Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

After the dissolution of their marriage, Jane and Kenton Girard became involved in prolonged legal proceedings regarding custody of their two minor children. Following Kenton's remarriage to Marissa Girard, the Illinois state court added Marissa as a party to the postjudgment custody dispute in 2023. The situation grew more complicated when Kenton filed a cross-claim against Marissa over a postnuptial agreement, which he argued did not obligate him to indemnify her for legal expenses or lost earnings related to the custody litigation. Marissa responded by removing the entire case to federal court, asserting the existence of a federal question.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois reviewed the removal and determined that the case did not present a federal question. The court found that the dispute revolved around state-law issues of contract and domestic relations, and therefore remanded the case to state court for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Marissa appealed this remand order to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. However, the Seventh Circuit dismissed her appeal, noting that remand orders are generally not appealable unless the case was removed under specific statutory provisions, which did not apply here.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit then addressed a motion for sanctions under Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, filed by Jane Girard. The court held that Marissa’s appeal was frivolous, both because removal to federal court was unwarranted and because the remand order was not appealable. The court awarded Jane damages in the amount of $2,808.75 for fees and costs incurred in defending the appeal. View "Girard v. Girard" on Justia Law

The case concerns an automobile accident in Prince George’s County, Maryland, involving George Bowens and a driver named Lisa Daniels, who was at fault. Bowens sustained injuries and held a $50,000 underinsured motorist (UIM) policy with State Farm. Daniels’ insurance had a $30,000 liability limit, which was offered to Bowens as a settlement for his injuries. Following established statutory procedures, Bowens notified State Farm of this offer, State Farm consented and waived subrogation rights, and Bowens accepted the $30,000. Bowens then sought to recover the remaining $20,000 available under his UIM policy from State Farm, which denied the claim.Bowens filed a breach of contract action in the District Court for Prince George’s County, seeking $20,000. State Farm moved to dismiss, arguing that the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Bowens would have to prove total damages of $50,000—exceeding the court’s $30,000 jurisdictional cap. The District Court agreed and dismissed the case. Bowens appealed to the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, which affirmed the dismissal, reasoning that the District Court would need to find damages over $30,000 and thus could not grant relief.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and held that the District Court’s jurisdiction is determined by the amount the plaintiff seeks from the defendant in the pending action, not by the total underlying damages or prior settlements received from the tortfeasor’s insurer. Since Bowens’ claim against State Farm was for $20,000, the District Court had jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Maryland reversed the judgment of the circuit court and ordered the case remanded to the District Court for further proceedings. View "Bowens v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins." on Justia Law

A consumer purchased a used vehicle from a dealership, with the transaction documented in two contracts: a purchase order and a retail installment sale contract (RISC). The purchase order included an arbitration provision for disputes arising from the purchase or financing of the vehicle, while the RISC detailed the financing terms but did not include an arbitration clause. The RISC contained an assignment clause by which the dealership assigned its interest in "this contract" (the RISC) to a third-party lender, and defined the agreement between the buyer and the assignee as consisting "only" of the RISC and any addenda. The consumer later filed a class action against the lender, alleging improper fees under Maryland law.The Circuit Court for Baltimore City found for the lender, ruling that the purchase order and RISC should be read together as one contract for the purposes of the transaction, and that the arbitration agreement was enforceable against the consumer. The court granted the lender’s motion to compel arbitration. On appeal, the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed, holding that the consumer was bound by the arbitration provision and that the assignee lender could enforce it, even though the consumer did not receive or sign a separate arbitration agreement.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case, focusing on contract interpretation and the scope of the assignment. The court held that, even if the purchase order’s arbitration provision was binding between the consumer and the dealer, it was not within the scope of the assignment to the lender. The RISC’s assignment language made clear that only the RISC and its addenda, not the purchase order or its arbitration clause, were assigned to the lender. As a result, the Supreme Court of Maryland reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Lyles v. Santander Consumer USA" on Justia Law

Bridgelink Engineering LLC, managed by two individuals, entered into a loan agreement with two banks in August 2021. The loans, totaling $34 million, were initially guaranteed by several LLCs also managed by the same individuals. A few months later, the individuals personally guaranteed Bridgelink’s loan obligations, with a guaranty agreement containing an early-release clause. This clause allowed the individuals to be released from liability if specific conditions were met, including the borrower’s loan being in good standing and compliance with financial covenants for two consecutive quarters. After a default in July 2022, the banks and Bridgelink amended the agreement, but Bridgelink later failed to meet the conditions for waiver of default and remained in default into 2023. Neither Bridgelink nor its guarantors made payments on the loans.The banks sued Bridgelink, the individuals, and the LLCs for breach of contract in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, asserting diversity jurisdiction. The individuals argued they had satisfied the guaranty’s early release conditions, and later challenged the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, contending that one of the banks was a Texas citizen, which would destroy diversity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed both the jurisdictional challenge and the merits. The appellate court held that complete diversity existed as the banks and all defendants were citizens of different states, confirming the district court’s jurisdiction. The court further held that the individuals had not satisfied the conditions for early release from their guaranty obligations because the borrower’s loan was in default and the required confirmations of compliance were not provided for two consecutive quarters. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s summary judgment holding the individuals liable as guarantors for the loans. View "Cadence Bank v. Johnson" on Justia Law

After a car accident in Prince George’s County, Maryland, George Bowens, who was injured by the clear negligence of another driver, sought to recover compensation for his injuries. The at-fault driver had $30,000 in liability insurance, which was offered to Bowens in settlement. Bowens, however, had a $50,000 underinsured motorist (UIM) policy with his own insurer, State Farm. After accepting the $30,000 from the at-fault driver’s insurer (with State Farm’s consent and waiver of subrogation rights), Bowens sought the remaining $20,000 from State Farm under his UIM policy, claiming breach of contract when State Farm denied the claim.Bowens filed his action in the District Court of Maryland, which has jurisdiction over contract claims not exceeding $30,000. State Farm moved to dismiss, arguing that to recover the $20,000, Bowens would have to prove total damages of $50,000—an amount above the District Court’s jurisdictional cap. The District Court granted the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County affirmed, reasoning that the court would need to find Bowens’ damages exceeded $30,000, thus exceeding the District Court's authority.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts. It held that, for purposes of determining the District Court’s jurisdiction under § 4-401(1) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, the relevant amount is the “debt or damages claimed” in the pleadings—that is, the net recovery sought from the defendant in the action—not the plaintiff’s total damages. Because Bowens sought only $20,000 from State Farm, the District Court had jurisdiction to hear the case. The Supreme Court of Maryland remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Bowens v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The case involves a Florida-based title insurer that suffered significant financial setbacks, prompting a series of business restructurings and asset transfers. In 2009, the company entered a joint venture with another title insurance group, forming a new entity to handle certain business functions. Over subsequent years, the original company retained substantial assets and continued operations, but further financial decline led to a 2015 agreement in which it transferred assets and liabilities to its business partner, in exchange for the assumption of its policy liabilities. The Florida insurance regulator scrutinized and ultimately approved the transaction after requiring additional commitments from the acquiring party.The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida later oversaw the company’s Chapter 11 proceedings. The appointed Creditor Trustee brought an adversary proceeding against the acquiring parties and related entities, alleging that the asset transfer constituted a fraudulent transfer under federal bankruptcy law and Florida statutes, and sought to impose successor liability and alter ego claims. The bankruptcy court held a bench trial, excluding portions of the Trustee’s expert valuation as unreliable, and found that the company had received reasonably equivalent value in the transaction. The court also rejected the successor liability and alter ego theories, finding insufficient evidence of continuity of ownership, improper purpose, or harm to creditors.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida affirmed the bankruptcy court’s rulings. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the record and affirmed the district court’s order. The Eleventh Circuit held that the bankruptcy court did not err in excluding the Trustee’s expert, that the asset transfer was for reasonably equivalent value and not fraudulent, and that the successor liability and alter ego claims failed for lack of evidence and legal sufficiency. View "Stermer v. Old Republic National Title Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC), an American technology services provider, licensed two insurance software platforms, Vantage and CyberLife, to Transamerica, an insurance company. Tata Consultancy Services (TCS), a technology consulting firm, was later engaged by Transamerica as a third-party consultant to maintain CSC’s platforms. CSC and Transamerica signed a Third-Party Addendum allowing TCS access to CSC’s software “solely for the benefit” of Transamerica. During this period, TCS sought to develop its own insurance platform, BaNCS, and won a $2.6 billion contract to transition Transamerica’s business to BaNCS. Evidence arose that TCS used CSC’s confidential information, including source code and technical manuals, for its BaNCS development, prompting CSC to allege trade secret misappropriation when a CSC employee discovered TCS sharing proprietary materials internally.CSC sued TCS in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas under the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA). After an eight-day trial with an advisory jury, the jury found in favor of CSC, recommending substantial damages. The district court found TCS liable, awarding CSC $56 million in compensatory damages (based on unjust enrichment), $112 million in exemplary damages, and imposing a permanent injunction barring TCS’s use of CSC’s trade secrets and BaNCS versions developed with misappropriated material.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s findings that TCS’s use was unauthorized under the relevant contracts and that TCS had the requisite mens rea, including willful and malicious misappropriation. The Fifth Circuit also affirmed the damages awards and the exemplary damages ratio. However, the court vacated the injunction in part, remanding for the district court to revise it: the injunction’s prohibition on TCS’s future use of BaNCS material developed post-misappropriation was found duplicative of the damages, and the definition of parties bound by the injunction was ordered to be clarified in line with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2). View "Computer Sciences v. Tata Consultancy" on Justia Law

A dispute arose between a manufacturer of construction equipment and its distributor over a 2012 distribution agreement. The distributor alleged that the manufacturer breached the agreement by selling covered equipment directly to third parties, bypassing the distributor. The manufacturer, in turn, counterclaimed that the distributor failed to pay amounts due under a 2016 rental agreement and for various purchases made between 2016 and 2017. Both parties sought damages and prejudgment interest related to their respective claims and counterclaims.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, after the completion of discovery, granted summary judgment for the distributor on liability for its breach-of-contract claim, leaving damages to be determined by a jury. The court also granted summary judgment for the manufacturer as to both liability and damages on its breach-of-contract counterclaim. A jury awarded the distributor substantial damages for the manufacturer’s breach. The district court denied the manufacturer’s post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial or remittitur, and later awarded prejudgment interest to the distributor, despite the manufacturer’s objection that the request was untimely under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e).On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed whether the distributor’s motion for prejudgment interest was timely. The court held that the initial judgment entered by the district court was not sufficiently final, as it omitted reference to the manufacturer’s successful counterclaim and the award of prejudgment interest. As a result, the 28-day deadline for a Rule 59(e) motion was not triggered until a later, comprehensive, final judgment was entered. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s award of prejudgment interest to the distributor. View "Alessi Equip., Inc. v. Am. Piledriving Equip., Inc." on Justia Law

An incarcerated individual at Corcoran State Prison hired an attorney to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus, both in state and potentially federal court, for a total fee of $35,000. The attorney did not file the petition as agreed, leading the client to sue for breach of contract. Throughout the proceedings, the plaintiff notified the Superior Court of Orange County multiple times that he was incarcerated, requested remote appearances, and actively participated by filing necessary court documents, including a case management statement and fee waiver application. Despite these efforts, the plaintiff failed to appear for the scheduled trial, and the attorney attended and testified that the plaintiff was incarcerated.After the plaintiff's failure to appear at trial, the Superior Court of Orange County dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, stating it was unaware of the plaintiff’s incarceration until the day of trial. The plaintiff appealed this dismissal, arguing that the court should have recognized his incarceration and taken additional steps before terminating the case.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the dismissal. The appellate court found that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing the lawsuit without first issuing an order to show cause or ensuring that the plaintiff had meaningful access to the court. The court emphasized that incarcerated, indigent litigants must be afforded meaningful access to civil courts, and that dismissal is a drastic remedy reserved for rare circumstances. The appellate court reversed the judgment of dismissal and remanded the case, instructing the trial court to provide the plaintiff with meaningful access to the court and to communicate with prison officials as necessary. The plaintiff may recover costs on appeal, subject to further determination by the trial court. View "Park v. Guisti" on Justia Law

A 2018 data breach at Barracuda Networks exposed protected health information of patients of Zoll Services LLC, a subsidiary of Zoll Medical Corporation. Zoll had contracted with Fusion LLC for data security services, and Fusion in turn relied on Barracuda’s technology. The agreements between these companies included certain liability and indemnification provisions, as well as a right for Barracuda to audit Fusion’s customer contracts. After the breach, Zoll settled a class action brought by its customers whose data was compromised.Following these events, Zoll initiated arbitration against Fusion and filed suit against Barracuda in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Fusion intervened and asserted additional claims against Barracuda. The district court dismissed most claims but allowed Zoll’s equitable indemnification claim and Fusion’s breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims to proceed. After arbitration and settlements, Axis Insurance Company, as assignee and subrogee of Zoll and Fusion, was substituted as plaintiff. Barracuda moved for summary judgment on the remaining claims, which the district court granted.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment rulings de novo. The appellate court held that Axis failed to present evidence of a relationship between Zoll and Barracuda that would support derivative or vicarious liability necessary for equitable indemnification under Massachusetts law. The court found that Fusion did not meet a condition precedent in its contract with Barracuda, and Barracuda had not waived or was estopped from asserting that condition. Further, Axis could not show that Barracuda breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, as no relevant contractual right existed. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Barracuda on all claims. View "Axis Insurance Company v. Barracuda Networks, Inc." on Justia Law