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In this action brought by Plaintiff alleging a deliberate intent claim and violations of the West Virginia Human Rights Act (Act) the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s rulings and remanded the case for entry of an order dismissing the action and compelling arbitration. Plaintiff instituted this civil action against Hampden Coal, LLC, his employer, and his supervisor alleging a deliberate intent claim related to his workplace injury and two violations of the Act arising from his demotion. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, to compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement Appellant signed as a condition of his employment. The circuit court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss and refused to compel arbitration, concluding, among other things, that the arbitration agreement was invalid because it lacked consideration and was both substantively and procedurally unconscionable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) more stringent or different standards do not apply to consideration of arbitration agreements in the employment context; (2) the parties’ agreement to arbitrate their disputes served as consideration for the agreement; (3) the agreement was neither substantively or procedurally unconscionable; (4) Plaintiff’s claims did not fall outside the scope of the agreement; and (5) the circuit court erred in finding that the agreement was an employment contract. View "Hampden Coal, LLC v. Varney" on Justia Law

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Qwinstar and Pro Logistics entered into an agreement wherein Qwinstar would purchase Pro Logistics and employ its owner for a term of five years. Qwinstar fired the owner a few months after the sale and filed suit alleging that it did not receive the inventory it bargained for in the sale. The owner counterclaimed, alleging breach of the employment contract by not paying him for the full five-year term. The Eighth Circuit held that Qwinstar was unable to prove that the owner breached the contract and thus affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the owner and Pro Logistics. The court held that summary judgment was inappropriate on the owner's counterclaim because the contract provisions were ambiguous and reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation. Therefore, interpretation becomes a question of fact precluding summary judgment. View "Qwinstar Corp. v. Anthony" on Justia Law

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STV One Nineteen Senior Living, LLC ("STV"), appealed a circuit court order denying its motion to compel arbitration of certain counterclaims filed against it by Dixie Boyd, by and through her agent, Mary Alice Boyd-Kline, under a valid power of attorney. Dixie Boyd and Mary-Alice Boyd-Kline, as holder of Boyd's power of attorney, signed a "residency agreement" with STV, which operated an assisted-living facility. STV agreed to provide Dixie Boyd with a private apartment and other related services, including, among other things, utilities, housekeeping, laundry, meals, maintenance, planned activities, transportation, and security and protection. The residency agreement contained an arbitration clause. The Alabama Supreme Court determined the plain language of the arbitration clause encompassed Boyd's counterclaims, and the trial court erred, therefore, in denying STV's motion to compel arbitration. View "STV One Nineteen Senior Living, LLC v. Boyd" on Justia Law

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In this breach of contract action brought by a homeowner (Plaintiff) against the company that laid his asphalt driveway (Defendant), the Supreme Court affirmed in part and in part reversed the judgment of the district court that significantly reduced the reduction of the award given by the county court. After Plaintiff’s driveway began to deteriorate prematurely, Plaintiff sued Defendant. The county court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff. The district court reversed the county court’s determination that Plaintiff’s damages included $26,189 for a two-inch overlay of the entire driveway and remanded the case with directions to enter judgment reflecting damages in the amount of $6,522. On appeal, the Supreme Court held (1) the county court’s verdict should have been limited to plain error; (2) there was no plain error in the county court’s assessment of $26,189 in damages for the two-inch overlay; (3) there was sufficient evidence that it was reasonable and necessary for Plaintiff to contract for a stopgap repair of patchwork replacement of broken sections; and (4) there was no plain error in the county court’s award of discovery sanctions and repairs. View "Houser v. American Paving Asphalt" on Justia Law

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The gestational surrogacy contract in the instant case was legally enforceable in favor of the intended, biological father against a surrogate mother and her husband who were not the child’s genetic parents. Plaintiffs were a married couple who signed a contract with Defendants, the surrogate mother and her husband. The surrogate mother was impregnated with embryos fertilized with the plaintiff-father’s sperm and the eggs of an anonymous donor. After one surviving child was born, Defendants refused to honor the agreement. Plaintiffs sued to enforce the contract and gain custody of the child. The district court concluded that the contract was enforceable, terminated the presumptive parental rights of the surrogate mother and her husband, established paternity in the biological father, and awarded him permanent legal and physical custody. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly established paternity in the biological father based on the undisputed DNA evidence, terminated the presumptive parental rights of Defendants and awarded permanent custody to the biological, intended father. A contrary holding invaliding surrogacy contracts would deprive infertile couples of the opportunity to raise their own biological children and limit the personal autonomy of women willing to serve as surrogates. View "P.M. v. T.B." on Justia Law

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The gestational surrogacy contract in the instant case was legally enforceable in favor of the intended, biological father against a surrogate mother and her husband who were not the child’s genetic parents. Plaintiffs were a married couple who signed a contract with Defendants, the surrogate mother and her husband. The surrogate mother was impregnated with embryos fertilized with the plaintiff-father’s sperm and the eggs of an anonymous donor. After one surviving child was born, Defendants refused to honor the agreement. Plaintiffs sued to enforce the contract and gain custody of the child. The district court concluded that the contract was enforceable, terminated the presumptive parental rights of the surrogate mother and her husband, established paternity in the biological father, and awarded him permanent legal and physical custody. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly established paternity in the biological father based on the undisputed DNA evidence, terminated the presumptive parental rights of Defendants and awarded permanent custody to the biological, intended father. A contrary holding invaliding surrogacy contracts would deprive infertile couples of the opportunity to raise their own biological children and limit the personal autonomy of women willing to serve as surrogates. View "P.M. v. T.B." on Justia Law

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FWP and its designees filed suit against Chesapeake and related entities to recover payment allegedly due under a provision of a Surface Use Agreement governing Chesapeake's use of FWP's land. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court determining that the payment provision was a covenant that ran with the surface of the land and that FWP accordingly forfeited the benefit of this covenant when it sold that land. Because FWP consequently forfeited its right to payment under this paragraph when it sold the surface of the land at issue to Chesapeake, the court did not address the district court's alternative holding. View "Fort Worth 4th Street Partners v. Chesapeake Energy Corp." on Justia Law

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FWP and its designees filed suit against Chesapeake and related entities to recover payment allegedly due under a provision of a Surface Use Agreement governing Chesapeake's use of FWP's land. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court determining that the payment provision was a covenant that ran with the surface of the land and that FWP accordingly forfeited the benefit of this covenant when it sold that land. Because FWP consequently forfeited its right to payment under this paragraph when it sold the surface of the land at issue to Chesapeake, the court did not address the district court's alternative holding. View "Fort Worth 4th Street Partners v. Chesapeake Energy Corp." on Justia Law

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Turtle Creek Crossing, LLC, a minority interest holder in Kimco Hattiesburg, L.P., filed an action in circuit court after it learned it would receive no distribution from the sale of the partnership’s only asset, a multimillion-dollar shopping center. In its complaint, Turtle Creek alleged its fellow partners breached their fiduciary duties and conspired with each other, the partnership, and a sister partnership to market and sell the asset in such a way as to keep Turtle Creek from profiting. According to the defendants, the predominant claim was for an accounting - an equitable claim that belonges in chancery court; had this case been filed in chancery court, there would be a strong argument for the chancery court’s original jurisdiction over the accounting claim, as well as pendant jurisdiction over the legal claims. Turtle Creek did not file this action in chancery court. It filed it in circuit court. And the circuit court also had original jurisdiction, not only over the accounting claim, but also Turtle Creek’s other legal claims. Because Turtle Creek chose a forum with proper subject-matter jurisdiction, the Mississippi Supreme Court determined that choice must be respected. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of the motion to transfer and remanded for further proceedings. View "KD Hattiesburg 1128, Inc. v. Turtle Creek Crossing, LLC" on Justia Law

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CNH, which manufactures “New Holland” brand farming and construction machinery, hired the real estate services firm, JLL, to manage a corporate re-branding program that involved the replacement of signage more than 1,400 North American dealerships. The vinyl used in the new signs was defective, necessitating the re-manufacture and replacement of virtually all of the installed signs. After the vinyl manufacturer repudiated its commitment to replace, at its own cost, the defective signs, CNH sued, alleging that JLL had failed to perform adequate quality control in the manufacturing of the signs, failed to negotiate the best possible warranty on the vinyl and the signs, and failed to properly document and manage the warranties. The district court found that CNH had suffered damages of $5,482,735 but reduced JLL’s liability to $3,026.361.60—the sum CNH paid to JLL in project management fees—plus such other amounts JLL might recover from third parties (the vinyl manufacturer and the sign fabricators) in the future. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court’s findings were supported by the evidence and make clear that JLL’s own failures with respect to quality control in the manufacturing process and with respect to the vinyl warranty made the defective-sign problem much worse for CNH than it otherwise would have been. View "CNH Industrial America LLC v. Jones Lang LaSalle Americas, Inc." on Justia Law