George Zakk filed suit against Vin Diesel, One Race Films, Inc., and Revolution Studios for breach of an oral contract, breach of an implied-in-fact contract, intentional interference with contractual relations, quantum meruit, promissory estoppel, and declaratory relief. Plaintiff alleged that he was entitled to be paid and receive an executive producer credit for a film that was a sequel to a film he had worked on and developed. The trial court sustained defendants' demurrers and dismissed the third amended complaint. With regard to oral contracts that fall within the statute of frauds category of contracts not to be performed within a year, the Court of Appeal held that the promisee's full performance of all of his or her obligations under the contract takes the contract out of the statute of frauds, and no further showing of estoppel is required. The court distinguished cases involving other categories of contracts within the statute of frauds, such as contracts to make a will or contracts not to be performed within the promisor's lifetime, because those categories of contracts historically have been treated differently than contracts not to be performed within a year. The court held that, to the extent those cases hold that avoidance of the statute of frauds requires the promisee to satisfy the elements of estoppel--showing extraordinary services by the promisee or unjust enrichment by the promisor--they do not apply to the category of contracts not to be performed within a year. In this case, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that Zakk's allegation that he fully performed his obligations under the alleged oral contract at issue is enough to avoid the statute of frauds. The trial court erred in finding that Zakk's breach of contract and related claims were barred by the statute of frauds absent alleged facts showing defendants were estopped to assert the statute. Furthermore, the trial court erred by finding that the third amended complaint was a sham pleading and that the quantum meruit claim was time-barred. However, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the promissory estoppel claim. View "Zakk v. Diesel" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed an adverse order by the FAA's Office of Dispute Resolution for Acquisition (ODRA) regarding property Southern leased to the Administration. Southern subsequently sold the property and surrounding land to Prairie Land, assigning its lease with the FAA to Prairie Land. After the FAA refused to vacate the premises, Prairie Land initiated a contract dispute with the ODRA. The court held that the FAA's continued occupancy of the property was permitted, and the ODRA did not err by concluding that the holdover provisions permitted the FAA to holdover on the property until either a new lease was agreed upon or it acquired the property in fee. Therefore, the FAA was fully within its rights to continue possessing the property. View "Prairie Land Holdings, LLC v. FAA" on Justia Law

The Property of Unincorporated Associations Act, 765 ILCS 115/2, requires a labor union to notify its members and obtain their approval before entering into an agreement to lease or purchase real estate. The circuit court held that an agreement is enforceable despite a union’s failure to follow these requirements because the Act is silent as to the consequences of noncompliance. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. Where a party lacks the legal authority to form a contract, the resulting contract is void ab initio. Absent compliance with the statutory prerequisites, an unincorporated association has no power to execute a valid real estate contract. The apparent authority doctrine is not relevant. A contract that is void ab initio is treated as though it never existed and, thus, cannot be enforced by either party. View "1550 MP Road LLC v. Teamsters Local Union No. 700" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the plan administrator denying Plaintiff pension benefits, holding that the superior court did not err in granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and in alternatively granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants. Plaintiff requested pension benefits but Defendants denied the request. Plaintiff then filed a complaint for breach of contract as well as seeking a declaratory judgment against Defendants. The hearing justice ultimately determined that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim and granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s judgment regarding its lack of subject matter jurisdiction and reinstated and granted Plaintiff’s previously-denied petition or writ of certiorari, consolidated that matter with the present appeal, and affirmed the decision of the plan administrator denying Plaintiff pension benefits, holding that the plan administrator’s decision was sufficiently supported by testimonial and other evidence that that it reached a reasonable conclusion. View "Sullivan v. Coventry Municipal Employees’ Retirement Plan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the superior court entering summary judgment in favor of Defendant on Plaintiff’s complaint alleging breach of contract and fraud, holding that the hearing justice correctly granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment after concluding that Plaintiff’s complaint was barred by the relevant statute of limitations. In his complaint, Plaintiff argued that Defendant breached his fiduciary duty owed to Plaintiff. The hearing justice concluded that the complaint was subject to the three-year statute of limitations for legal malpractice contained within R.I. Gen. Laws 9-1-14.3 and concluded that Plaintiff’s cause of action was untimely. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff’s complaint was time barred. View "Broccoli v. Manning" on Justia Law

Johnson Electric sued Robinson Electric Supply for numerous claims, including breach of contract, fraud, and a variety of other torts. Johnson asserted that Robinson Electric Supply carried out a fraudulent scheme to overcharge Johnson. Robinson Electric Supply counterclaimed for balances due on Johnson’s accounts. Both parties requested an accounting. The chancellor appointed a special master to hear the case due to its complexity and size of the amount in controversy. The chancellor stayed discovery until the special master could release her findings; however, the chancellor also ordered Robinson to release numerous business records sought by Johnson. Before the accounting was concluded by the special master, Johnson Electric was administratively dissolved, and as a result, the chancellor dismissed the claims brought on behalf of the corporation. After the special master released her recommendations and a supplemental report, the chancellor agreed with the special master’s findings and adopted the report. On appeal, Johnson challenged the chancellor’s decision to dismiss Johnson Electric from the lawsuit, the chancellor’s adoption of the special master’s report, and the chancellor’s decision to stay discovery until an accounting could be conducted by the special master. The Mississippi Supreme Court found that because Johnson Electric was administratively dissolved, it could not "maintain" a claim as a corporation under Mississippi law. Furthermore, the Court determined neither the chancellor's acceptance of the special master's report nor the chancellor's discovery rulings were an abuse of discretion. View "Wayne Johnson Electric Inc. v. Robinson Electric Supply Company, Inc." on Justia Law

After Mako acquired a historic building with intentions to restore it using state and federal historic tax credits, it retained the law firm of Winthrop & Weinstine to draft the tax credit bond. CRBT then retained Winthrop to represent it in connection with the building tax credit project. CRBT, through counsel Winthrop, later sought to foreclose on the building. Mako retained separate counsel and moved to dismiss the complaint and to disqualify Winthrop. The district court denied both of Mako's motions and awarded $5.2 million to CRBT. The Eighth Circuit held that the district court did not err by denying Mako's motion to dismiss the action for failure to join Chevron as a necessary party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a)(1); the district court did not err in calculating the money judgment; and, although the district court erred in failing to disqualify Winthrop as counsel for CRBT, the error was harmless. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment for money damages; reversed the district court's denial to disqualify counsel in any future proceedings; and, as proceedings continue and the Winthrop law firm has a conflict of interest necessitating removal as counsel, remanded for further proceedings. View "Cedar Rapids Bank & Trust Co. v. Mako One Corp." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals accepted a question certified to it by the federal court of appeals and answered that, pursuant to the Court’s Rule 500.27, if a bond issuer remains obligated to make biannual interest payments until the principal is paid, including after the date of maturity, enforceable claims for such biannual interest do not continue to accrue after a claim for principal of the bonds is time-barred. In 1997, Defendant, the Province of Mendoza, issued bonds valued at $250 million. Plaintiff Moshe Marcel Ajdler was the beneficial owner of $7,050,000 of the principal amount. Plaintiff did not receive any scheduled interest payments or payment of his share of his principal on the maturity date. In 2017, Plaintiff brought this action seeking to collect his share of principal and interest payments to which he was entitled. The district court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss, concluding that all claims for principal and any accrued interest were time-barred. The Second District concluded that Plaintiff’s claim for principal was untimely but certified questions as to the viability of Plaintiff’s claims to recover interest. The Court of Appeals held that in the absence of a timely action to recover principal, a bondholder cannot enforce the conditional obligation to make post-maturity interest payments. View "Ajdler v. Province of Mendoza" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the trial court’s judgment granting a bank’s motion to dismiss this action brought by Plaintiff, holding that the allegations of the complaint were sufficient to survive the bank's motion to dismiss. Plaintiff was listed as a joint tenant with right of survivorship on the checking and savings accounts. Plaintiff brought this breach of contract action alleging that Defendant, the bank, removed his name from checking and savings accounts without his consent and breached its duty to him as co-owner of the account by accepting forged signature cards. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of Defendant’s motion to dismiss, holding (1) Plaintiffs sufficiently complied with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 10.03 by attaching the signature cards reflecting his status as a joint tenant with right of survivorship, which is the basis of his breach of contract claim; and (2) Plaintiff’s claims were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss because, under Tennessee law, a contractual relationship arises between a bank and joint tenants upon the creation of joint tenancy bank accounts and no statute affords banks protection from liability for removing a joint tenant’s name from an account without the joint tenant’s consent. View "Estate of Ella Mae Haire v. Webster" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court granting summary judgment against Petitioners in their action against Respondents based upon a coal lease agreement between the parties and granting summary judgment against Respondents’ counterclaim, holding that there was no error to the dismissal of the parties’ respective claims. In granting summary judgment against Petitioners, the circuit court concluded that Respondents had no obligation to diligently mine coal and did not have to make royalty payments based upon comparable sales by other mining companies. The circuit court also granted summary judgment against Respondents’ counterclaim seeking damages for Petitioners’ refusal to consent to an assignment or sublease of the coal lease and for alleged tortious interference with an asset agreement Respondents had with another company. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no error in the circuit court’s judgment. View "Bruce McDonald Holding Co. v. Addington Inc." on Justia Law