Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries
Falcao v. Richardson
Plaintiff and her partner, owners of Health Hero Farm LLC, sought to buy out a local farming family from their partnership. During this period, they befriended the defendant, a local auto-repair shop owner with a small farm. They discussed forming a partnership with him, and plaintiff represented to the Vermont Land Trust that they were partnering with the defendant to secure approval for the buyout. Plaintiff and defendant agreed to purchase Galloway cattle, with plaintiff advancing the funds. Plaintiff insisted on a written agreement, but defendant preferred a handshake deal. Eventually, defendant signed a promissory note without reading it, which included an attorney’s-fees provision.The Superior Court, Grand Isle Unit, Civil Division, held a bench trial and concluded that the promissory note did not accurately reflect an agreement between the parties. The court found that the note was a contract of adhesion and awarded plaintiff damages and prejudgment interest under a theory of unjust enrichment, rather than enforcing the promissory note.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the promissory note was unambiguous and enforceable according to its terms. The court found that defendant’s failure to read the note before signing it did not constitute a defense to enforcement. The court also determined that the note was not a contract of adhesion and was not unconscionable. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Falcao v. Richardson" on Justia Law
Bluebird v. World Business Lenders
Bluebird Property Rentals, LLC, a Montana limited liability company, and its sole member, Alaina Garcia, received a $450,000 loan from World Business Lenders, LLC (WBL) and its subsidiaries in December 2020. The loan, secured by real property in Gallatin County, had an annual percentage rate of approximately 85% and required weekly payments. Bluebird signed several agreements, including a Business Promissory Note and Security Agreement, which listed Axos Bank as the lender, although Bluebird had no prior dealings with Axos. After falling behind on payments, Bluebird sold the collateral property in a distress sale and paid off the loan in October 2022, having paid a total of $945,990.39.Bluebird sued WBL, alleging that WBL engaged in a "rent-a-bank" scheme to evade Montana's usury laws, claiming that Axos Bank was merely a front and that WBL was the true lender. Bluebird sought a declaration that Montana law applied and sought double the interest paid above the maximum allowable rate under Montana law. WBL filed a motion to dismiss and compel arbitration based on the agreements' arbitration and choice-of-law provisions.The Eighteenth Judicial District Court denied WBL's motion, ruling that Montana law must be applied to determine the enforceability of the arbitration and choice-of-law provisions. The court treated WBL's motion as a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and found that the validity of the arbitration clause was for the court to decide, not an arbitrator.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court's decision, holding that the general rule that courts determine arbitrability was not overcome by the facts of this case. The court found no clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability, despite WBL's arguments regarding the incorporation of AAA rules. The court did not address the merits of the enforceability of the arbitration agreement or the choice-of-law provision. View "Bluebird v. World Business Lenders" on Justia Law
Core Finance Team Affiliates, LLC v. Maine Medical Center
A healthcare consulting firm, Core Finance Team Affiliates, LLC (Core), provided data services to three Maine hospitals (the Hospitals) to support their claims for federal reimbursement for Medicare-eligible patients. Core's services included adjustments to the Hospitals' internal data, specifically annual hourly wage data and occupational mix survey (OMS) data. The Maine Hospital Association entered into a contract with Core, which included a contingent fee for OMS services. The Hospitals used Core's data but refused to pay the contingent fee, leading Core to file a complaint for breach of contract and unjust enrichment.The Superior Court (Cumberland County) held a jury trial on the breach of contract claim, resulting in a verdict for the Hospitals, finding they were not contractually obligated to pay the contingent fee for OMS services. Subsequently, the Business and Consumer Docket (Duddy, J.) held a bench trial on the unjust enrichment claim, awarding Core $566,582.25 based on the increased federal reimbursement the Hospitals received due to Core's services. The court ruled that the Hospitals waived the issue of quantum meruit by not pleading it as an affirmative defense.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and vacated the judgment. The court held that the trial court erred in awarding restitution for unjust enrichment without first addressing the adequacy of a quantum meruit claim. The court emphasized that quantum meruit, a legal remedy, should be considered before unjust enrichment, an equitable remedy. The court also found that the award exceeded the amount Core would have received under the proposed contract and was improperly based on the Hospitals' increased federal reimbursement rather than the market value of Core's services. The case was remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the Hospitals. View "Core Finance Team Affiliates, LLC v. Maine Medical Center" on Justia Law
Savoie v. Pritchard
Kenny Savoie, a former employee of Pritchard Energy Advisors, LLC (PGA), filed a breach-of-contract lawsuit against Thomas Pritchard, his former boss, in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana. Savoie, a Louisiana resident, claimed that Pritchard, a Virginia resident, owed him compensation under a 2017 offer letter for work done on behalf of Empire Petroleum Corporation. Savoie alleged that Pritchard fraudulently informed him that PGA had not received any payments for his projects, thus denying him due compensation.The district court dismissed the case against Pritchard for lack of personal jurisdiction, concluding that Pritchard's contacts with Louisiana were made in his corporate capacity and were protected by the fiduciary shield doctrine. The court found that Savoie failed to establish any exceptions to this doctrine that would allow Pritchard's corporate contacts to be attributed to him personally.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the fiduciary shield doctrine, which prevents the exercise of personal jurisdiction based solely on a defendant's corporate acts, applied in this case. The court noted that Louisiana law recognizes the fiduciary shield doctrine and that Savoie did not establish any exceptions, such as piercing the corporate veil or alleging a tort for which Pritchard could be personally liable. Consequently, the court concluded that Pritchard's corporate contacts could not be used to establish personal jurisdiction over him in Louisiana. View "Savoie v. Pritchard" on Justia Law
Knight v New York & Presbyt. Hosp.
The plaintiff, the decedent's son and Administrator of her estate, filed a negligence, medical malpractice, and wrongful death lawsuit in the Supreme Court, New York County, against Dewitt Rehabilitation and Nursing Center and other defendants. The decedent was a resident at Dewitt in February and March 2019. Dewitt moved to transfer the venue to Nassau County based on a forum selection clause in two electronically signed admission agreements. Dewitt supported its motion with the agreements and an affidavit from its director of admissions, Francesca Trimarchi. The plaintiff contested the authenticity of the agreements, claiming the signatures were forged and provided an exemplar of the decedent's handwritten signature for comparison.The Supreme Court granted Dewitt's motion, finding that Dewitt met its initial burden to show the forum selection clause was applicable and enforceable, and that the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact regarding the alleged forgery. The case was ordered to be transferred to Supreme Court, Nassau County. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that Dewitt failed to adequately authenticate the admission agreements as Trimarchi did not witness the signing, and thus the forum selection clause was unenforceable. The dissent argued that the burden should be on the plaintiff to prove the clause should not be enforced.The Court of Appeals of New York reversed the Appellate Division's decision, reinstating the Supreme Court's order. The court held that Dewitt met its burden of establishing the authenticity of the agreements through circumstantial evidence, including Trimarchi's affidavit and the agreements themselves. The plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact regarding the authenticity of the signatures. The court also clarified that CPLR 4539(b) was inapplicable as the documents were originally created in electronic form. The certified question was answered in the negative. View "Knight v New York & Presbyt. Hosp." on Justia Law
Inouye v. Estate of McHugo
Susan McHugo Inouye sought damages and equitable remedies against Gregory McHugo, Nancy McHugo, and the estate of Patricia Bixby McHugo, alleging that Patricia breached a contract for mutual wills made with Susan’s father, John McHugo, under which Susan was a beneficiary. The trial court dismissed Susan’s claims, concluding that Patricia’s notice of intent to revoke her will during John’s life meant there was no detrimental reliance and thus no enforceable contract. Alternatively, the court found that John consented to rescission of the mutual-wills contract.The Superior Court, Windsor Unit, Civil Division, initially reviewed the case. The court found that John had notice of Patricia’s intention to change her will and did not alter his own estate plan in response. The court concluded that there was no detrimental reliance by John and that mutual consent was not required to revoke the contract. The court also suggested that John’s inaction indicated his consent to rescind the contract. Susan appealed the decision.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the mutual-wills contract was enforceable on its own terms and that unilateral notice of intent to revoke was insufficient to rescind the contract. The court held that mutual consent was required to revoke the contract, as explicitly stated in the contract. The court found that the trial court’s conclusion that John consented to rescission was inadequately supported by the record, as mere inaction did not constitute consent. The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Inouye v. Estate of McHugo" on Justia Law
Rochon Corporation of Iowa, Inc. v. Des Moines Area Community College
Graphite Construction Group, Inc. (Graphite) was hired by Des Moines Area Community College (DMACC) in 2019 for a construction project. DMACC withheld 5% of each payment as retainage, amounting to about $510,000 by January 2022. Graphite requested the release of the retainage, but the project was not yet completed. A dispute arose between Graphite and a subcontractor, Metro Concrete, Inc. (Metro), over unpaid services. Metro filed a claim, and Graphite filed a bond for twice the amount of Metro’s claim, demanding the release of the retainage.The Iowa District Court for Polk County denied Graphite’s motion to compel the release of the retainage, stating that under Iowa Code chapter 573, retainage could not be released before the project’s completion and final acceptance. The court also denied Graphite’s request for attorney fees, as Graphite had not prevailed on its retainage claim.The Iowa Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s decision, ordering the release of the retainage to Graphite but denied Graphite’s request for attorney fees. DMACC sought further review from the Iowa Supreme Court.The Iowa Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals' decision and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Supreme Court held that under Iowa Code chapter 573, retainage could not be released before the project’s completion and final acceptance, and the statutory exceptions did not apply in this case. The court also upheld the denial of attorney fees to Graphite, as they were not the prevailing party. View "Rochon Corporation of Iowa, Inc. v. Des Moines Area Community College" on Justia Law
Jerry & John Woods Construction, Inc. v. Jordan
In May 2022, Jerry & John Woods Construction, Inc. ("Woods Construction") entered into a contract with John David Jordan and Carol S. Jordan to construct a house and a metal building. Woods Construction claimed the Jordans failed to pay for the work performed, leading the company to sue them in the Dallas Circuit Court for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The Jordans moved to dismiss or for summary judgment, arguing that Woods Construction's lack of a required residential-home-builder's license barred the company from bringing civil claims. They also filed counterclaims alleging improper and negligent work by Woods Construction.The Dallas Circuit Court denied the Jordans' motion to dismiss but later granted their motion for summary judgment, finding that Woods Construction, as an unlicensed residential home builder, was barred from enforcing the construction contract under § 34-14A-14(d) of the Alabama Code. The court also declared Woods Construction's "Notice of Lis Pendens/Lien" null and void. The court certified its judgment as final under Rule 54(b), despite the Jordans' counterclaims remaining pending.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and determined that the Rule 54(b) certification was improper. The court noted that the claims and counterclaims were closely intertwined, as both concerned the same contract and construction work. Additionally, the resolution of the Jordans' counterclaims could potentially moot Woods Construction's claims. Therefore, the court concluded that the circuit court exceeded its discretion in certifying the judgment as final and dismissed the appeal for lack of a final judgment. View "Jerry & John Woods Construction, Inc. v. Jordan" on Justia Law
132 Ventures v. Active Spine Physical Therapy
Active Spine Physical Therapy, LLC (Active Spine) and its owners, Sara and Nicholas Muchowicz, were sued by 132 Ventures, LLC (Ventures) for breach of contract and personal guarantee after failing to pay rent and common area maintenance (CAM) charges under a lease agreement. Ventures had purchased the property in a foreclosure sale and sought damages for unpaid rent and CAM charges from June 2020 to February 2021. Active Spine argued that the lease was invalid due to fraudulent inducement and that they were under a COVID-19-related rent abatement.The district court initially ordered restitution of the premises to Ventures and denied Active Spine's request for a temporary injunction. A separate bench trial found Active Spine and the Muchowiczes liable for breach of contract. On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the restitution order but reversed the breach of contract judgment, remanding for a jury trial.At the jury trial, Ventures presented evidence of unpaid rent and CAM charges, while Active Spine argued that Ventures failed to provide notice of budgeted direct expenses, a condition precedent to their obligation to pay CAM charges. The jury found in favor of Ventures, awarding $593,723.82 in damages. Active Spine and the Muchowiczes moved for a new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), arguing errors in the jury's damage calculations and the lack of notice of budgeted direct expenses.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the exhibits as business records and not summaries under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-1006. The court also held that Active Spine and the Muchowiczes failed to preserve their arguments for appeal regarding the costs of new tenancy, COVID-19 abatement, and the amended lease. The court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion for new trial or JNOV, concluding that the jury's verdict was supported by sufficient evidence. View "132 Ventures v. Active Spine Physical Therapy" on Justia Law
Colony Place South, Inc. v. Volvo Car USA, LLC
Two Massachusetts-based Volvo dealers filed a lawsuit against Volvo Car USA, Volvo Car Financial Services, and Fidelity Warranty Services, alleging violations of Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 93B. The dispute centers on Volvo-branded Prepaid Maintenance Program (PPM) contracts, which allow customers to prepay for future maintenance services at a discounted rate. Fidelity administers these contracts, which the dealers sell to their customers. The dealers claimed that the defendants were underpaying them for the parts and labor costs incurred in servicing these PPM contracts.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts heard cross-motions for summary judgment from both parties. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that entities like Fidelity are not regulated by the relevant provisions of Chapter 93B. The court denied the dealers' motion for summary judgment, leading the dealers to appeal the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision, but for a different reason. The appellate court held that the dealers' sale and service of the Volvo PPM are not franchise obligations under Chapter 93B. The court found that the Retailer Agreement between the dealers and Volvo USA did not obligate the dealers to sell or service the Volvo PPM. The court also noted that the dealers had the discretion to sell various financial products, including the Volvo PPM, and that servicing the PPM was not a material term of the Retailer Agreement. Therefore, Chapter 93B did not require Fidelity to reimburse the dealers at the statutory rates. View "Colony Place South, Inc. v. Volvo Car USA, LLC" on Justia Law