Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries
Davidson v. Schleedlewitz, LLC
Three siblings inherited interests in two parcels of land near Saratoga, Wyoming: the Davidson Ranch and a nearby Commercial Property. After years of disputes and litigation, one sibling, Sue, became the sole owner of the Davidson Ranch but retained an easement over a road across the Commercial Property, which was owned by her siblings Chuck and Deb through various business entities. Chuck and Deb entered into a land sale agreement with the Platte Valley Healthcare Project (PVHP) to sell part of the Commercial Property for construction of a hospital. During this process, Sue learned of the sale, filed a lis pendens on the property related to other ongoing litigation, and made additional demands during easement negotiations with PVHP. PVHP terminated the deal after discovering the lis pendens clouded title.The Carbon County District Court consolidated the parties’ disputes, including claims by Sue regarding interference with her easement and counterclaims by Chuck and Deb for intentional interference with the PVHP land sale. Following a bench trial, the district court found against Sue on her claims and ruled in favor of Chuck and Deb on their intentional interference claim, awarding them damages equal to the unpaid contract price from the failed sale, less earnest money retained, and ordering Sue to pay to relocate the easement road.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case. It held that the district court properly found Sue liable for intentional interference with a business expectancy, concluding that her filing of lis pendens was not absolutely privileged and that she acted without good faith. The court also upheld the district court’s damages award and its use of the appropriate legal standard for damages in intentional interference cases. Finally, the Supreme Court declined to consider Sue’s challenge to the allocation of relocation costs for the easement road because it was raised for the first time on appeal. The decision of the district court was affirmed. View "Davidson v. Schleedlewitz, LLC" on Justia Law
COMPREHENSIVE TRAINING CENTER, LLC v. EDCOUCH-ELSA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT
A superintendent for a Texas public school district entered into contracts with two consulting firms to provide grant-writing and administration services, agreeing to pay them a contingent fee based on a percentage of any federal grant monies awarded. The contracts were not brought before the district’s board of trustees for approval, even though the board had a policy requiring board approval for any single, budgeted purchase of goods or services costing $25,000 or more. The consultants’ fees ultimately amounted to over $800,000 after the district successfully obtained a federal grant. When the district refused to pay, the consultants sued for breach of contract.The consultants filed suit in a Texas trial court, seeking to enforce the contracts under Chapter 271 of the Texas Local Government Code, which waives governmental immunity for properly executed contracts with local governments. The district responded with a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that the superintendent lacked authority to bind the district to these contracts because they exceeded his delegated authority and were not budgeted. The trial court denied the district’s plea. On interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District of Texas reversed, holding that the contracts were not properly executed because they were not budgeted for and exceeded the superintendent’s authority.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and affirmed the appellate court’s judgment. The Court held that, under the district’s policy, the superintendent only had authority to make budgeted purchases under $25,000, and these contracts far exceeded that limit. Because the contracts were not properly executed by someone with authority, Chapter 271’s waiver of governmental immunity did not apply and the district was immune from suit. The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the dismissal of the consultants’ claims. View "COMPREHENSIVE TRAINING CENTER, LLC v. EDCOUCH-ELSA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT" on Justia Law
The Armory Commission of Alabama v. Nearen Construction Company, LLC
A construction company submitted a bid to build a military project for a state commission, but its bid was rejected because it included only one original bid form instead of the preferred two, despite otherwise complying with requirements. The company claimed to be the lowest responsible bidder and alleged the commission failed to consider its bid due to a minor irregularity. After exhausting administrative remedies, the company sued the commission, seeking to enjoin further work and recover bid-preparation costs, arguing the rejection was improper.The Montgomery Circuit Court initially dismissed the complaint, but the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed, finding the complaint stated a claim. On remand, the company sought a preliminary injunction to stop further payments on the project, citing ongoing disbursement of funds. The commission moved for judgment on the pleadings, asserting sovereign immunity under the Alabama Constitution, which it argued deprived the trial court of jurisdiction. The trial court granted the preliminary injunction against the commission and its officers, but stayed the injunction pending appeal.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and held that the commission is an arm of the state entitled to absolute sovereign immunity, meaning the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to issue an injunction against it. The court emphasized that such immunity is not waived and applies regardless of the nature of the plaintiff or the relief sought, including claims relating to competitive bidding laws or taxpayer status. The court concluded that the preliminary injunction was void and dismissed the appeal, instructing the trial court to vacate the injunction and dismiss the commission from the case. The court took no position on whether claims could proceed against the commission's officer in his official capacity. View "The Armory Commission of Alabama v. Nearen Construction Company, LLC" on Justia Law
PriorityOne Bank v. JSC-Americanzil Construction, LLC
Harvey Lott, an employee of PriorityOne Bank, contracted with JSC-Americanzil Construction, LLC to build his home and encouraged the contractor to obtain a construction loan from his employer. Dissatisfied with the construction, Lott sued JSC, and JSC counterclaimed, alleging Lott improperly pressured them into a bank loan and raised several contract-related claims. The parties settled, executing a release that broadly discharged all claims between them, including any against PriorityOne Bank relating to the home construction and financing.Subsequently, Jason Ray Temple and his wife, who had also hired JSC to build their home and financed it through PriorityOne Bank, sued JSC and PriorityOne for defects in their home. JSC filed a cross-complaint against PriorityOne Bank in this new lawsuit, raising claims similar to those previously settled. PriorityOne Bank moved to dismiss or for summary judgment, arguing that the earlier settlement barred these claims. Judge Matthew Sullivan of the Covington County Circuit Court initially dismissed the cross-complaint but later recused himself. Judge Stanley Sorey reinstated the cross-complaint and denied PriorityOne Bank’s renewed motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, prompting this interlocutory appeal.The Supreme Court of Mississippi determined that the release from the prior settlement was clear and unambiguous, expressly naming and protecting PriorityOne Bank as a third-party beneficiary from claims related to the Lott home construction and its financing. The Court held that the cross-complaint in the Temple lawsuit raised only issues already addressed and settled in the previous litigation. Finding no genuine issue of material fact, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the circuit court’s order, rendered summary judgment in favor of PriorityOne Bank, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "PriorityOne Bank v. JSC-Americanzil Construction, LLC" on Justia Law
Hopson v. City of Indianola, Mississippi
A city attorney entered into a retainer agreement with a municipal board, serving as an independent contractor at the board’s pleasure, with the agreement permitting termination at will, with or without cause. Several months into the engagement, disputes arose regarding the attorney’s invoices and billing practices. The board discussed these concerns at various meetings and, at a special-called meeting, voted to terminate the attorney’s retainer agreement. The agenda for this meeting listed “Attorney Bills?” but did not explicitly mention termination of the attorney’s contract. The attorney did not attend the meeting and received notice of his termination the following day.After his termination, the attorney appealed to the Sunflower County Circuit Court under Mississippi Code Section 11-51-75, arguing that the meeting was not lawfully noticed for the business transacted, specifically the termination of his contract, and that he was denied due process. The City responded that the attorney was an at-will contractor with no property interest requiring due process and that the board acted within its legal authority. The circuit court found that the attorney had standing and had timely appealed but held that the board’s decision was not arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, or illegal, and that as an at-will contractor, the attorney was owed no hearing or due process protections.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi held that while the board could terminate the attorney at will and owed no hearing, the termination action taken at the special-called meeting was void because the written call for the meeting did not distinctly specify the subject of terminating the city attorney, as required by statute and city ordinance. The court accepted the City’s failure to file a brief as a confession of error, reversed the circuit court’s order, set aside the termination, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court denied the attorney’s requests for additional relief. View "Hopson v. City of Indianola, Mississippi" on Justia Law
Doelger v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
A married couple, the plaintiffs, alleged that their life savings were lost due to investment advisory services provided by a national bank and an investment management company. The husband, after retiring, managed his investments, particularly in master limited partnerships (MLPs). He had a long-standing banking relationship with the defendant bank and, in 2015, signed an advisory agreement appointing the bank as investment manager for an MLP-focused portfolio managed by the defendant investment company. Despite the bank’s internal policy limiting such investments to 5% of a client’s liquid net worth, the husband invested a much larger amount, after signing a letter acknowledging the risks. The plaintiffs’ MLP investments subsequently suffered significant losses, especially during the early 2020 COVID-19 outbreak, resulting in the loss of most of their liquid assets.After divesting from MLPs in 2020, the plaintiffs sued both defendants in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts in 2021, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, negligence, misrepresentation, and violations of certain state statutes, as well as seeking declaratory and rescission relief. The district court referred pretrial matters to a magistrate judge. The plaintiffs sought to amend their complaint to add a new party and claims, but the magistrate judge denied this, citing undue delay and prejudice; the district court affirmed. The district court also granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all claims, finding that the plaintiffs failed to present evidence of causation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s orders. It held that the plaintiffs forfeited the causation argument required for their claims, failed to develop arguments regarding their declaratory and rescission claims, and that the denial of leave to amend was not an abuse of discretion. The court dismissed as moot the pending substitution and motions to strike. View "Doelger v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law
ROBINSON NURSING AND REHABILITATION CENTER, LLC v. PHILLIPS
A group of plaintiffs, including the personal representative of a deceased resident’s estate and other similarly situated individuals, brought a class action against a nursing and rehabilitation facility. The complaint, filed in 2015, alleged chronic understaffing, breach of contract, violations of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, negligence, civil conspiracy, and unjust enrichment. The class was defined as all residents at the facility from June 2010 onward.After initial certification, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed some claims but reversed on negligence. The focus then shifted to whether the facility could compel arbitration under various resident agreements. The Pulaski County Circuit Court denied a 2017 motion to compel arbitration as to some residents, which the Supreme Court partly affirmed and partly reversed. Subsequent appeals and remands required the circuit court to make specific findings for each agreement. The latest orders reviewed involved 227 residents: the court granted arbitration as to 112 and denied it for 115, based on issues such as authority of signatories and ambiguities in the agreements.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed whether the circuit court correctly denied arbitration for the 115 residents. The court held that, except for three residents (for whom the circuit court exceeded its mandate), the denials were correct because the arbitration agreements were procedurally unconscionable. This was due to the agreements being a condition of admission, unequal bargaining power, and the facility’s failure to disclose an ongoing class action. The court reversed the denials for the three residents and reinstated prior orders compelling arbitration for them. The cross-appeal regarding orders granting arbitration was dismissed because such orders are not immediately appealable. The direct appeal was therefore affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part, and the cross-appeal dismissed. View "ROBINSON NURSING AND REHABILITATION CENTER, LLC v. PHILLIPS" on Justia Law
Hess v. Morphis Pediatric Group of Lancaster, P.A.
A nurse practitioner was employed by a pediatric practice under a 2010 written agreement that entitled him to an annual bonus equal to 50% of the company’s net profits. In 2015, the employer proposed changing the bonus structure to 5% of gross revenues, and a new agreement was signed, meant to take effect retroactively. The employee later discovered, during due diligence for a potential purchase of the practice, that he had not received the agreed-upon share of net profits in prior years and was not given the financial information needed to verify his bonuses. He was subsequently terminated and sued the employer and related parties, alleging violations of the South Carolina Wage Payment Act, breach of contract, and other claims.A jury in the Circuit Court for Lancaster County found for the employee, awarding actual and punitive damages. The court denied the employer’s post-trial motions and granted treble damages, attorney's fees, and costs under the Wage Payment Act. On appeal, the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that a private cause of action existed for notice violations under section 41-10-30(A) of the Wage Payment Act and that the statute of limitations issue was properly submitted to the jury.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed, holding that the Wage Payment Act does not provide a private cause of action for violations of the notice requirement in section 41-10-30(A); the statute only provides an administrative remedy for such violations. However, the court held that the employee could recover his 2015 bonus under the original 2010 agreement, because the 2015 agreement did not take effect until seven days after it was signed. The court also held that only the 2015 bonus claim was timely under the Act’s three-year statute of limitations, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with these rulings. View "Hess v. Morphis Pediatric Group of Lancaster, P.A." on Justia Law
Anaplan Parent, LP v. Brennan
An employee of an enterprise software company entered into equity incentive agreements with the parent company of his employer, receiving equity interests in exchange for agreeing to certain restrictive covenants, including that he would not compete with the subsidiary employer for twelve months after cessation of employment. The agreements were signed by the parent company and the employee, but not by the subsidiary employer. The subsidiary was named as a third-party beneficiary. Later, the employee resigned to join a competitor.After the employee accepted a position at the competitor, the parent and subsidiary initiated a suit in the Massachusetts Superior Court seeking a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to prevent the employee from starting his new job. The Superior Court judge denied the motion, finding the noncompetition covenants unenforceable under the Massachusetts Noncompetition Agreement Act (MNAA) because they were not signed by the employer, and rejecting the argument that they were outside the MNAA’s scope. The parent and subsidiary appealed, and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts transferred the appeal from the Appeals Court.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that a noncompetition agreement signed by the employee and the parent company, but not by the employer subsidiary, does not satisfy the MNAA’s requirement for validity, which mandates the agreement be signed by both employer and employee. The Court further determined that the agreement did not qualify for the statutory exception for noncompetition agreements “outside of an employment relationship.” As a result, the Court affirmed the Superior Court’s denial of preliminary injunctive relief, holding that the restrictive covenants were unenforceable due to noncompliance with the MNAA’s signature requirement. View "Anaplan Parent, LP v. Brennan" on Justia Law
Poor Boy v. City of Winnfield
After Hurricane Laura struck Louisiana, Poor Boy Tree Service, Inc. and Mobile Help 4U, Inc. traveled to the City of Winnfield to provide cleanup and recovery services. Poor Boy communicated with City officials, including the mayor and certain employees, about performing these services, but there was no written agreement formalizing their relationship. Poor Boy later issued invoices totaling over $1 million for the work performed, but the City did not pay. Poor Boy sought payment through legal action, alleging a breach of an open account relationship under Louisiana law.The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana granted summary judgment in favor of the City. The court determined that there was a genuine dispute regarding whether the City consented to a contract with Poor Boy, but found that, under the Lawrason Act, the mayor could not bind the City to a contract without approval from the board of aldermen, which was not shown by Poor Boy. The district court also held that the parties’ arrangement did not constitute an open account relationship, relying on Fifth Circuit precedent requiring a history of prior dealings. Finally, it ruled that unjust enrichment was unavailable because Poor Boy had another legal remedy.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s holding that the mayor lacked capacity to bind the City to an oral contract without aldermen approval. However, it vacated the grant of summary judgment on Poor Boy’s open account claim, finding that the district court relied on outdated precedent and that Louisiana Supreme Court guidance allows open account actions without prior dealings. The court also vacated as premature the district court’s determination that Poor Boy could not pursue unjust enrichment, remanding both the open account and unjust enrichment issues for further proceedings. View "Poor Boy v. City of Winnfield" on Justia Law