Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Several individuals filed a putative class action against two related corporate defendants, alleging that the defendants’ website terms and conditions violated a California statute known as section 1670.8, or the “Yelp Law.” The plaintiffs argued that certain provisions in the website’s terms—specifically, language related to trademark use and website access—prohibited or penalized negative statements about the defendants, their employees, or their goods and services. The plaintiffs claimed these provisions constituted unlawful non-disparagement clauses in consumer contracts.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the case and sustained the defendants’ demurrer to the consolidated class action complaint, first with leave to amend and then, after an amended complaint was filed, without leave to amend. The court found that the challenged terms were limited to intellectual property protections and did not restrict consumer speech. It also determined that the statute did not create a private right of action for merely including a violative provision unless there was a threat to enforce that provision or penalize speech. The court concluded that neither the trademark nor the termination provisions in the defendants’ terms constituted actionable violations of section 1670.8 and entered judgment dismissing the case.Upon appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Five, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the website’s trademark language did not waive consumers’ rights to make critical statements about the defendants, and the website access termination clause was not a restriction on consumer speech. The court concluded that plaintiffs had not stated a cause of action under section 1670.8 and confirmed that the inclusion of these provisions, without a threat or attempt to enforce against protected speech, does not violate the statute. View "Scott v. Ulta Beauty, Inc." on Justia Law

A physician who practiced at Corona Regional Medical Center alleged that the hospital and three individual doctors conspired to defame him, destroy his professional reputation, and summarily suspended his admitting privileges under false pretenses. He claimed these actions were motivated by competitive and financial interests, and that the hospital and defendants orchestrated a campaign using fabricated internal reports to target him, resulting in financial and emotional harm. The physician entered into an agreement with the hospital to lift his suspension, subject to several conditions, and avoided having the suspension reported to the California Medical Board. His wife separately claimed loss of consortium due to the defendants’ actions.The Superior Court of Riverside County reviewed the case and granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court found that the physician had failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him through the hospital’s peer review process before suing for damages. The trial court also partially granted the defendants’ motion for attorney fees based on a provision in the hospital’s bylaws, but denied fees against the wife, and reduced the fee amounts for certain attorneys.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, affirmed the judgment and the postjudgment order. The court held that the physician did not establish he was excused from exhausting his administrative remedies, as the agreement to lift his suspension was conditional and did not provide the maximum relief available through the peer review process. The court also upheld the attorney fee award to defendants under the bylaws, finding the fee provision valid and not preempted by statute, and concluded that the trial court correctly denied fees against the wife and for certain attorney billing records. View "Sujan v. UHS Corona" on Justia Law

Programmers who published open-source code on GitHub sued GitHub, Microsoft, and various OpenAI entities, alleging that GitHub Copilot and Codex—AI tools trained on publicly available code from GitHub—reproduce portions of their code without attribution. These programmers claimed that the AI’s omission of copyright management information (CMI), such as attribution and license terms required by open-source licenses, violated the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), specifically 17 U.S.C. § 1202(b). Plaintiffs alleged that Copilot’s outputs sometimes consist of verbatim or near-verbatim reproductions of their code, but the AI-generated outputs do not include the original CMI.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California reviewed the case and dismissed the DMCA claims under Rule 12(b)(6, first with leave to amend and then with prejudice, concluding that plaintiffs failed to allege that Copilot’s outputs were “identical” to their code and that only identical copies from which CMI had been removed could support a DMCA claim. The court allowed breach of contract claims to proceed. It certified the DMCA dismissal for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), noting the issue of whether § 1202(b) imposes an identicality requirement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that plaintiffs had Article III standing due to a plausible risk of injury. However, it determined that under their “output” theory, Copilot and Codex do not “remove or alter” CMI from copies of existing protected works; instead, they generate new works that never contained CMI. The court declined to consider the plaintiffs’ “input” theory as it was forfeited. The main holding is that generating new works without CMI does not violate § 1202(b) of the DMCA. View "DOE V. GITHUB, INC." on Justia Law

Island Creek Associates, LLC was awarded a multiple award contract (MAC) known as SeaPort-NxG by the United States Navy, alongside two other companies, Don Selvy Enterprises, Inc. (DSE) and Precise Systems Inc., each receiving contracts on identical terms. In 2022, DSE and Precise formed a joint venture, Secise, under the Small Business Administration’s Mentor-Protégé Program (MPP). In 2024, the Navy issued a modification to the SeaPort-NxG MAC, allowing MPP joint ventures, as well as their mentor and protégé members, to each hold a separate MAC, creating an exception to the previous “One Prime Contract Per Company” rule. Following this modification and the issuance of a task order to Secise, Island Creek filed a five-count complaint in the United States Court of Federal Claims, raising challenges to the contract modification, its implementation, and an alleged organizational conflict of interest involving a Navy contracting official and a Precise employee.After Island Creek’s complaint, the Navy took corrective action by rescinding the challenged portions of the contract modification, thereby reverting to the original rules. The Navy then moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the corrective action mooted four counts and that the remaining count was barred by statutory restrictions. The United States Court of Federal Claims dismissed the complaint, holding that Island Creek lacked statutory standing as an “interested party” under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1), but did not rule on mootness or the application of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA).On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal, but on alternative grounds. The appellate court held that Counts I–III and V were moot due to the Navy’s corrective action, which eradicated the effects of the challenged modification. It further held that Count IV was barred under the FASA’s task order protest provision, 10 U.S.C. § 3406(f), and Island Creek lacked statutory standing to challenge Precise’s award. The judgment of the Court of Federal Claims was affirmed. View "ISLAND CREEK ASSOCIATES, LLC v. US " on Justia Law

A plaintiff who won a substantial lottery prize in Maine sought to protect his identity and that of his minor daughter from public disclosure. He entered into a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) with the mother of his child, intending to keep details of his lottery win and finances private. After the plaintiff believed the NDA was breached, he sued for injunctive relief and damages in the United States District Court for the District of Maine. Throughout the proceedings, both parties were initially allowed to litigate under pseudonyms, and a local news organization intervened to advocate for public access. As trial approached, the plaintiff moved to close the courtroom to the public and to continue using pseudonyms, arguing that disclosure could jeopardize his family’s safety and his daughter’s privacy.The District Court for the District of Maine denied both requests. It issued a detailed opinion emphasizing the strong presumption of public access to judicial proceedings, citing common-law tradition and relevant federal rules. The court found that while the case involved sensitive financial and familial information, such concerns did not outweigh the public’s right to access. The court determined that the plaintiff’s wealth and desire for privacy did not constitute “unusually severe harm” justifying deviation from established principles. Additionally, the court noted that any potential harm to the minor child would be mitigated by identifying her only by initials, a standard protocol. The plaintiff timely appealed these rulings.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case under the abuse of discretion standard. It affirmed the District Court’s decision, holding that neither the plaintiff’s wealth nor purported risks to his family met the exceptional circumstances required for trial closure or continued pseudonymity. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the lower court’s balancing of public access against privacy interests and awarded costs to the appellees. View "Doe v. Smith" on Justia Law

A television production company maintained insurance coverage for its shows, including one chronicling the struggles of obese individuals to lose weight. In 2011, the insurer added an exclusion to the general liability portion of the policy, barring coverage for “any/all reality shows.” The company did not object to this exclusion. Years later, several participants or their families sued the production company for injuries allegedly arising from the show’s filming. The insurer refused to defend or indemnify the company, citing the “reality show” exclusion.The insurer brought a declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, seeking confirmation that it had no duty to defend or indemnify. The production company counterclaimed for breach of contract, fraudulent inducement, and violations of Texas consumer protection statutes. The district court granted summary judgment to the insurer, finding that the exclusion unambiguously barred coverage for bodily injuries arising from reality shows like the one at issue. At a subsequent bench trial, the district court rejected the company’s fraud and statutory claims, finding no misrepresentation by the insurer and concluding the company could not have justifiably relied on any representation given its knowledge of the exclusion and the show’s nature.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The Fifth Circuit held that the company forfeited its argument about the ambiguity of "reality show" by not raising it in the district court and, in fact, previously represented the show as a “reality show.” The appellate court also found no clear error in the district court’s factual findings rejecting the fraud and consumer protection claims, noting substantial evidence of the company’s understanding of the exclusion. The district court’s judgment was affirmed in full. View "Megalomedia v. Philadelphia Indemnity" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on royalty payments under thousands of Kansas oil-and-gas leases. The lessors (royalty owners) claim that the lessees (operators and working interest owners) improperly deducted certain midstream processing costs from royalties paid on natural gas produced from their wells. The lessors argue that, under Kansas law’s implied duty to market, lessees must bear all costs necessary to make raw gas “marketable” before calculating royalties, and that gas is only marketable when it meets the requirements of the market where it is actually sold (in this case, the interstate pipeline market). The lessees respond that gas can be marketable at the wellhead even if not actually sold there, and that processing merely enhances value rather than making the gas marketable, so post-production costs may be shared with royalty owners if the lease allows.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas, facing this disagreement and noting the absence of controlling Kansas precedent, certified a question to the Kansas Supreme Court regarding when natural gas is considered “marketable” for purposes of royalty obligations and the proper application of the marketable condition rule. The federal court provided a limited factual record and sought guidance on whether marketability depends on the intended or actual market of sale, or if it may occur earlier.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas held that oil-and-gas leases must be interpreted according to their express terms. If the lease is silent or ambiguous about allocation of costs, the court may apply the marketable condition rule to fill contractual gaps, but this rule does not apply categorically. Determining when gas is “marketable” is a fact-specific inquiry that depends on the particular lease language and surrounding circumstances, and must be decided case-by-case. Express royalty provisions such as “proceeds if sold at the well” or “market value at the well” must be enforced as written and are not displaced by the marketable condition rule. The certified question was answered accordingly. View "Cooper-Clark Foundation v. Scout Energy Management " on Justia Law

Three individuals deposited approximately $85,000 into a joint account with a bank. When one of the depositors became subject to a civil judgment in an unrelated matter, the judgment creditor garnished the account. The bank paid about $38,000 from the joint account to the creditor without seeking the depositors’ permission. The depositors sued the bank for breach of contract and fiduciary duty in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, which compelled arbitration under the account agreement. The arbitrator ruled in favor of the bank and awarded attorney fees. After the award, the bank sought confirmation of the arbitration award. The depositors’ attorney missed the 30-day deadline to seek judicial review due to a family emergency, specifically the unexpected death of his stepson.The depositors’ counsel filed a motion for nunc pro tunc relief in the Court of Common Pleas, requesting an extension to file for review. The court granted an additional 20 days. Counsel filed the belated appeal, and the court vacated the attorney fee award but otherwise affirmed the arbitration award. The bank appealed. The Pennsylvania Superior Court, after remanding for an unrelated issue, considered cross-appeals. The depositors argued due process violations during arbitration, while the bank contended the court lacked jurisdiction to modify the award after the statutory deadline and erred in granting nunc pro tunc relief.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed whether the “non-negligent happenstance” exception to statutory filing deadlines—established in Bass v. Commonwealth—remained viable and whether it applied to the attorney’s family emergency. The Court held that the statutory 30-day period in 42 Pa.C.S. § 7342(b) is mandatory and not subject to an equitable, non-negligent-happenstance exception absent express statutory language. The Court affirmed the Superior Court’s order, disapproving Bass as a basis for extending arbitration review deadlines without legislative authorization. View "Carr v. First Commonwealth Bank" on Justia Law

A Michigan marijuana grower entered into a contract with two subsidiaries of a larger company to supply all marijuana grown in its 2020 and 2021 harvests. At the time of contracting, the grower was licensed by Michigan to produce medical marijuana, while the buyers held both medical and recreational licenses. The contract required the marijuana to meet recreational testing standards, and the buyers paid a deposit. After the initial shipment, the buyers refused further deliveries due to a price drop, prompting the grower to sell the remaining harvests to other entities at lower prices.The grower sued the buyers for breach of contract in Michigan state court, seeking lost profits. The buyers removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, raised counterclaims, and asserted that the contract was unenforceable due to federal illegality. After cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court denied the buyers’ illegality defense and allowed the case to proceed to trial. A jury found the buyers liable and awarded substantial damages to the grower. The buyers renewed their motion for judgment as a matter of law and requested a new trial, again arguing federal illegality.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial de novo. The Sixth Circuit held that federal courts cannot enforce contracts founded on agreements to commit conduct that is explicitly prohibited by federal law, such as distribution and possession of marijuana under the Controlled Substances Act. Because the contract was not limited to medical use and encompassed conduct criminalized under federal law, the court found the contract unenforceable. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of the buyers’ motion for judgment as a matter of law. View "Hello Farms Licensing MI, LLC v. GR Vending MI, LLC" on Justia Law

Ford hired Versata to develop software for vehicle configuration, resulting in two products: Automotive Configuration Manager (ACM) and Materials Cost Analytics (MCA). In 2004, the parties entered into a licensing agreement called the Master Subscription and Services Agreement (MSSA). When the MSSA expired in 2014 and negotiations failed, Ford developed its own software, PDO, while still licensing Versata’s products. Ford sought a declaratory judgment that it had not infringed Versata’s rights. Versata counterclaimed, alleging misappropriation of trade secrets (specifically three combination secrets within ACM) and breach of contract.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan excluded testimony from Versata’s damages expert regarding trade secret damages, limiting Versata to damages based on the parties’ licensing history. At trial, a jury found Ford liable for trade secret misappropriation (of ACM, not MCA) and breach of contract, awarding Versata $22,386,000 for misappropriation and $82,260,000 for breach. Post-trial, the district court reduced both awards, setting trade secret damages to $0 and breach damages to $3, reasoning that the jury lacked sufficient evidentiary basis for their calculations. The district court denied Ford’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on liability.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. It held that Versata was entitled to pursue unjust enrichment damages under both the Defend Trade Secrets Act and the Michigan Uniform Trade Secrets Act, and the district court erred in precluding this. The Federal Circuit vacated the district court's judgment on trade secret damages, remanding for a new trial with instructions to consider previously excluded damages models. For breach of contract, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s reduction and reinstated the jury’s $82,260,000 award. It affirmed the district court’s denial of Ford’s motion for judgment as a matter of law regarding liability for trade secret misappropriation. View "VERSATA SOFTWARE, LLC v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY " on Justia Law