Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries
Doelger v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
A married couple, the plaintiffs, alleged that their life savings were lost due to investment advisory services provided by a national bank and an investment management company. The husband, after retiring, managed his investments, particularly in master limited partnerships (MLPs). He had a long-standing banking relationship with the defendant bank and, in 2015, signed an advisory agreement appointing the bank as investment manager for an MLP-focused portfolio managed by the defendant investment company. Despite the bank’s internal policy limiting such investments to 5% of a client’s liquid net worth, the husband invested a much larger amount, after signing a letter acknowledging the risks. The plaintiffs’ MLP investments subsequently suffered significant losses, especially during the early 2020 COVID-19 outbreak, resulting in the loss of most of their liquid assets.After divesting from MLPs in 2020, the plaintiffs sued both defendants in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts in 2021, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, negligence, misrepresentation, and violations of certain state statutes, as well as seeking declaratory and rescission relief. The district court referred pretrial matters to a magistrate judge. The plaintiffs sought to amend their complaint to add a new party and claims, but the magistrate judge denied this, citing undue delay and prejudice; the district court affirmed. The district court also granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all claims, finding that the plaintiffs failed to present evidence of causation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s orders. It held that the plaintiffs forfeited the causation argument required for their claims, failed to develop arguments regarding their declaratory and rescission claims, and that the denial of leave to amend was not an abuse of discretion. The court dismissed as moot the pending substitution and motions to strike. View "Doelger v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law
ROBINSON NURSING AND REHABILITATION CENTER, LLC v. PHILLIPS
A group of plaintiffs, including the personal representative of a deceased resident’s estate and other similarly situated individuals, brought a class action against a nursing and rehabilitation facility. The complaint, filed in 2015, alleged chronic understaffing, breach of contract, violations of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, negligence, civil conspiracy, and unjust enrichment. The class was defined as all residents at the facility from June 2010 onward.After initial certification, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed some claims but reversed on negligence. The focus then shifted to whether the facility could compel arbitration under various resident agreements. The Pulaski County Circuit Court denied a 2017 motion to compel arbitration as to some residents, which the Supreme Court partly affirmed and partly reversed. Subsequent appeals and remands required the circuit court to make specific findings for each agreement. The latest orders reviewed involved 227 residents: the court granted arbitration as to 112 and denied it for 115, based on issues such as authority of signatories and ambiguities in the agreements.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed whether the circuit court correctly denied arbitration for the 115 residents. The court held that, except for three residents (for whom the circuit court exceeded its mandate), the denials were correct because the arbitration agreements were procedurally unconscionable. This was due to the agreements being a condition of admission, unequal bargaining power, and the facility’s failure to disclose an ongoing class action. The court reversed the denials for the three residents and reinstated prior orders compelling arbitration for them. The cross-appeal regarding orders granting arbitration was dismissed because such orders are not immediately appealable. The direct appeal was therefore affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part, and the cross-appeal dismissed. View "ROBINSON NURSING AND REHABILITATION CENTER, LLC v. PHILLIPS" on Justia Law
Hess v. Morphis Pediatric Group of Lancaster, P.A.
A nurse practitioner was employed by a pediatric practice under a 2010 written agreement that entitled him to an annual bonus equal to 50% of the company’s net profits. In 2015, the employer proposed changing the bonus structure to 5% of gross revenues, and a new agreement was signed, meant to take effect retroactively. The employee later discovered, during due diligence for a potential purchase of the practice, that he had not received the agreed-upon share of net profits in prior years and was not given the financial information needed to verify his bonuses. He was subsequently terminated and sued the employer and related parties, alleging violations of the South Carolina Wage Payment Act, breach of contract, and other claims.A jury in the Circuit Court for Lancaster County found for the employee, awarding actual and punitive damages. The court denied the employer’s post-trial motions and granted treble damages, attorney's fees, and costs under the Wage Payment Act. On appeal, the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that a private cause of action existed for notice violations under section 41-10-30(A) of the Wage Payment Act and that the statute of limitations issue was properly submitted to the jury.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed, holding that the Wage Payment Act does not provide a private cause of action for violations of the notice requirement in section 41-10-30(A); the statute only provides an administrative remedy for such violations. However, the court held that the employee could recover his 2015 bonus under the original 2010 agreement, because the 2015 agreement did not take effect until seven days after it was signed. The court also held that only the 2015 bonus claim was timely under the Act’s three-year statute of limitations, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with these rulings. View "Hess v. Morphis Pediatric Group of Lancaster, P.A." on Justia Law
Anaplan Parent, LP v. Brennan
An employee of an enterprise software company entered into equity incentive agreements with the parent company of his employer, receiving equity interests in exchange for agreeing to certain restrictive covenants, including that he would not compete with the subsidiary employer for twelve months after cessation of employment. The agreements were signed by the parent company and the employee, but not by the subsidiary employer. The subsidiary was named as a third-party beneficiary. Later, the employee resigned to join a competitor.After the employee accepted a position at the competitor, the parent and subsidiary initiated a suit in the Massachusetts Superior Court seeking a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to prevent the employee from starting his new job. The Superior Court judge denied the motion, finding the noncompetition covenants unenforceable under the Massachusetts Noncompetition Agreement Act (MNAA) because they were not signed by the employer, and rejecting the argument that they were outside the MNAA’s scope. The parent and subsidiary appealed, and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts transferred the appeal from the Appeals Court.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that a noncompetition agreement signed by the employee and the parent company, but not by the employer subsidiary, does not satisfy the MNAA’s requirement for validity, which mandates the agreement be signed by both employer and employee. The Court further determined that the agreement did not qualify for the statutory exception for noncompetition agreements “outside of an employment relationship.” As a result, the Court affirmed the Superior Court’s denial of preliminary injunctive relief, holding that the restrictive covenants were unenforceable due to noncompliance with the MNAA’s signature requirement. View "Anaplan Parent, LP v. Brennan" on Justia Law
Poor Boy v. City of Winnfield
After Hurricane Laura struck Louisiana, Poor Boy Tree Service, Inc. and Mobile Help 4U, Inc. traveled to the City of Winnfield to provide cleanup and recovery services. Poor Boy communicated with City officials, including the mayor and certain employees, about performing these services, but there was no written agreement formalizing their relationship. Poor Boy later issued invoices totaling over $1 million for the work performed, but the City did not pay. Poor Boy sought payment through legal action, alleging a breach of an open account relationship under Louisiana law.The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana granted summary judgment in favor of the City. The court determined that there was a genuine dispute regarding whether the City consented to a contract with Poor Boy, but found that, under the Lawrason Act, the mayor could not bind the City to a contract without approval from the board of aldermen, which was not shown by Poor Boy. The district court also held that the parties’ arrangement did not constitute an open account relationship, relying on Fifth Circuit precedent requiring a history of prior dealings. Finally, it ruled that unjust enrichment was unavailable because Poor Boy had another legal remedy.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s holding that the mayor lacked capacity to bind the City to an oral contract without aldermen approval. However, it vacated the grant of summary judgment on Poor Boy’s open account claim, finding that the district court relied on outdated precedent and that Louisiana Supreme Court guidance allows open account actions without prior dealings. The court also vacated as premature the district court’s determination that Poor Boy could not pursue unjust enrichment, remanding both the open account and unjust enrichment issues for further proceedings. View "Poor Boy v. City of Winnfield" on Justia Law
Ford Motor Co. v. InterMotive, Inc.
Ford Global Technologies, LLC and Ford Motor Company worked with InterMotive, Inc. and its founder Gregory E. Schafer to develop an Upfitter Interface Module (UIM) for Ford vehicles. The collaboration was governed by a confidentiality agreement. InterMotive developed and shared with Ford specifications for a programmable UIM, but Ford ultimately ended the project. Some years later, Ford released its own UIM, prompting InterMotive to allege that Ford had misappropriated InterMotive’s trade secret—the use of programmable inputs in such a module.Ford sued InterMotive and Schafer in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, asserting various trademark and unfair competition claims. InterMotive counterclaimed, alleging trademark infringement, trade secret misappropriation under the Michigan Uniform Trade Secrets Act, unfair competition, breach of contract, and false advertising. Most claims survived summary judgment, and Ford’s motion to exclude InterMotive’s implied contract theory from trial was granted. At trial, the jury found for InterMotive on its trade secret, unfair competition, and trademark claims, awarding over $13 million for trade secret misappropriation and a smaller sum for unfair competition. The district court reduced the award to avoid double recovery, denied Ford’s post-trial motions, and declined to enhance damages or allow disgorgement for breach of contract.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court correctly denied Ford’s motions for judgment as a matter of law and a new trial, as there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find in InterMotive’s favor on trade secret misappropriation and damages. The court affirmed the district court’s reduction of damages to prevent duplicative recovery, its denial of enhanced damages for trademark infringement, its exclusion of disgorgement for breach of contract, and its exclusion of InterMotive’s implied contract theory for lack of notice. The district court’s rulings were affirmed in full. View "Ford Motor Co. v. InterMotive, Inc." on Justia Law
SH Nashville, LLC v. FWREF Nashville Airport, LLC
The case concerns a dispute arising from a purchase and sale agreement for a Hilton-branded hotel near the Nashville airport. The seller and purchaser agreed to a contract with a $79 million purchase price and an initial $1.75 million earnest money deposit, later increased through twenty-four amendments over fifteen months to a total of nearly $19 million. Each amendment extended deadlines and required additional nonrefundable earnest money, with the contract stipulating that, in the event of the purchaser’s default, the seller’s sole remedy would be retention of the earnest money as liquidated damages. When the purchaser failed to close by the final deadline, the seller terminated the agreement and retained the earnest money. The purchaser sued, seeking a declaratory judgment that the damages provision was an unenforceable penalty.The Chancery Court for Davidson County granted summary judgment to the seller, concluding the provision was an enforceable and reasonable prediction of actual damages. The Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed, finding the seller had not provided sufficient evidence that the liquidated damages amount was a reasonable estimate of potential damages and holding that contractual language alone was insufficient to establish enforceability.Reviewing the case, the Supreme Court of Tennessee clarified the state’s standard for liquidated damages provisions. The court held that when contracting parties expressly agree that actual damages would be difficult or impossible to ascertain and that the liquidated sum is a reasonable estimate, there is a presumption of enforceability. The party seeking to avoid enforcement must then show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the provision is actually an unenforceable penalty. The court found the purchaser had not raised a material factual dispute to overcome this presumption. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Tennessee reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "SH Nashville, LLC v. FWREF Nashville Airport, LLC" on Justia Law
Colton v. Lime Rock Resources GP V, LP
Gregg B. Colton, a mineral-interest owner, initiated a lawsuit against several Lime Rock entities, alleging that Lime Rock failed to pay statutory interest on late royalty payments, in violation of North Dakota law. He also asserted that Lime Rock breached mineral-interest leases by improperly deducting post-production costs from oil royalties. Colton sought to represent two classes of owners, and included declaratory judgment claims for each class. After the district court dismissed the declaratory judgment claims, Colton filed a second amended complaint with revised class definitions and reasserted his claims for statutory violations and breach of contract.The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota reviewed the case. It granted Lime Rock’s motion to strike the class allegations, finding that the proposed classes failed to satisfy the typicality and predominance requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(3) and (b)(3). Colton did not pursue an interlocutory appeal under Rule 23(f). Subsequently, the parties submitted a stipulation for entry of judgment, awarding Colton the full amount of damages claimed on his individual claims. The district court entered this stipulated judgment, which did not include costs or fees, and preserved Colton’s right to appeal the order striking class allegations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed Colton’s appeal regarding the stricken class allegations. The court determined that, because Colton voluntarily consented to the stipulated judgment that resolved his individual claims in full, he no longer maintained a continuing personal stake in the class allegations. As a result, the appeal was deemed moot, and the court dismissed it for lack of Article III jurisdiction. The court clarified that parties cannot confer appellate jurisdiction by agreement, and Colton’s attempt to preserve his right to appeal did not alter this outcome. View "Colton v. Lime Rock Resources GP V, LP" on Justia Law
Bennett v. VXI Global Solutions
The dispute centers on an employee, who was hired by a company operating customer service call centers, and who signed an arbitration agreement and a confidentiality agreement as part of her onboarding process. The arbitration agreement was included in a lengthy new hire packet, and the employee understood she was required to sign it to accept the job. The agreement mandated arbitration for nearly all claims between the parties, including those that could arise after employment ended and claims unrelated to employment. The confidentiality agreement included provisions restricting the employee from soliciting colleagues and granted the company the ability to seek injunctive relief for breaches without proving actual damages.After the employee left her position, she filed a class action lawsuit against the company asserting several employment-related claims. The company responded by seeking to compel arbitration based on the previously signed agreement. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the motion. It found the arbitration agreement was governed by the Federal Arbitration Act and determined it was a contract of adhesion with a low degree of procedural unconscionability. However, the court found the agreement substantively unconscionable due to its overly broad scope, unlimited duration, and lack of mutuality, following precedent such as Cook v. University of Southern California (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 312. The court also concluded the confidentiality agreement’s injunctive relief and nonsolicitation clauses were unconscionable. Ultimately, the court denied the motion to compel arbitration, finding the unconscionable terms could not be severed without rewriting the contract.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, affirmed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that the arbitration agreement, read together with the confidentiality agreement, was permeated with unconscionability that could not be cured by severance, and thus was unenforceable. View "Bennett v. VXI Global Solutions" on Justia Law
HYC Logistics, Inc. v. OJCommerce, LLC
HYC Logistics, a Tennessee-based logistics provider, entered into a contract with OJCommerce (OJC), a Florida-based importer, to transport consumer goods from the Port of Los Angeles to OJC’s California warehouse. While the contract included provisions regarding liens, attorney’s fees, and Tennessee law, payment terms were negotiated separately by email. HYC Logistics billed OJC for various services, but OJC contested the charges, claiming they were inflated, and left a substantial balance unpaid despite making a partial payment. When OJC attempted to cancel a shipment, HYC Logistics exercised its lien rights over nine shipping containers and withheld delivery pending payment.The United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee presided over the case, which involved both parties asserting multiple claims. A jury found OJC liable for breach of contract and validated HYC Logistics’ exercise of its lien, awarding damages to HYC Logistics. The jury also found HYC Logistics liable for violating the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) and for intentional or reckless misrepresentation, awarding damages to OJC on these claims. Post-trial motions resulted in the district court vacating the TCPA verdict against HYC Logistics but upholding the misrepresentation verdict. The court granted HYC Logistics attorney’s fees and denied OJC’s request for fees, and it rejected a motion for Rule 11 sanctions brought by Weiss, OJC’s owner.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the consolidated appeal. It affirmed the district court’s rulings, upholding the jury’s verdicts on breach of contract and lien rights, finding no error in the jury instructions or damages awards, and agreeing with the district court’s grant of attorney’s fees to HYC Logistics. The Sixth Circuit also affirmed the denial of prejudgment interest and Rule 11 sanctions, concluding there was no abuse of discretion or objective unreasonableness in the district court’s decisions. View "HYC Logistics, Inc. v. OJCommerce, LLC" on Justia Law