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ARC, a distributor of compressed gases, sold its assets to American. Because ARC leased asset cylinders to customers, it was not immediately able to identify the number of cylinders included in the purchase; the Agreement estimated 6,500 cylinders and provided that American would hold back $150,000 for 180 days to protect against a shortage of up to 1,200 cylinders, at $125 per cylinder. When American began billing the customers it acquired, it learned that many of them paid only to have cylinders refilled but did not pay rent on the cylinders they used. An audit revealed that ARC owned and transferred 4,663 asset cylinders--1,837 cylinders short of the 6,500 promised. In an ensuing breach of contract suit, ARC argued that American breached the contract because it did not complete its audit within the specified 180-day period. The district court disagreed, concluding that ARC extended that deadline and that, because only 4,663 cylinders were delivered, ARC was never entitled to receive any portion of the Cylinder Deferred Payment. The court granted American’s counterclaim for breach of contract, holding that American was entitled to the entire $150,000 and to recover $125 for each cylinder it failed to receive under the threshold of 5,300. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Because ARC was not entitled to any of the Cylinder Deferred Payment in that it provided less than the 5,300 cylinders, it could not have been damaged by the delay in completing the audit. View "ARC Welding Supply, Co. Inc. v. American Welding & Gas, Inc." on Justia Law

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The plaintiffs, used car dealerships, were solicited by the defendant to enter into a “Demand Promissory Note and Security Agreement.” The defendant would issue a line of credit for the plaintiffs to access in purchasing used vehicles at automobile auctions. The plaintiffs claim defendant did not pay the auction house at the time that possession was delivered put paid only after it received the title to the vehicles purchased, which could take several weeks, but charged interest from the date of the initial purchase. The plaintiffs filed suit and sought class certification to sue on behalf of all other dealers who were subject to the same Agreement. The district court granted Rule 23(b)(3) class certification as to the breach of contract and substantive RICO claims. Weeks later, defendant filed a Motion to Reconsider, arguing that the plaintiffs had asserted in summary judgment briefing that the Agreements are ambiguous and that under such a theory courts must resort to extrinsic evidence on a plaintiff-by-plaintiff basis to determine intent. The court rescinded class certification. The Seventh Circuit vacated. Neither the categorization of the contract as ambiguous nor the prospect of extrinsic evidence necessarily imperils class status. The Agreement at issue is a standard form contract; there was no claim that its language has different meanings for different signatories. View "Red Barn Motors, Inc. v. NextGear Capital, Inc." on Justia Law

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In 2003, Dobyns, then an ATF agent engaged in undercover work, infiltrated the Hells Angels and assisted in the indictment of 36 people for racketeering and murder. The disclosure of his identity during the prosecutions led to threats against Dobyns and his family. ATF’s alleged failure to appropriately respond to the threats and to adequately conceal Dobyns’ identity during an emergency relocation, led Dobyns to seek compensation. In 2007, ATF agreed to pay Dobyns a lump-sum. ATF withdrew Dobyns’ and his family’s fictitious identities in 2008 despite a 2007 threat assessment. A 2008, arson attack substantially damaged Dobyns’ home, but his family escaped without injury. ATF pursued Dobyns as a suspect. In 2013, ATF’s Internal Affairs Division concluded that there was no valid reason for the withdrawal of the fictitious identifies; that risks to the family had been ignored; and that the response to the arson had been mismanaged. Dobyns sued in 2008, alleging breach of the agreement. While the suit was pending, Dobyns’ book was released; Dobyns made frequent media appearances. In 2013, the Claims Court held that there was no breach of any express provision of the agreement but that there was a breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing and that Dobyns was entitled to emotional distress damages of $173,000. Dobyns alleged misconduct by the Justice Department during the litigation; the court determined that none of the alleged misconduct warranted Rule 60 relief because, even if they occurred, there was no showing that these acts could have affected Dobyns’ case. The Federal Circuit reversed the judgment as to the breach of the implied duties and affirmed the Rule 60 decision. View "Dobyns v. United States" on Justia Law

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CMI, a purchaser and reseller of mortgage loans, filed suit against Platinum, an originator and seller of mortgage loans, alleging that Platinum breached a contract by failing to repurchase seven allegedly defective loans after CitiMortgage demanded repurchase by sending multiple notices to Platinum for each loan. The Eighth Circuit reversed and held that CMI adequately and substantially complied with the contract, which neither specified a form of notice nor indicated that the prescription of a time for cure had to be contained within the notice. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Platinum Home Mortgage, Corp." on Justia Law

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US Bank appealed the district court's dismissal of its second amended consolidated complaint as untimely. The Second Circuit affirmed and held that ACE Secs. Corp. v. DB Structured Prods., Inc., 25 N.Y.3d 581 (2015), and Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Quicken Loans Inc., 810 F.3d 861, 868 n.8 (2d Cir. 2015), governed U.S. Bank's contractual claims in this case. The court held that the district court properly granted summary judgment to GreenPoint where the first two causes of action for breach of contract were untimely under settled New York law, because they were filed over six years after the statute of limitations began running. The court also held that the district court properly dismissed the third cause of action for indemnification under section 9 of the Flow Mortgage Loan Purchase and Warranties Agreement, because U.S. Bank's claim was in reality a repackaged version of its breach of contract claims. Finally, the court held that the fourth cause of action for breach of the indemnification agreements did relate back to the original filing for claims based on any of the Trusts, and was therefore untimely asserted. View "Lehman XS Trust v. Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part the judgment of the appellate court reversing the judgment of the trial court granted Defendants’ special motions to strike the second through sixth causes of action advanced by Plaintiffs in Plaintiffs’ dispute with the City of Carson and other defendants, holding that some of Plaintiffs’ causes of action were based on protected activities under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. 425.26(e)(2) and (e)(4) but others were not. After Plaintiffs brought this lawsuit Defendants responded by making a motion under the anti-SLAPP statute. The Supreme Court held that the causes of action asserted in Plaintiffs’ dispute with Defendants did not arise from Defendants’ acts in furtherance of their right of free speech in connection with a public issue with the exception of two discrete claims, which were within the scope of subdivision (e)(2) and (e)(4) of the anti-SLAPP statute, thus affirming in part and reversing in part the appellate court’s judgment. View "Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson" on Justia Law

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The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in an action against Direct Energy, alleging breach of contract, deceptive and unfair trade practices, and unjust enrichment. Plaintiff had entered into a consumer electricity contract with Direct Energy which initially guaranteed a fixed electricity rate. Consistent with the terms of the contract, the fixed‐rate plan was converted into a variable rate plan after the first twelve months. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Direct Energy and held that, by the contract's plain terms, Direct Energy promised that the variable rate would be set in its discretion and that it would reflect "business and market conditions," a phrase which encompasses more than just procurement costs. Because plaintiff's claims under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act were entirely duplicative of his contract claim, they also failed. Finally, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's unjust enrichment and Massachusetts unfair trade practices claims. View "Richards v. Direct Energy Servs., LLC" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the trial court’s award of both actual and punitive damages as to all Plaintiffs in this lawsuit, holding that Plaintiffs were entitled to actual damages but were not entitled to punitive damages. Plaintiffs brought suit against Bombardier Aerospace Corporation for breach of contract, breach of express warranty, and fraud. The jury found in favor of Plaintiffs, and the trial court awarded both actual and punitive damages. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the evidence was legally sufficient to support the award of actual damages to Plaintiffs; but (2) the limitation-of-liability clauses in the parties’ agreements barred the punitive damages award under the circumstances. View "Bombardier Aerospace Corp. v. SPEP Aircraft Holdings LLC" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court that Plaintiff’s implied warranty claim was actionable only under the Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act (DTPA), Tex. Bus. & Com. Code 17.41-17.63, holding that the claim for breach of implied warranty of good and workmanlike repairs in this case was not brought under the DTPA and thus was not covered by the DTPA’s two-year limitations period. Plaintiff sought damages for injuries to himself and his small plane when the plane’s engine failed and it crash-landed. Defendant moved to strike Plaintiff’s petition, arguing that the DTPA’s two-year statute of limitations applied. The trial court agreed with Defendant and struck the petition. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff’s breach of implied warranty claim was not barred by the DTPA limitations period. View "Nghiem v. Sajib" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Sabre Travel International, Ltd.’s motion to dismiss Deutsche Lufthansa Airline Group’s tortious interference with contract claim based on preemption, holding that the federal Airline Deregulation Act (ADA) did not preempt an airline’s claim for tortious interference with contract brought under state law. The trial court denied Sabre’s motion to dismiss but certified a legal question under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 51.014(d) providing for permissive interlocutory appeals. The court of appeals denied the permissive interlocutory appeal without explanation. After Sabre filed a petition for review in the Supreme Court, Lufthansa argued that the Court had no jurisdiction to hear the case because the court of appeals denied the permissive appeal. The Supreme Court held (1) under Tex. Gov. Code 22.225(d), an appellate court’s denial of a permissive interlocutory appeal does not prevent the Supreme Court from reviewing the merits of the interlocutory order; and (2) there was no preemption under the ADA. View "Sabre Travel International, Ltd. v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG" on Justia Law