Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries
Poor Boy v. City of Winnfield
After Hurricane Laura struck Louisiana, Poor Boy Tree Service, Inc. and Mobile Help 4U, Inc. traveled to the City of Winnfield to provide cleanup and recovery services. Poor Boy communicated with City officials, including the mayor and certain employees, about performing these services, but there was no written agreement formalizing their relationship. Poor Boy later issued invoices totaling over $1 million for the work performed, but the City did not pay. Poor Boy sought payment through legal action, alleging a breach of an open account relationship under Louisiana law.The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana granted summary judgment in favor of the City. The court determined that there was a genuine dispute regarding whether the City consented to a contract with Poor Boy, but found that, under the Lawrason Act, the mayor could not bind the City to a contract without approval from the board of aldermen, which was not shown by Poor Boy. The district court also held that the parties’ arrangement did not constitute an open account relationship, relying on Fifth Circuit precedent requiring a history of prior dealings. Finally, it ruled that unjust enrichment was unavailable because Poor Boy had another legal remedy.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s holding that the mayor lacked capacity to bind the City to an oral contract without aldermen approval. However, it vacated the grant of summary judgment on Poor Boy’s open account claim, finding that the district court relied on outdated precedent and that Louisiana Supreme Court guidance allows open account actions without prior dealings. The court also vacated as premature the district court’s determination that Poor Boy could not pursue unjust enrichment, remanding both the open account and unjust enrichment issues for further proceedings. View "Poor Boy v. City of Winnfield" on Justia Law
Ford Motor Co. v. InterMotive, Inc.
Ford Global Technologies, LLC and Ford Motor Company worked with InterMotive, Inc. and its founder Gregory E. Schafer to develop an Upfitter Interface Module (UIM) for Ford vehicles. The collaboration was governed by a confidentiality agreement. InterMotive developed and shared with Ford specifications for a programmable UIM, but Ford ultimately ended the project. Some years later, Ford released its own UIM, prompting InterMotive to allege that Ford had misappropriated InterMotive’s trade secret—the use of programmable inputs in such a module.Ford sued InterMotive and Schafer in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, asserting various trademark and unfair competition claims. InterMotive counterclaimed, alleging trademark infringement, trade secret misappropriation under the Michigan Uniform Trade Secrets Act, unfair competition, breach of contract, and false advertising. Most claims survived summary judgment, and Ford’s motion to exclude InterMotive’s implied contract theory from trial was granted. At trial, the jury found for InterMotive on its trade secret, unfair competition, and trademark claims, awarding over $13 million for trade secret misappropriation and a smaller sum for unfair competition. The district court reduced the award to avoid double recovery, denied Ford’s post-trial motions, and declined to enhance damages or allow disgorgement for breach of contract.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court correctly denied Ford’s motions for judgment as a matter of law and a new trial, as there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find in InterMotive’s favor on trade secret misappropriation and damages. The court affirmed the district court’s reduction of damages to prevent duplicative recovery, its denial of enhanced damages for trademark infringement, its exclusion of disgorgement for breach of contract, and its exclusion of InterMotive’s implied contract theory for lack of notice. The district court’s rulings were affirmed in full. View "Ford Motor Co. v. InterMotive, Inc." on Justia Law
SH Nashville, LLC v. FWREF Nashville Airport, LLC
The case concerns a dispute arising from a purchase and sale agreement for a Hilton-branded hotel near the Nashville airport. The seller and purchaser agreed to a contract with a $79 million purchase price and an initial $1.75 million earnest money deposit, later increased through twenty-four amendments over fifteen months to a total of nearly $19 million. Each amendment extended deadlines and required additional nonrefundable earnest money, with the contract stipulating that, in the event of the purchaser’s default, the seller’s sole remedy would be retention of the earnest money as liquidated damages. When the purchaser failed to close by the final deadline, the seller terminated the agreement and retained the earnest money. The purchaser sued, seeking a declaratory judgment that the damages provision was an unenforceable penalty.The Chancery Court for Davidson County granted summary judgment to the seller, concluding the provision was an enforceable and reasonable prediction of actual damages. The Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed, finding the seller had not provided sufficient evidence that the liquidated damages amount was a reasonable estimate of potential damages and holding that contractual language alone was insufficient to establish enforceability.Reviewing the case, the Supreme Court of Tennessee clarified the state’s standard for liquidated damages provisions. The court held that when contracting parties expressly agree that actual damages would be difficult or impossible to ascertain and that the liquidated sum is a reasonable estimate, there is a presumption of enforceability. The party seeking to avoid enforcement must then show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the provision is actually an unenforceable penalty. The court found the purchaser had not raised a material factual dispute to overcome this presumption. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Tennessee reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "SH Nashville, LLC v. FWREF Nashville Airport, LLC" on Justia Law
Colton v. Lime Rock Resources GP V, LP
Gregg B. Colton, a mineral-interest owner, initiated a lawsuit against several Lime Rock entities, alleging that Lime Rock failed to pay statutory interest on late royalty payments, in violation of North Dakota law. He also asserted that Lime Rock breached mineral-interest leases by improperly deducting post-production costs from oil royalties. Colton sought to represent two classes of owners, and included declaratory judgment claims for each class. After the district court dismissed the declaratory judgment claims, Colton filed a second amended complaint with revised class definitions and reasserted his claims for statutory violations and breach of contract.The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota reviewed the case. It granted Lime Rock’s motion to strike the class allegations, finding that the proposed classes failed to satisfy the typicality and predominance requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(3) and (b)(3). Colton did not pursue an interlocutory appeal under Rule 23(f). Subsequently, the parties submitted a stipulation for entry of judgment, awarding Colton the full amount of damages claimed on his individual claims. The district court entered this stipulated judgment, which did not include costs or fees, and preserved Colton’s right to appeal the order striking class allegations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed Colton’s appeal regarding the stricken class allegations. The court determined that, because Colton voluntarily consented to the stipulated judgment that resolved his individual claims in full, he no longer maintained a continuing personal stake in the class allegations. As a result, the appeal was deemed moot, and the court dismissed it for lack of Article III jurisdiction. The court clarified that parties cannot confer appellate jurisdiction by agreement, and Colton’s attempt to preserve his right to appeal did not alter this outcome. View "Colton v. Lime Rock Resources GP V, LP" on Justia Law
Bennett v. VXI Global Solutions
The dispute centers on an employee, who was hired by a company operating customer service call centers, and who signed an arbitration agreement and a confidentiality agreement as part of her onboarding process. The arbitration agreement was included in a lengthy new hire packet, and the employee understood she was required to sign it to accept the job. The agreement mandated arbitration for nearly all claims between the parties, including those that could arise after employment ended and claims unrelated to employment. The confidentiality agreement included provisions restricting the employee from soliciting colleagues and granted the company the ability to seek injunctive relief for breaches without proving actual damages.After the employee left her position, she filed a class action lawsuit against the company asserting several employment-related claims. The company responded by seeking to compel arbitration based on the previously signed agreement. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the motion. It found the arbitration agreement was governed by the Federal Arbitration Act and determined it was a contract of adhesion with a low degree of procedural unconscionability. However, the court found the agreement substantively unconscionable due to its overly broad scope, unlimited duration, and lack of mutuality, following precedent such as Cook v. University of Southern California (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 312. The court also concluded the confidentiality agreement’s injunctive relief and nonsolicitation clauses were unconscionable. Ultimately, the court denied the motion to compel arbitration, finding the unconscionable terms could not be severed without rewriting the contract.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, affirmed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that the arbitration agreement, read together with the confidentiality agreement, was permeated with unconscionability that could not be cured by severance, and thus was unenforceable. View "Bennett v. VXI Global Solutions" on Justia Law
HYC Logistics, Inc. v. OJCommerce, LLC
HYC Logistics, a Tennessee-based logistics provider, entered into a contract with OJCommerce (OJC), a Florida-based importer, to transport consumer goods from the Port of Los Angeles to OJC’s California warehouse. While the contract included provisions regarding liens, attorney’s fees, and Tennessee law, payment terms were negotiated separately by email. HYC Logistics billed OJC for various services, but OJC contested the charges, claiming they were inflated, and left a substantial balance unpaid despite making a partial payment. When OJC attempted to cancel a shipment, HYC Logistics exercised its lien rights over nine shipping containers and withheld delivery pending payment.The United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee presided over the case, which involved both parties asserting multiple claims. A jury found OJC liable for breach of contract and validated HYC Logistics’ exercise of its lien, awarding damages to HYC Logistics. The jury also found HYC Logistics liable for violating the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) and for intentional or reckless misrepresentation, awarding damages to OJC on these claims. Post-trial motions resulted in the district court vacating the TCPA verdict against HYC Logistics but upholding the misrepresentation verdict. The court granted HYC Logistics attorney’s fees and denied OJC’s request for fees, and it rejected a motion for Rule 11 sanctions brought by Weiss, OJC’s owner.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the consolidated appeal. It affirmed the district court’s rulings, upholding the jury’s verdicts on breach of contract and lien rights, finding no error in the jury instructions or damages awards, and agreeing with the district court’s grant of attorney’s fees to HYC Logistics. The Sixth Circuit also affirmed the denial of prejudgment interest and Rule 11 sanctions, concluding there was no abuse of discretion or objective unreasonableness in the district court’s decisions. View "HYC Logistics, Inc. v. OJCommerce, LLC" on Justia Law
Kreitzer v. Safeco Insurance Company of America
After being rear-ended in 2018, the plaintiff claimed various injuries including concussion, neck pain, cognitive deficits, psychological issues, and TMJ dysfunction. She settled with the at-fault driver’s insurer for $45,000 but believed her damages exceeded that amount. She sought $25,000—the full underinsured motorist (UIM) policy—from her own insurer, Safeco. Safeco evaluated her claim, excluded certain medical expenses such as TMJ treatment, and initially offered $4,000, inviting further negotiation. The plaintiff rejected this and filed suit for breach of contract, enhanced damages (Hayseeds), and violations of the West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act (WVUTPA).The case originated in West Virginia state court but was removed by Safeco to the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia. During discovery, the plaintiff produced new expert reports estimating much higher damages. Safeco then offered the full UIM policy limit of $25,000, which was memorialized in a joint motion signed by both parties, explicitly resolving the claim for policy proceeds and leaving only extracontractual and bad faith claims. The district court found the contractual claim settled, denied the plaintiff’s attempt to later seek reformation for higher policy limits, and granted summary judgment to Safeco on all claims. It found Safeco’s conduct reasonable and no evidence of a pattern of unfair trade practices.Reviewing the appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment. The court held the breach of contract claim was resolved for $25,000 based on undisputed settlement evidence, rejected the plaintiff’s reformation argument, found Safeco’s conduct did not necessitate litigation for Hayseeds damages, and concluded there was no evidence of a general business practice violating WVUTPA. The judgment and orders of the district court were affirmed. View "Kreitzer v. Safeco Insurance Company of America" on Justia Law
Cemen Tech, Inc. v. G.W. Van Keppel Co.
Cemen Tech manufactures concrete production equipment and entered into a Reseller Agreement with G.W. Van Keppel Company in 2016, authorizing Van Keppel to sell and service its products. The agreement included a publicity provision prohibiting either party from making public statements about the other or the agreement without prior consent. In late 2025, Cemen Tech alleged Van Keppel breached contractual obligations and signaled intent to terminate if not remedied. Van Keppel denied the breach, but Cemen Tech formally terminated the agreement in early 2026. Shortly after, Van Keppel sent a message to its customers and employees explaining the termination and defending its performance, which Cemen Tech viewed as a violation of the publicity provision.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa reviewed the matter after Cemen Tech sought a preliminary injunction to prevent Van Keppel from making further public statements about Cemen Tech or the agreement without its approval. The court held a hearing and considered evidence presented by both parties. It granted the injunction, finding Van Keppel’s communication posed a risk of irreparable harm to Cemen Tech’s reputation, goodwill, and customer relationships, and enjoined Van Keppel from making public statements about Cemen Tech or the agreement without Cemen Tech’s consent.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion, examining factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. Van Keppel challenged the sufficiency of Cemen Tech’s showing of irreparable harm and the breadth of the injunction. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding a risk of irreparable harm or in issuing the injunction. Because Van Keppel did not properly raise the overbreadth argument below, it was not considered on appeal. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. View "Cemen Tech, Inc. v. G.W. Van Keppel Co." on Justia Law
Stewart v. Plains Commerce Bank
Two cousins established a custom T-shirt company in 2012, entering into agreements governing equal ownership and joint authorization of disbursements. One founder took medical leave in 2017, allegedly delegating management duties and compensation to the other. During his absence, he claims he was denied access to company financial records and excluded from payment decisions, contrary to the agreements. The business declined, and in 2023, the founder sold his share for $550,000, releasing all related claims. He later discovered purportedly suspicious financial payments and asserts he would not have agreed to the buyout had he known about them. The company was acquired and dissolved in 2024. The founder then brought federal RICO and state law claims, individually and on behalf of the company, against various related parties, alleging financial misconduct.The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota dismissed the action without prejudice, denied leave to amend the complaint as futile, and awarded attorney fees to two defendants based on an indemnification provision in the buyout agreement. The court found the plaintiff lacked capacity to bring derivative claims because he was no longer a company member, and that his individual claims failed because his injuries were not distinct from those suffered by all shareholders. The plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration was also denied.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s rulings, holding that the plaintiff lacked legal capacity to bring derivative RICO claims and failed to allege a distinct individual injury sufficient for direct RICO claims. The denial of leave to amend was upheld because the proposed amendments would not cure these deficiencies. The court also concluded it had jurisdiction to review the attorney fees award and affirmed that award, finding no reversible error in the district court’s application of the indemnification provision. View "Stewart v. Plains Commerce Bank" on Justia Law
Lamson v. Goode
The case arises from a series of contractual and property disputes among three parties in Vermont. In 2015, one party sold land to another, then was hired to construct a pond on a separate property owned by the buyer. The pond builder subcontracted a third party to clear-cut land for the pond and also hired this subcontractor to cut timber on his own property. Disagreements ensued regarding payment, completion of work, and use of equipment, resulting in a lawsuit in 2017. The plaintiff alleged breach of contract and violations under Vermont’s Prompt Pay Act against the buyer, as well as conversion and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Claims against the subcontractor included breach of contract and conversion. Both defendants counterclaimed, including allegations of consumer protection violations, assault, and extortion.The Vermont Superior Court, Windsor Unit, Civil Division, conducted a jury trial on most claims. The plaintiff was awarded $7,500 for breach of contract against the buyer, plus interest. The buyer received $5,000 for assault, and the subcontractor was awarded $15,100 on his civil extortion claim. Both the plaintiff and buyer requested attorney’s fees under the Prompt Pay Act, each arguing they were the substantially prevailing party. The court denied both motions, finding neither party substantially prevailed in the construction dispute. The court also allowed the subcontractor’s civil extortion claim to proceed.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decisions. It held that the determination of a substantially prevailing party under the Prompt Pay Act is within the trial court’s discretion and confirmed that neither party substantially prevailed. The Supreme Court also upheld the recognition of a civil claim for restitution based on economic duress, consistent with Vermont precedent, and affirmed the damages awarded for extortion. The judgment was affirmed in all respects. View "Lamson v. Goode" on Justia Law