The award of summary judgment in favor of the general contractor against the subcontractor in this case based on a pay-if-paid clause was improper because the pay-if-paid clause did not apply to the issues in this case. Pay-if-paid clauses make the project owner’s payment of the general contractor a condition precedent of the general contractor’s obligation to pay the subcontractor. Thus, the pay-if-paid clause can relieve the general contractor of liability to the subcontractor even where the subcontractor has fully performed its part of the subcontract. Here, Subcontractor sued General Contractor for breach of contract relating to a construction project. The circuit court granted summary judgment to General Contractor, concluding that, under Virginia law, a pay-if-paid provision in the subcontract applied to the damages sought. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding (1) the pay-if-paid clause did not necessarily apply to the costs at issue in this case; and (2) the other provision relied upon by the circuit court did not create a condition precedent for payment of subcontractors. View "Young Electrical Contractors, Inc. v. Dustin Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the district court dismissing Plaintiff’s amended complaint against several lenders, holding that the district court did not err in dismissing some of Plaintiff’s claims but erred in dismissing the remaining claims. After Plaintiff defaulted on her loan on real property, she received at least nine notices of sale. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint against Lenders, alleging six causes of action. The district court granted Lenders’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to Mont. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Supreme Court held that the district court (1) did not err in dismissing Plaintiff’s declaratory judgment claim as a matter of law or in dismissing Plaintiff’s negligent and/or intentional infliction of emotional distress claim fore failure to state sufficient facts to entitle her to relief; and (2) incorrectly determined that Plaintiff’s amended complaint failed to state a claim on her asserted breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), and Montana Consumer Protection Act (MCPA) claims. View "Puryer v. HSBC Bank" on Justia Law

XY’s patents relate to the sorting of X- and Y-chromosome-bearing sperm cells, for selective breeding purposes. Trans Ova provides services related to embryo transfer and in-vitro fertilization for cattle. XY and Trans Ova entered into a five-year licensing agreement in 2004 under which Trans Ova was authorized to use XY’s technology, subject to automatic renewal unless Trans Ova was in material breach. In 2007, Inguran acquired XY and sent a letter purporting to terminate the Agreement because of alleged breaches. For several years, the parties negotiated but failed to resolve their disputes. Trans Ova continued to make royalty payments to XY, which were declined. XY alleges that it became aware of further breaches, including underpayment of royalties and development of improvements to XY’s technology without disclosure of such improvements to XY. XY sued for patent infringement and breach of contract. Trans Ova counterclaimed, alleging patent invalidity, breach of contract, and antitrust violations. The district court granted XY summary judgment on the antitrust counterclaims. A jury found breaches of contract by both parties; that Trans Ova failed to prove that the asserted patent claims were invalid and willfully infringed the asserted claims; and XY was entitled to patent infringement damages. The court denied all of Trans Ova’s requested relief and granted XY an ongoing royalty. The Federal Circuit affirmed except the ongoing royalty rate, which it remanded for recalculation. View "XY, LLC v. Trans Ova Genetics, L.C." on Justia Law

Prolite Building Supply bought Ply Gem windows, which it resold to Wisconsin builders. Some homeowners were not satisfied with the windows, which admitted air even when closed. Contractors stopped buying from Prolite, which stopped paying Ply Gem. Prolite and homeowners sued. Ply Gem removed the action to federal court and counter-claimed against Prolite for unpaid bills. Additional parties intervened. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Prolite. The court vacated the judgment on the homeowners’ claims for remand to state court. The service agreement between Prolite and Ply Gem requires Prolite to repair the Ply Gem windows in exchange for a discount and needed parts. There was no breach of that agreement. The homeowners’ claims can be resolved under supplemental jurisdiction only if they “are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy,” 28 U.S.C. 1367(a). The language of the window warranties received by the homeowners and the service agreement did not overlap. Prolite complained that Ply Gem did not do enough to ensure that its customers (the builders) remained willing to purchase Ply Gem windows. The homeowners just wanted to stop drafts and moisture. The nature of the work done differed. View "ProLite Building Supply, LLC v. Ply Gem Windows" on Justia Law

In this declaratory judgment action brought against Judge Russell E. Steele and Judge Kristie Swaim challenging two amendments to a consolidation agreement the parties entered into in 2008, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s judgment that these two amendments were invalid and entered judgment for Judge Steele. The consolidation agreement designated Decker as the sole appointing authority for all deputy circuit clerks and division clerks. In 2013, Judge Steele signed an administrative order amending the consolidation agreement and designating the presiding judge of the Second Judicial Circuit as the appointing authority for all deputy and division clerks. In 2014, the Second Judicial Circuit approved an administrative order amending the consolidation agreement to designate Judge Swaim as the sole appointing authority. Plaintiffs filed this declaratory judgment action challenging the validity of the amendments. The circuit court entered judgment for Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the 2013 and 2014 amendments were made in compliance with the procedures to which Decker consented in voluntarily joining the consolidation agreement; and (2) therefore, Judge Steele held appointing authority over deputy and division clerks from the date of the order adopting the 2013 amendment until the date of the order adopting the 2014 amendment and transferring that authority to Judge Swaim. View "Gall v. Steele" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the superior court granting summary judgment for Defendant, Price Rite, on count one of Plaintiff’s complaint and also granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss the remaining four counts. Plaintiff slipped and fell on liquid in an aisle of a store owned by Defendant. Plaintiff’s amended complaint alleged negligence, breach of contract, mode of operation, failure to warn, and breach of the implied warranties of merchantability, fitness for use, and fitness for a particular purpose. The court granted summary judgment on the negligence count and dismissed the remaining counts. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court granting summary judgment on Plaintiff’s negligence claim and affirmed the dismissal of the remaining counts, holding (1) Plaintiff satisfied her burden of producing competent evidence that proved the existence of a disputed issue of material fact with respect to Defendant’s safety procedures or lack thereof, (2) the trial judge impermissibly weighed the evidence in his decision granting summary judgment, and (3) there is no requirement at the summary judgment stage for a plaintiff to produce direct evidence of how long a spill has existed on a floor. View "Dent v. PRRC, Inc." on Justia Law

The clear-and-convincing standard applies when determining the existence of an oral contract for the conveyance of farmland when only money damages are sought for the claimed breach of that contract. Plaintiff argued that the Estates of his parents were obligated under an oral contract for the sale of land to convey farm property to him. After a second trial, the jury found by a preponderance of the evidence that an oral contract existed between Plaintiff and his parents and awarded Plaintiff damages for the breach of that contract. The Estates moved for judgment as a matter of law and a new trial, arguing that the district court instructed the jury on the incorrect standard of proof. The district court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the matter to the district court for a new trial, holding (1) the clear and convincing evidence is required to prove that an oral contract for the sale of land existed, regardless of whether the party seeks damages or specific performance; and (2) therefore, the district abused its discretion in denying Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial. View "Christie v. Estate of Dilman Christie" on Justia Law

Sports Medicine performed shoulder surgery on “Joshua,” who was covered by a health insurance plan, and charged Joshua for the procedure. Because it did not participate in the insurers’ network, Sports Medicine was not limited to the insurer’s fee schedule and charged Joshua $58,400, submitting a claim in that amount to the insurers on Joshua’s behalf. The claim form indicated that Joshua had “authorize[d] payment of medical benefits.” The insurer processed Joshua’s claim according to its out-of-network cap of $2,633, applying his deductible of $2,000 and his 50% coinsurance of $316, issuing him a reimbursement check for the remaining $316, and informing him that he would still owe Sports Medicine the remaining $58,083. Sports Medicine appealed through the insurers’ internal administrative process and had Joshua sign an “Assignment of Benefits & Ltd. Power of Attorney.” Sports Medicine later sued for violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), and breach of contract, citing public policy. The district court dismissed for lack of standing because Joshua’s insurance plan included an anti-assignment clause. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the anti-assignment clause is not inconsistent with ERISA and is enforceable. View "American Orthopedic & Sports Medicine v. Independence Blue Cross Blue Shield" on Justia Law

This case centered on a dispute between Green Meadow Realty Co. (Realtor) and Roger and Mary Gillock (Owners) over Realtor's right to a commission. Realtor sued to recover a commission on a sale to certain buyers that Owners believed were excluded from the listing agreement. Realtor relied on an addendum to the listing agreement that limited the period of time in which an excluded sale could occur as well as the fact that the sale closed outside the time period. Owners claimed they insisted on a complete exclusion and did not knowingly agree to a time limit for the excluded sale, despite having signed the addendum. Owners asserted that they signed the addendum without reading it based on Realtor's representation that it set forth "your exclusion." The trial court concluded Owners were bound by the addendum, having had the opportunity to read it and not doing so. The trial court granted summary judgment to Realtor. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the summary judgment awarding Realtor the commission, but reversed for further proceedings on a counter claim by Owners. Owners sought certiorari review. Realtor did not. The trial court and Court of Civil Appeals regarded Owners' failure to read the addendum when presented with it to be dispositive. The Oklahoma Supreme Court found while this was certainly important, ultimately, the communications and conduct of the parties with respect to the addendum "must be judged in the totality of the circumstances surrounding its creation. The conflicting positions and evidentiary materials of the parties in the case at hand pose a comparable controversy that would preclude summary judgment on Realtor's claim for a commission." View "Green Meadow Realty Co. v. Gillock" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in an action arising from a property insurance policy that Lexington issued to LWL to insure construction equipment that LWL leased from Sierra. The court held that the equitable lien doctrine did not apply to Sierra, who was not a party to the insurance policy, and Sierra did not have standing to sue Lexington. In this case, the agreement between Sierra and LWL did not require that LWL obtain insurance with a loss payable clause to Sierra, and the Lexington policy did not contain such a clause. View "Sierra Equipment, Inc. v. Lexington Insurance Co." on Justia Law