Defendants were liable to Bock. The district court then stayed this case pursuant to Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States (Colorado River), 424 U.S. 800 (1976).   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order staying. The panel first concluded that Bock had standing to bring the suit because Bock raised a question of fact as to whether it was injured by the defendants’ asset transfers. Noting that a Colorado River stay is proper only in exceptional circumstances, the panel held that a Colorado River stay cannot issue when, as here, there was substantial doubt as to whether the state proceedings would resolve the federal action. Because Colorado River did not support a stay, neither could the district court’s docket management authority. View "ERNEST BOCK, LLC V. PAUL STEELMAN, ET AL" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of Kevin Costner in this breach of contract case and dismissing the claims brought by Peggy Detmers, holding that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment for Costner.Costner commissioned Detmers to create sculptures of buffalo and Lakota warriors to display at a luxury resort called The Dunbar that Costner planned to build on his property. A court later found that the parties had agreed to permanently display the sculptures at Tatanka, another project Costner developed. In 2021, Detmers sued Costner again, alleging that Costner's online real estate listing for the Tatanka property constituted an anticipatory breach of the agreement permanently to display the sculptures at Tatanka. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Costner. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) erred in holding that Detmers' claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata; (2) erred in its conclusion that Costner had no remaining obligation under the agreement after the parties agreed to display the sculptures at Tatanka; and (3) properly denied Detmers' motion for summary judgment on her claim for anticipatory repudiation by Costner. View "Detmers v. Costner" on Justia Law

Before Peter and Debra Last were married in June 2002, they entered into a premarital agreement which included a provision by which Debra purported to waive any right to receive spousal support in the event the marriage ended in dissolution. When the marriage did end in dissolution, Debra sought, and the trial court awarded her, temporary spousal support. The court did not adjudicate the issue whether the premarital agreement was enforceable but granted Peter’s request to bifurcate that issue. Peter argued the trial court erred by awarding Debra temporary spousal support because the premarital agreement was presumed to be valid and, absent a determination the agreement was unenforceable, it barred an award of temporary spousal support. While the Court of Appeal agreed that premarital agreements were no longer disfavored and are not per se unenforceable, the Court found Peter was incorrect in asserting the premarital agreement was presumed valid simply because it facially appeared to satisfy the requirements of Family Code section 1615(c)(1) and (2). "To the contrary, a premarital agreement is presumed to have not been executed voluntarily, and is therefore unenforceable, unless the trial court finds in writing or on the record that the agreement satisfies the requirements of section 1615(c)(1) and (2)." When the court ordered temporary spousal support, the premarital agreement was deemed not to have been voluntarily executed, and, therefore, the spousal support waiver did not prevent the court from awarding Debra temporary spousal support. The appeals court also concluded the trial court had the ability to modify the support order retroactively to the first support payment if it ultimately determined the premarital agreement was enforceable. Although the appeals court believed this reservation of jurisdiction did not make the temporary spousal support order nonappealable, it resolved any doubts about appellate jurisdiction by treating the appeal as a petition for writ of mandate, which was thus denied. View "Last v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Andrew Hennessey appealed a district court order dismissing with prejudice his action against the Milnor School District (“District”). The District employed Hennessey as a teacher for the 2021-2022 school year. In October 2021, the District placed Hennessey on paid administrative leave for immoral conduct and conduct unbecoming his position. The District requested Hennessey sign a resignation letter, which would have immediately terminated his employment, salary, and benefits. He declined to sign the resignation letter and requested an administrative hearing. The District then converted Hennessey’s leave from paid to unpaid leave and recommended his dismissal for cause. Hennessey subsequently signed a severance agreement providing him salary through October 2021 and insurance benefits through December 2021, and waiving his rights to challenge the dismissal. He later learned through an open records request that the District’s legal counsel had advised the District in an email, in part, to convert his leave to unpaid to have “some leverage over this guy.” In December 2022, Hennessey filed this action seeking to rescind the agreement’s release and waiver section to allow him to challenge his dismissal. He claimed the District exerted undue financial pressure on him to secure the waiver of his rights to an administrative hearing and to challenge his termination in district court when it converted his paid leave to unpaid leave. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, finding Hennessey failed to allege facts sufficient to support rescinding a contract for undue influence under N.D.C.C. § 9-09-02. View "Hennessey v. Milnor School District" on Justia Law

Defendants GADECO, LLC, and Continental Resources, Inc. appealed a judgment quieting title in oil and gas leasehold interests in Zavanna, LLC. Zavanna and the Defendants made competing claims to oil and gas leasehold interests covering 1,280 gross acres in Williams County, North Dakota. These interests were located in the Golden Unit; the Golden Well was the only well producing oil and gas from the subject leasehold within the Golden Unit. GADECO operated the Golden Well. Zavanna was the lessee by assignment of the “Top Leases” and GADECO and Continental were the lessees of the “Bottom Leases.” The Top Leases and Bottom Leases covered the same lands and leasehold interests. The Bottom Leases automatically terminated upon cessation of production unless certain express conditions were met. The Bottom Leases stated that a cessation of production after the lease’s primary term would not terminate the lease if the lessee restores production or commences additional drilling or reworking operations within 90 days (or 120 days in the case of the Parke Energy Leases) from the date of cessation of production. After a bench trial, the district court quieted title in Zavanna, concluding the Bottom Leases terminated by their own terms when production ceased and GADECO failed to timely commence drilling or reworking operations. The court found three periods of production cessation. The court concluded Defendants bore the burden to prove that production did not cease or reworking operations were timely commenced. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court did not err in concluding Defendants’ leases terminated under their terms when production ceased and Defendants failed to timely commence reworking operations, and in concluding Defendants failed to show a force majeure condition saved the leases from termination. View "Zavanna v. Gadeco, et al." on Justia Law