Plaintiffs hold participating life-insurance policies from State Farm and Country Life that guarantee policyholders annual dividends from their insurers’ surpluses. The insurers decide the dividend amounts. Dissatisfied with their dividends, Plaintiffs filed nearly identical class-action complaints claiming that the dividend provisions in their policies violate the Illinois Insurance Code by failing to include a provision mandated by the Code. Plaintiffs concede that their annual dividends satisfied the terms of their respective policies. In consolidated appeals, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claims. Illinois requires only that life-insurance policies of this type contain a provision for policyholders to participate in their insurers’ surpluses. The policies at issue here contain the required provision and are in compliance, despite allowing insurers discretion to set dividend amounts. View "Anderson v. Country Life Insurance Co." on Justia Law

MCI held a business owners insurance policy with an “Employment-Related Practices Liability Endorsement” from Society Insurance. When DirecTV sued MCI under 47 U.S.C. 521 for publicly displaying its programming in MCI’s two restaurants without paying the commercial subscription rate, Society denied MCI’s claim. MCI sued Society; the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Society. The Endorsement requires Society to cover MCI for “damages resulting from a ‘wrongful act’ to which [the Policy] applies” and defines “wrongful act” to include, “[l]ibel, slander, invasion of privacy, defamation or humiliation.” There is no reasonable interpretation of the DirecTV complaint that could arguably fall within the category of libel, slander or defamation. That complaint alleged that MCI damaged DirecTV’s goodwill by showing its programming without paying the correct subscription fee; there are no allegations that MCI made any false, defamatory statement about DirecTV. DirecTV’s actions did not include allegations that MCI made any kind of statement at all. View "Martinsville Corral, Inc. v. Society Insurance" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered a certified question submitted by the United States District Court for the District of Nevada by holding that, under Nevada law, an insurer’s liability where it breaches its contractual duty to defend is not capped at the policy limits plus any costs incurred by the insured in mounting a defense. Instead, an insurer may be liable for any consequential damages caused by its breach. Further, good faith determinations are irrelevant for determining damages upon a breach of the duty to defend. Respondents filed suit against Appellant-insurer for breach of contract and other causes of action. The federal court concluded that Appellant did not act in bad faith but did breach its duty to defend. The federal court subsequently entered an order staying the proceedings until resolution of the certified question by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered as set forth above, holding that an insured may recover any damages consequential to the insurer’s breach of its duty to defend, and therefore, an insurer’s liability for breach of that duty is not capped at the policy limits, even if the insurer did not act in bad faith. View "Century Surety Co. v. Andrew" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals applying provisions of the Kentucky Fairness in Construction Act (KFCA) to void an entire dispute resolution process contained in the parties’ sewer construction contract, reinstated the summary judgment entered in the trial court, and affirmed the Court of Appeals on all remaining issues. Plaintiff hired Defendant for its sewer project for approximately $2.3 million. The contract contained a provision detailing the process for dispute resolution (Article 13). When Defendant did not substantially complete the project by the scheduled deadline, Plaintiff brought this action. The Court of Appeals deemed the whole of Article 13 void and unenforceable. The Supreme Court held (1) the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff on Defendant’s claim for extra work, and the court of appeals erred in applying certain portions of the KFCA to render null and void the entirety of Article 13; (2) the trial court correctly handled Plaintiff’s liquidated damages claim; and (3) the trial court did not err in denying Plaintiff’s motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict on one of Plaintiff’s breach of contract claims. View "Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer District v. T&C Contracting, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s decision granting summary judgment in favor of Protective Life Insurance Company on Plaintiff’s complaint alleging breach of contract and bad faith, holding that there were no genuine issues of material fact indicating that Protective breached its contract with Plaintiff. Specifically, the Court held (1) Plaintiff’s claim that Protective breached the implied contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing was reviewable; (2) the circuit court did not err when it determined that Protective did not breach the implied contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing; and (3) the circuit court did not err in ruling that Protective did not commit bad faith in handling Plaintiff’s claims. View "Zochert v. Protective Life Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court denying Appellants’ motion to intervene in a partnership dissolution action, holding that Appellants failed to meet the tripartite test necessary for intervention as a matter of right under S.D. Codified Laws 15-6-24(a)(2). Appellants entered into a farm lease/cash rent agreement with Berbos Farms General Partnership. Appellants sued Berbos Farms to recover unpaid cash rent under the lease for the years 2015. During discovery, Appellants learned that Joe and Lisa Berbos, partners in Berbos Farms, had filed a separate action to dissolve Berbos Farms. Seeking to preserve their right to payment of the 2015 cash rent in the event Berbos Farms was dissolved, Appellants move to intervene in the partnership dissolution action. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Appellants failed to show that the claim for unpaid cash rent might be impaired by the disposition of the partnership dissolution lawsuit, the circuit court correctly denied the motion to intervene under section 15-6-24(a)(2). View "Berbos v. Berbos" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review were the insurance proceeds owed to petitioners Rosalin Rogers and Mark Thompson because of a failed property investment orchestrated by their broker-dealer, United Securities Alliance. Ten years into litigation, the issue of the amount of debt at issue has remained at issue, and unresolvable by the courts. United's insurer, Catlin Insurance, was ordered to pay petitioners under a professional liability policy; an appellate court upheld a district court's determination of attorney fees and costs that Catlin could deduct from the liability limit under the policy. The Supreme Court first addressed whether the "Thompson IV" division erred when it upheld the district court’s decision to consider new evidence on remand from Thompson v. United Securities Alliance, Inc. (Thompson III), No. 13CA2037, (Colo. App. Oct. 16, 2014). And Secondly, the Supreme Court addressed whether the Thompson IV division erred when it held that there was no legal basis for awarding prejudgment interest in a garnishment proceeding. As to the first issue, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals; as to the second, it reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Thompson v. Catlin" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Irmat's complaint against Express Scripts, alleging various contract claims, a promissory estoppel claim, and violations of federal antitrust laws and state Any Willing Provider laws. The court held that the inclusion of Express Scripts's unilateral right to terminate the agreement between the parties upon thirty days written notice was, by itself, insufficient to support a claim of unconscionability; the agreement was not unconscionable because it was a non-negotiable form contract (i.e., a contract of adhesion); Express Scripts did not violate its duty of good faith and fair dealing when it terminated Irmat from its network; and the e-mail Express Scripts sent to Irmat in August 2015 did not constitute a novation where it lacked essential contractual provisions. The court also held that Irmat failed to plausibly plead promissory estoppel. Finally, the court rejected Irmat's claim that Express Scripts violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, and that Express Scripts violated the Any Willing Provider laws. Irmat was not entitled to leave to amend its complaint. View "Park Irmat Drug Corp. v. Express Scripts Holding Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration and dismiss the case, holding that the district court did not erroneously compel arbitration. Plaintiff entered into a construction contract that contained an arbitration agreement. Plaintiff later filed a complaint against Defendants, asserting claims for breach of contract, negligence, and other torts. Defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration and dismiss. The Supreme Court granted the motion to compel arbitration and dismissed the action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err (1) in concluding that the arbitration agreement required arbitration of matters within its scope rather than merely authorizing it as a matter of discretion upon timely demand; (2) in failing to conclude that Defendants equitably waived the right to arbitrate; (3) in compelling arbitration without consideration of Plaintiff’s proposed declaratory judgment claim challenging the validity of the arbitration agreement; (4) in concluding that Plaintiff’s asserted non-contract claims were subject to arbitration; and (5) in failing to conclude that, as a non-party to the agreement, one defendant lacked standing to enforce the arbitration agreement. View "Peeler v. Rocky Mountain Log Homes Canada, Inc." on Justia Law

Wakaya Perfection, LLC and its principals sued Youngevity International Corp. and its principals in Utah state court. The Youngevity parties responded by bringing their own suit against the Wakaya parties in a California federal district court, then removing the Utah case to federal court. These steps resulted in concurrent federal cases sharing at least some claims and issues. The California litigation progressed; and in November 2017, the federal district court in Utah ordered dismissal. The issues presented for the Tenth Circuit's review centered on whether: (1) the federal district court should have abstained from exercising jurisdiction under the Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976) test; and (2) and arbitrator would have needed to decide the arbitrability of Wakaya's claims. The Tenth Circuit reversed on both grounds: the federal trial court applied the wrong abstention test and erroneously ruled that an arbitrator should have decided whether Wakaya's claims were arbitrable. View "Wakaya Perfection, LLC v. Youngevity International" on Justia Law