At issue was what findings a court must make in order to require attorney’s fees to be paid to an adverse party who was subjected to proceedings that were brought in bad faith or lacked substantial justification and what the appropriate means are for calculating attorney’s fees when a court determines that a party’s complaint includes claims that have substantial justification and claims that lack substantial justification. Respondents prevailed in having the trial judge dispose of Petitioner’s claims after the close of the evidence. The hearing judge found no substantial justification for each of Petitioner’s claims against Respondents and awarded $300,000 in attorney’s fees to Respondents. The court of special appeals vacated the circuit court’s judgment, concluding that there was substantial justification as to some of Petitioner’s claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the hearing judge (1) did not commit clear error in finding no substantial justification for the claims brought by Petitioner; but (2) abused his discretion in assessing $300,000 in attorney’s fees against Petitioner without articulating how he calculated his fees. View "Christian v. Maternal-Fetal Medicine Associates of Maryland, LLC" on Justia Law

A-1 Self Storage Inc.’s alternative indemnity agreement was not subject to regulation under the Insurance Code because (1) A-1 was not acting as an agent for an insurer, and (2) the indemnification agreement was incidental to the principal object and purpose of renting storage space. See Cal. Ins. Code 1758.7 et seq. In its rental agreements with tenants, A-1 required the tenant to obtain insurance for loss of or damage to a tenant’s stored property, stating that A-1 shall not be liable for such losses. A-1 also offered an alternative to the requirement that the tenant obtain insurance. In exchange for an additional amount in rent per month, A-1 provided that it would reassume the risk of such losses, up to $2,500. Plaintiff brought this putative class action arguing that the alternative constituted an insurance policy, which A-1 was not licensed to sell, and therefore, A-1’s sale of this indemnity agreement violated the Insurance Code. The trial court concluded that the alternative indemnity agreement was not insurance and entered judgment for Defendants. The court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the alternative indemnity agreement did not constitute insurance subject to regulation under the Insurance Code. View "Heckart v. A-1 Self Storage, Inc." on Justia Law

Budget Truck Sales, LLC, Brek A. Pilling, Brian L. Tibbets, and Mike Tilley (the “Budget Parties”) and Kent Tilley entered into various oral agreements relating to the purchase, repair and sale of large trucks and heavy equipment. Shortly thereafter, the relationship of the parties broke down, leading to the filing of three separate lawsuits. Budget Truck Sales, LLC filed a lawsuit against Tilley, alleging that Tilley owed it money on an open account for loans it had provided to Tilley. Tilley filed a lawsuit against Brek Pilling and Brian Tibbits, alleging they personally owed him for his share of the profits. Trial started for the consolidated cases on December 13, 2016. By the second day of trial, the parties engaged in settlement negotiations to resolve each of the cases. Once a resolution was reached, the parties recited the terms of their agreement on the record in open court. In accordance with the settlement agreement, a loader was delivered to the Budget Truck Sales’ lot. Because the loader’s condition was not as Tilley had allegedly represented, the Budget Parties refused to pay Tilley the $100,000 that was due the following day. Tilley’s attorney advised that if the $100,000 payment was not received the next day a motion to enforce the settlement agreement would be filed, and Tilley would seek an award of attorney fees. Tilley’s counsel was notified the Budget Parties would not honor the agreement because they believed Tilley had misrepresented the condition of the loader, and the Budget Parties relied upon that representation when they agreed to the settlement. The parties appealed enforcement of the settlement agreement; the Budget Parties alleged the settlement agreement was void because it was procured by fraud. The Idaho Supreme Court concluded material questions of fact existed upon which the district court could rely in finding that Tilley committed fraud in the inducement by allegedly representing to the Budget Parties the loader was in “great working condition.” Accordingly, the judgment was vacated and the case was remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the Budget Parties’ claim of fraud in the inducement. If such fraud occurred, the entire settlement was vitiated and the parties are placed back in the position they were in before the case was purportedly settled. View "Budget Truck Sales v. Tilley" on Justia Law

Budget Truck Sales, LLC, Brek A. Pilling, Brian L. Tibbets, and Mike Tilley (the “Budget Parties”) and Kent Tilley entered into various oral agreements relating to the purchase, repair and sale of large trucks and heavy equipment. Shortly thereafter, the relationship of the parties broke down, leading to the filing of three separate lawsuits. Budget Truck Sales, LLC filed a lawsuit against Tilley, alleging that Tilley owed it money on an open account for loans it had provided to Tilley. Tilley filed a lawsuit against Brek Pilling and Brian Tibbits, alleging they personally owed him for his share of the profits. Trial started for the consolidated cases on December 13, 2016. By the second day of trial, the parties engaged in settlement negotiations to resolve each of the cases. Once a resolution was reached, the parties recited the terms of their agreement on the record in open court. In accordance with the settlement agreement, a loader was delivered to the Budget Truck Sales’ lot. Because the loader’s condition was not as Tilley had allegedly represented, the Budget Parties refused to pay Tilley the $100,000 that was due the following day. Tilley’s attorney advised that if the $100,000 payment was not received the next day a motion to enforce the settlement agreement would be filed, and Tilley would seek an award of attorney fees. Tilley’s counsel was notified the Budget Parties would not honor the agreement because they believed Tilley had misrepresented the condition of the loader, and the Budget Parties relied upon that representation when they agreed to the settlement. The parties appealed enforcement of the settlement agreement; the Budget Parties alleged the settlement agreement was void because it was procured by fraud. The Idaho Supreme Court concluded material questions of fact existed upon which the district court could rely in finding that Tilley committed fraud in the inducement by allegedly representing to the Budget Parties the loader was in “great working condition.” Accordingly, the judgment was vacated and the case was remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the Budget Parties’ claim of fraud in the inducement. If such fraud occurred, the entire settlement was vitiated and the parties are placed back in the position they were in before the case was purportedly settled. View "Budget Truck Sales v. Tilley" on Justia Law

Laine Hedwall filed a cross-complaint in the underlying action against CLP, Arcis, and PCMV, alleging claims for breach of contract, fraud, declaratory relief, and related causes of action. The trial court sustained CLP's demurrer to the cross-complaint with leave to amend, Hedwall filed a first amended cross-complaint (FACC), CLP then demurred to all but one of the claims against it in the FACC; and, while CLP's demurrer to the FACC was pending, Hedwall then filed a second amended cross-complaint (SACC). The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision to cancel the filing of the SACC on its own motion, sustain CLP's demurrer to the FACC without leave to amend, and grant of judgment on the pleadings in CLP's favor on Hedwall's sole remaining claim against CLP. The court also affirmed the trial court's denial of Hedwall's request for an order staying the proceedings relating to Arcis and PCMV. View "Hedwall v. PCMV, LLC" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit certified two questions of New Jersey law to the New Jersey Supreme Court arising from two putative class actions brought under the New Jersey Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act (TCCWNA). Plaintiffs David and Katina Spade claimed that on or about April 25, 2013, they purchased furniture from a retail store owned and operated by defendant Select Comfort Corporation. They alleged that Select Comfort’s sales contract included the language prohibited by N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.3(c). The Spades also alleged the sales contract that Select Comfort provided to them did not include language mandated by N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.2(a) and N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.3(a). The Third Circuit asked: (1) whether a violation of the Furniture Delivery Regulations alone constituted a violation of a clearly established right or responsibility of the seller under the TCCWNA and thus provided a basis for relief under the TCCWNA; and (2) whether a consumer who receives a contract that does not comply with the Furniture Delivery Regulations, but has not suffered any adverse consequences from the noncompliance, an “aggrieved consumer” under the TCCWNA? The New Jersey Supreme Court answered the first certified question in the affirmative and the second certified question in the negative. View "Spade v. Select Comfort Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court granting summary judgment in favor of West Davisville Realty Co., LLC (West Davisville) holding David Paolo liable on a personal guaranty of a termination of lease agreement between West Davisville and Alpha Nutrition, Inc. (Alpha). West Davisville filed a complaint against Alpha and Paolo alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The hearing justice granted West Davisville’s motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) any attempt by Paolo to point to purported evidence that West Davisville fraudulently induced Paolo to personally guarantee the agreements was not relevant in this appeal; and (2) the personal guaranty was valid because the underlying termination agreement was supported by consideration. View "West Davisville Realty Co. v. Alpha Nutrition, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue was whether an indemnity clause in a rental agreement required the renter to indemnify the rental company for the rental company’s negligence. The Tower Tap & Restaurant entered into an agreement to rent folding picnic tables from London Road Rental Center, Inc. for an event. Plaintiff injured his hip at Tower Tap’s event after one of the rented tables collapsed on him. Plaintiff sued Tower Tap and London Road. London Road filed a cross-claim against Tower Tap, seeking contractual indemnity based on the indemnity clause in the rental agreement. The district court granted summary judgment to London Road, concluding that the clause unequivocally covered liability for London Road’s own negligence. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the indemnity clause did not include express language that clearly and unequivocally showed the parties’ intent to transfer such liability to Tower Tap. View "Dewitt v. London Road Rental Center, Inc." on Justia Law

Unitherm filed suit against Hormel, alleging that Hormel wrongfully terminated a Joint Development Agreement (JDA) and breached a Mutual Confidential Disclosure Agreement (MCDA). Hormel counterclaimed and alleged that Unitherm breached the JDA and sought a declaratory judgment that Hormel owned the patented "Unitherm Process" for precooking bacon in a spiral oven. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment, dismissing Unitherm's breach of contract claims and Hormel's breach of contract and declaratory judgment counterclaims. The court held that Unitherm failed to present evidence permitting a reasonable jury to find that Hormel wrongfully terminated the JDA; Hormel was under no contractual duty to disclose to Unitherm whether it intended to continue exploring a commercially viable method to produce precooked bacon using a process that included superheated steam in a spiral oven; the spiral test oven did not qualify as confidential information; Hormel did not breach the MCDA; and the district court did not err in denying Unitherm's request for discovery. Finally, no reasonable jury could find that Hormel became the rightful owner of Unitherm's patented process. View "HIP, Inc. v. Hormel Foods Corp." on Justia Law

University Park hired Linear as its Village Manager through May 2015, concurrent with the term of its Mayor. In October 2014 the Village extended Linear’s contract for a year. In April 2015 Mayor Covington was reelected. In May, the Board of Trustees decided that Linear would no longer be Village Manager. His contract provides for six months’ severance pay if the Board discharges him for any reason except criminality. The Village argued that the contract’s extension was not lawful and that it owes Linear nothing. The district court agreed and rejected Linear’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, reasoning that 65 ILCS 5/3.1-30-5; 5/8-1-7 prohibit a village manager's contract from lasting beyond the end of a mayor’s term. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on different grounds. State courts should address the Illinois law claims. Linear’s federal claim rests on a mistaken appreciation of the role the Constitution plays in enforcing state-law rights. Linear never had a legitimate claim of entitlement to remain as Village Manager. His contract allowed termination without cause. His entitlement was to receive the contracted-for severance pay. Linear could not have a federal right to a hearing before losing his job; he has at most a right to a hearing to determine his severance pay--a question of Illinois law. View "Linear v. Village of University Park" on Justia Law